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FOREWORD
The study entitled "Space Transfer Concepts and Analyses for Exploration Missions
(STCAEM)" was performed by Boeing Defense and Space Group, Huntsville, Alabama, for
the George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). The activities reported herein were
carried out under Technical Directives 16, and 17 during the period January through
August 1993. The Boeing program manager was Gordon Woodcock and the MSFC
Contracting OffieePs Technical Representative was Alan Adams. The deputy program
manager at Boeing was Dr. Irwin Vas. The task activities for the studies carried out
under these Technical Directives were performed by M. Appleby, P. Buddington,
M. Cupples, B. Donahue, and R. Fowler.
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ABSTRACT
Earlier studies carried out under this contract covered a wide range of lunar and Mars
transportation options, and lunar rove concepts and technology needs. The current
report discusses the activities conducted under Technical Directives 16 and 17. Mars
transportation was addressed as well as a review and update of architectures and
propulsion systems.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 STUDY SCOPE
The Space Transfer Concepts and Analyses for Exploration Missions (STCAEM) study
addresses in-space transportation systems for human exploration missions to the Moon
and Mars. The subject matter includes orbit-to-orbit transfer vehicles, planetary
landing/ascent vehicles, and the crew modules needed to form complete crew and cargo
transportation systems. Also included are orbital assembly and operations facilities if
these are needed for assembly, construction, recovery, storage in orbit, or processing in-
space transportation systems for reuse. All propulsion and systems technologies that
can be technically evaluated are open for consideration. Excluded from the study are
Earth-to-orbit systems. Crew entry vehicles intended for direct Earth atmosphere entry
from a lunar or planetary return trajectory are included. Capabilities of, and constraints
on, Earth-to-orbit systems and their operations are parametrically considered as a
boundary condition on in-space transportation systems.
1.2 REPORT SCOPE
This report represents Phase 4 of the STCAEM study. Phase 1 covered a wide range
of lunar and Mars transportation options, and lunar rover concepts and technology needs.
Phase 2 concentrated on Mars transportation using nuclear thermal propulsion. Phase 3
concluded certain trade studies on Mars transportation that were begun during Phase 2;
most of Phase 3 was devoted to analysis of a lunar surface habitation system, the "First
Lunar Outpost". Phase 4, conducted under Technical Directives 16 and 17, returned to
the subject of Mars transportation with a review and update of architectures and
propulsion systems. The Statements of Work for these technical directives included the
following major tasks:
a. Task 1: Architecture Assessment- Assess impacts of evolution to Mars crew
rotation and resupply, in-situ propellant production, and alternate mission modes
b. Task 2: Lunar Synergism- Assess the Mars transportation system synergism with
the lunar program including commonality and evolution.
e. Task 3: Advanced Transportation Systems Update- Provide and update to NTP,
NEP, Cryo-Aerobraking, and Mars lander concepts.
d. Task 4: Technology Assessment- Provide assessment of the technology require-
ments for Mars transportation system - timing, priorities and program plan outlines.
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1.3 REPORT ORGANIZATION
This report is organized in three volumes. The present volume covers architecture
assessment, lunar syncretism, and technology assessment. In addition, new results on
electric propulsion mission profile analysis are included. Review of electric propulsion
systems architecture indicated that not enough significant new work had been done to
merit a separate volume on eleetrie propulsion.
The second volume is a re-issue of the Nuclear Thermal Propulsion Implementation
Plan and Element Description Document: the STCAEM contract requires one of these
documents be reissued whenever enough new data are available to make the prior issue
obsolete. Similarly, the third volume is a re-issue that covers aerobraking and Mars
Isnders.
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2.0 ARCHITECTURE ASSESSMENT
The architecture assessment task covered certain specific issues addressed under
section 2.4 below, but also addressed "understanding the implications of various mission
architectures, transportation vehicle selections, mission-enhancing technologies, and
mission modes", and provided our "analysis of the 'big picture' aspects of Mars missions'*.
(Quotes from the Statement of Work)
2.1 MARS ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
NASA planning for human exploration missions to the Moon and Mars was resumed in
NASA following publication of the Report of the President's Commission on Space,
Pioneering the Space Frontier (the "Paine Commission Report") in 1986. This began with
a study by NASA and the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Manned Mars Missions, which
researched and updated earlier literature on the subject. The NASA-Los Alamos study
actually took place during the Commission deliberations and the detailed report was
released in June of 1986, a month after the Commission report.
More than a decade earlier, numerous studies of human planetary missions were
conducted by NASA. These studies, from about 1963 to about 1973, investigated many
mission profiles including Venus and Mars flyby missions and Mars landing, and
concentrated on a Mars landing mission using nuclear thermal propulsion on an opposition
mission profile. The stay time at Mars was typically described as 30 days; the missions
tended to be what today would be called "flags and footprints", although a few studies
included permanent bases. (Note that one 30-day stay on Mars would be nearly three
times the total Apollo stay time on the Moon.) Various landing dates from 1975 to 2000
were considered.
In the mid-1960s U. S. space planners anticipated that successful conclusion of the
Apollo lunar landing program would lead to establishment of modest lunar bases, or an
early manned Mars landing mission or both. By about 1970 it became clear that national
funding for a Mars mission would not be forthcoming in the foreseeable future, and that
any extension of Apollo missions to the Moon would be confined to use of modified
Apollo systems. The nation was considering deeisions which would lead to the Space
Shuttle program. The rationale being developed for the shuttle focused on "economic
space transportation for practical applications". Support for continued study of Mars
missions withered and the last ongoing studies were completed by 1973. The U. S.
entered a period of more than a decade of no funding of any consequence for exploration
mission studies.
[n 1968, a concept for collecting solar power in space and transmitting it to Earth
was published. A modest NASA-funded study of solar power satellites took place in
1972-73. In 1974, Gerard O'Neill published the results of a student design project on
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space colonies in Physics Today. By early 1975, these ideas had merged to the extent
that a conference was held at Prineeton University|the mission of space eolonies would
be to build solar power sateUitas,for energy supply to Earth, using lunar materials.
These ideas gained a certain popularity. Societies of spaee enthusiasts formed to
promote the eolonization of space. In 1984, when the Paine Commission held public
hearings on the U. S. space program, space enthusiasts testified in large numbers,
advocating a more aggressive space program ineluding colonization. Dr. Paine himself
was a long-time enthusiast for the exploration and eventual settlement of Mars. The
Paine Commission Report called for an aggressive U. S. spaee program emphasizing
exploration and technology advaneement.
In response, NASA initiated new systems studies and planning activities for
exploration missions.
2.1.1 "Cue Studies"
The study effort began with a series of "ease studies",each intended to develop a
particular mission profileand concept or answer a speeifie set of questions. Two mission
profiledesign innovations occurred early inthe effort: a "split-sprint"Mars mission and
two kinds of cycler (multiple-encounter) Earth-Mars trajeetories.
The splitsprint was as an answer to the challenge of performing a round-trip Mars
mission in one year. The opposition profilesof the earlierstudies normally required at
least 15 months. The splitsprintprofileentailsseparate early delivery of the propellant
for return to Earth from Mars, on a low-energy trajeetory, and parking the propellant
tanker in Mars orbit where it isused to refuel the erew mission upon Mars arrival. This
means that the crew mission does not carry its return propellant on its high-energy
trajectory to Mars. The advantage in initialmass in Earth orbit (IMLEO) ean be greater
than 2:1 for high energy, "fast"profiles.
Cyeler trajectorieswere devised to satisfythe idea of placing an Earth-Mars-Earth
transfer habitat system into a repeating transfer orbit so that it could be used on
successive missions without further propulsion. Small "taxi" vehieles would be used on
Earth and Mars encounters to transfer crews. Mars cargoes would be separately
delivered on one-way trajectories.
A major issue addressed by the ease studies was whether or not the firsthuman Mars
mission eould be reduced in cost by visiting one of Mars' moons, Phobos, instead of
landing. In addition, the potential benefit of extraetion of propellant from Phobos, for
the return trip,was considered.
Phobos' orbit about Mars is inefficientfrom a flightmeehanies point of view. For
this reason, while significantsavings compared to landing were found for a mission to
Phobos, the mission was stilla major interplanetary expedition without the excitement
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of landing on the planet itself. Further, the benefits of extracting propellant from
Phobos were largely negated by the added performance required, and dependenee on
Phobos-derived propellant on a firstmission was seen as a major risk. Consequently, the
idea of a firstmission to Phobos was abandoned.
Continuing "case studies" focused on Mars landing missions, using cryogenic
propulsion for Earth and Mars departure and aerobraking for Mars and Earth capture.
Trajectories were optimized, and vehicle concepts developed, for several opportunities
2.1.2 90-Day Study
The "90-Day Study" of exploration missions followed from a speech by President
Bush on July 20, 1969, establishingthe Space Exploration Initiative(SEI) as NASA's next
major human space mission after Space Station Freedom. This activity also marked the
beginning of current Boeing involvement in exploration studies by way of the present
study. Boeing supported the 90-Day Study by analyzing mission profiles,developing Mars
transportation systems concepts, and performing systems trades.
The "90-Day Study" baseline scenario established a permanent base for 4 people on
the Moon and had a seriesof missions to Mars beginning in 2015 with a Mars mission for
4 to 6 people every Mars opportunity. The space transportation concepts were
"conventional", employing cryogenic propulsion and aerobraking. Figure 2-1 illustrates
the STCAEM concept for a cryogeniclaerobraking vehicle developed during the "90 Day
Study". Lunar missions were of course aerobraked only on Earth return. Mars missions
used aerobraking for Mars and Earth arrival. Several Earth launch vehicle options were
portrayed, generally based on the proposed National Launch System (NLS) or derivatives
thereof. The overall program, and the projected costs, tended to be driven by space
transportation. While lifecycle cost estimates were not published in the report, the
resultswere common knowledge, and the total lifecycle figure was reported to be about
$500 billionin 1990 dollars. While this isa large sum, the "90-Day Study" program was
not derived through cost trades; itwas an ambitious program; and itstretched over about
35 years. The "90-Day Study" report also included variations on the baseline seenario,
some of which reduced the lifecycle cost by scaling baek the mission activities.
Cryogenic propulsion with aerobraking was baselined for the "90-Day Study" because
itwas perceived as having minimum technology riskand significantpayoff. Several prior
studies had indicated high payoff for aerobraking and reuse of upper stages for
geosynchronous orbit and lunar missions. The earlier "ease studies" had emphasized
aerobraking and shown that Mars mission trajectoriescan be tailored to use an aerobrake
to the limit of its capabilities,reducing the performance demand placed on the
propulsion system. At the time of the "90-Day Study", the proposed Aeroassist Flight
Experiment was in development and was expected to demonstrate a low L/D large-area
aerobrake with a flightin 1994.
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MEV
MTV
TMIS
MTV total 163.7 t
MEV total 84 8 t
ECCV 70 t
Interstage Structure OS t
TMI stage total 545.5 t
IMLEO 801 0 t ac¢,127
Figure 2-1. CryogeniclAerobraking Mars Mission Vehicle Ready for Launch from Earth Orbit
Only briefly mentioned in the "90-Day Study" final report, significant effort was
also invested in conceptual definition of nuclear thermal and nuclear electric Mars
transfer propulsion options. Somewhat lesser effort was spent on nuclear gas-core and
solar electric concepts. Sit_nificant new technical work was accomplished on high-thrust
and low-thrust Mars round trip trajectories and mission profile designs. Much of this
work was performed by Boeing on the STCAEM contract supporting MSFC.
The "90-Day Study" was intended to collect the extant knowledge of how to conduct
lunar and Mars exploration missions and to organize the information into a plausible and
technically feasible overall program. While the "90-Day Study" has received
considerable criticism, it accomplished its intended purpose quite successfully.
2.1.3 STCAEM Trades
At the completion of the "90-Day Study" technical effort, the Boeing STCAEM study
returned to its primary objective of comprehensive tradeoff of Mars mission
transportation analyses and trades. This activity had three main differences from the
"90-Day Study" technical effort:
a. Three greatly different (range 10:1 people and cargo) levels of exploration activity
were represented in mission scenarios in order to ascertain the sensitivity of results
to overall scale of activity. A theme was established for each level:
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Co
1. Minimum satisfaction of SEI objectives as stated by President Bush,
2. Full menu of seience, and
3. lunar industrialization and Mars settlement;
Technology advancement and evolution of mission activities were represented in
each scenario; and
Tradeoffs emphasized life eycle cost and return on investment analyses rather than
seeking minimum-mass solutions.
Seven Mars transportation architectures, summarized in figure 2-2, were played
against the three scenarios,includingdevelopment of lifecycle transportation manifests.
These architectures included the four main propulsion technologies, representation of
in-situpropellants in the L2-based and direet modes, and representation of cycler orbits.
(As described below, the STCAEM concept of "Mars direct" differed from the one later
introduced by Zubrin and Baker.) Detailed performance and system mass calculations
were made and configurationsdefined using computer-aided design tools.
Archttecture
Cryogemc/aerobrak rag;
all-propulswe option
Features
Dtrect cryogemc/
aerobrakmg
Cryogenic chemical propulsion and
aerobrakmg at Mars and Earth. LEO-based
operattons
Rattonal@
NASA 90-day study baseline; lower
development cost
Combined MTV/MEV refuels at Mars and LEO
"Fast" conjunction profiles
NEP Nuclear-electric propulston for Mars transfer; H_gh performance of nuclear electrtc
optionally for lunar cargo, propulsion
SEP Solar electrtc propulsion for Mars transfer; High effic=ency of solar electriC propulsion;
opt=onally for lunar cargo, find cost crossover for array costs
NTR (nuclear rocket) Nuclear rocket propulsion for Lunar and Mars Htgh Isp of nuclear rocket enables avoidance
transfer_ ofhtgh-energy aerocapture at Mars
L2 Based cryogemc/ L2-based operations; use of lunar oxygen L2 base gets out of LEO debris environment
aerobrakmg Lunar oxygen reduces resupply by _factor 2
Ehmmates Mars orbit operations
Cycler orbtts Cycler orbit stattons a la 1986 Space
Comm=ss=on report
Ehmmates boosting massive Mars transfer
vehicle
Figure 2-2. Seven Mars Transportation Architectures Investigated During STCAEM Trades
Summary of Results of STCAEM Trades - The trade studies compared transportation
architectures on mass, triptime, reusability,and finallylifecycle cost and internal rate
of return, based on comparing lifecycle costs streams for the alternatives. Figure 2-3
shows a representative mass versus trip time comparison of the transportation options
for opposition mission profiles. The uncertainty band represents the range of
performance requirements from "easy" to "hard" Mars opportunities; the comparison
shown does not include Venus swingbys (see Section 2.3.3 below for discussion of mission
profilesand their characteristics). Figure 2-4 presents a comparison of transportation
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Figure 2-4. Architectures Comparison Summary
options in terms of "resupply" mass and reusability for opposition and conjunction
profiles. In this ease, Venus swingbys are used for the opposition profiles except for
"easy" years where they offer little advantai_e. "Resupply" mass is the launch
requirement (to low Earth orbit) needed to aeeomplish a typiesl mission; it takes credit
for reuse of hardware on missions subsequent to the first one, which the usual "IMLEO"
(initial mass in Earth orbit) comparison does not.
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Trade Conelusions - The STCAEM trades progressed from these assessments to life
cycle cost analyses and comparisons, including the internal rate of return (where
applieable) for investment in a more advanced teehnology or system leading to lower
cost later on. As mentioned above, transportation arehitectures were evaluated in total
program scenarios over a wide range of activity levels. The conelusions presented below
were primarily derived from the resultsof these cost and investment/return analyses.
Before discussing conelusions (most of which are stillvalid),one very important
viewpoint shift between then and now needs to be pointed out. During the case studies,
the "90-Day Study", and the Synthesis activities,widespread coneern existed regarding
the long duration of Mars missions and the riskinherent therein. This was evident in the
one-year splitsprint mission mentioned above and in the emphasis on fast opposition
profilesin general. Since about the middle of 1992, the idea of using the Mars base itself
as a safe haven has altered this view to the extent that the very firsthuman mission to
Mars is now posited as a conjunction type with surface stay of over 500 days. The
signifieanceof this isthat electric propulsion systems are at a severe disadvantage under
a requirement for fast trips. The conclusions reaehed by STCAEM in early 1991 change
iffast opposition tripsare not a requirement.
The STCAEM trade studies of 1990-91 reached many conclusions. Only those
particularlyrelevant to the current Mars architecture assessment are summarized here;
quotes are from the March 1991 Exeeutive Summary Report:
Propulsion - "For a minimum Mars program, consisting of perhaps a half-dozen
landings of a few days' stay eaeh ...eryogenic all-propulsiveminimum-energy missions ...
are very attractive." A Mars-orbit-based eonjunetion profile with short surface sorties
was presumed. The conelusion may also apply to a minimum program using a surface-
based conjunction profile.
"The performanee potential of a nuclear thermal roeket leads to less initialmass
than cryogeniclaerobraking for most mission profiles.... Return on investment tradeoff
...at the median activity level favored the nuclear rocket....The nuclear thermal roeket
is indicated as the most economic and flexible Mars transfer propulsion system over a
wide range of program activity levels."
The nuclear rocket concept presented in the report isshown in figure2-5.
"While fast trips [referring to fast opposition trips a year or less duration] are
teehnieally interesting, they are probably not affordable in a spaee program with
constrained funding."
"The inherently high reusability and low resupply mass of electrie [propulsion]
systems offers life-cycle cost advantages at high activity levels. Development cost for
NEP and array production cost for SEP are major issues....SEP beeomes very attraetive
at $10O/watt, showing about 1096 return on investment versus NTR at the median
activitylevel."
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Figure 2-5. Nuclear Thermal Rocket Concept from STCAEM Phase 1
The L2-based, lunar oxygen architecture was found to have a poor return on
investment in the oxygen production facilities. Subsequent study has indicated this
conclusion to be sensitive to assumptions and implementation details; lunar resources
concepts merit further investigation.
An extensive habitat tradeoff selected 7.6 meters diameter as preferred over 4.4
meters (space station diameter) and 10 meters.
Orbital Operations and Assembly - "Reviews and analyses of orbital assembly
operations did not identify major problems."
"Benefits of very large launch vehicles appear not worth the cost."
It is important to note that when the STCAEM study began, the prevailing image of
on-orbit assembly involved a very large and complex assembly facility that surrounded
the entire Mars vehicle, and appeared to pose more of an assembly problem than the
Mars vehicle itself. Concepts developed by STCAEM steadily evolved in the direction of
lesser assembly facilities and reached a point by 1992 wherein the assembly "facility"
consisted of a robotic device launched with the first section of the vehicle, as shown
below in figure 2-6.
The issue of launch vehicle for SEl-type programs continues to evolve. Section 1.3
of Volume 2 of the current Phase 4 report presents a discussion of this.
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Figure 2-6. Assembly Device for Assembly of Nuclear Rocket Mars Vehicle (SI"CAEM Phase 2)
General Cost - The STCAEM trades posited a minimum program with mueh less life
eyele cost than (roughly 1/3 o£) the "90-Day Study". [t of course included fewer and less
ambitious missions. The STC&EM scenarios were inherently evolutionary in use of
technology and mission eharaeteristies. Lunar industrialization and Mars settlement
were recognized as at least possible scenarios. Better det'inition of program purposes
and functions were recognized as urgently needed.
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"Before ultimate selection among these architectures can be made, better definition
is needed as to the nature and activity level of the lunar and Mars exploration and
development programs ..."
2.1.4 Outreach and Synthesis
"Sticker shock" reaction to the high estimated cost of the "90-Day Study" scenarios
led to a call for innovation. We would have a national outreach for new ideas (we
actually had two), and find "faster, better, cheaper" ways to send humans to the Moon
and Mars. The outreaches did not discover very much that was genuinely new. This isn't
surprising since space visionaries and planners have been thinking about Mars for over a
generation, and communication in the community is quite open. The "Synthesis" report,
America at the Threshold, gave little recognizance to the few innovations that were
found. The Synthesis nuclear thermal propulsion baseline for Mars was very similar to
the Mars missions recommended by the Agnew Commission of 1968, except for certain
new technology items somewhat incidental to the main issues of transportation and
habitation. Even the launch concept was a throwback to Saturn V technology. Life cycle
costs were reduced somewhat relative to the "90-Day Study" by reducing the scope of
the lunar base and lunar operations.
The Synthesis mission scenarios were a step forward from the "90-Day Study": more
cost-efficient, better integrated, and directly derived from themes based on different
rationale emphasis. The Mars scenarios progressed quickly from an initial opposition
mission to the more productive long-stay conjunction profile.
The Synthesis report included a scathing, too-severe indictment of aerobraking as
having excessive risk, and came down squarely in favor of nuclear thermal propulsion.
Nuclear electric propulsion was mentioned as having potential.
Since the Synthesis report, a reduced-cost initial lunar program, the First Lunar
Outpost (FLO), has been defined by NASA. Other proposals, generally not very credible,
have presented even lower cost projections. Contemporary Mars studies, initiated by a
workshop in Houston in August of 1992, are examining ways of reducing cost, mainly by
minimizing Earth orbit operations in favor of Mars operations and by increasing
commonality between lunar and Mars systems, especially habitats and planet ascent
propulsion. One very high cost item, a 200+ tonne launch vehicle, was retained by the
NASA studies, even though it creates a severe early program cost problem.
During the Synthesis period, the STCAEM study concentrated on refining the NTP
concept by taking its definition one layer deeper. This included definition of subsystems
and attention to the details of the on-orbit assembly problem. The resulting
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configuration is shown in figure 2-7; it could be assembled by a simple robotic fixture, as
described earlier. An alternate concept requiring only berthing for assembly was also
created; it is shown in figure 2-8.
Transparent Port Elevation
Figure 2-7. STCAEM Phase 2 Nuclear Thermal Rocket Vehicle Concept
A($129
The STCAEM analysis of Synthesis architectures examined abort profiles and
philosophy in some depth. In particular, the Synthesis conjunction profile design
approach was examined. This approach makes the Earth-to-Mars segment of a
conjunction profile (after the first mission which is opposition) a segment compatible
with an opposition-like Mars flyby and return to Earth, in order to provide an abort
opportunity. The STCAEM conclusion was that this approach is good but doesn't go far
enough. The likelihood of an abort was quantitatively estimated with the result that an
abort after Mars orbit capture is more likely than during the Earth-Mars transfer. This
means that the conjunction mission needed to be designed to fly an opposition profile
abort, which in some opportunity years is a significant penalty.
The main activity of the STCAEM study during 1992 supported MSFC in
development of the First Lunar Outpost (FLO) habitat system.
2.1.5 Mars Direct
The Mars direct profile as visualized by the STCAEM study was an evolutionary step
beyond early missions; it consisted of an integrated reusable Mars transfer and landing
system refueled on Mars with hydrogen and oxygen derived from in-situ propellants. The
vehicle was to fly from Earth orbit to Mars landing on Earth-supplied propellants and
from Mars surface to Earth orbit on Mars-supplied propellants. It was presumed that a
Mars base complete with propellant production facilities had already been emplaced.
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Figure 2-8. STCAEM In-Line Modular Nuclear Thermal Rocket Vehicle Concept
The Mars Direct profile popularized by Zubrin and Baker was the same fundamental
profile but implemented very differently. Zubrin and Baker visualized an expendable-
mode Mars direct profile as the most promising scheme for an early Mars mission and
proposed one as early as 1999. In their scheme_ an Earth return transfer propulsion and
habitat system is prepositioned on Mars and refueled by methane and oxygen produced
from Mars t atmosphere (with the aid of a modest amount of hydrogen brought from
Earth) The refueling process uses automated propellant production and relatively simple
robotics. The mission crew transfers to Mars, bringing their transfer habitat to Mars _
surface via aerobraking for use on the surface during the S00-day stay. With a large
enough launch vehicle, no Earth orbit assembly is required. Also, no Mars orbit
operations are required.
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The Zubrin/Baker scheme has been criticized as risky; also in order to reduce the
size of the return system to be compatible with a single Earth launch, the return habitat
as defined by Zubrin and Baker is extremely austere. Whether or not Mars Direct is
adopted, it brings out important ideas:
a. Production of propellants from Mars t atmosphere is a greatly simpler proposition
than production from lunar regolith.
b. An adequately robust habitation facilityon the surface of Mars ismore reachable as
a safe haven than return to Earth for some portion of almost any Mars mission
profile.
c. Restricting the first human mission to Mars to a short, opposition-profile stay is
probably neither necessary nor desirable. (Zubrin_sargument)
d. Architectures can be devised which make possible a firstMars mission much earlier
than indicated by "conventional wisdom".
2.1.6 JSC Mars Working Group, 1992 - 93
In 1992, as SEI activitieswere winding down, a Mars Working Group was formed at
JSC. The initialpurpose of the group was to develop an architecture for beginning Mars
exploration that would provide continuity and evolutionary context for the FLO mission
definition activitiesthen underway. After the 1992 election, it was clear that the SEI
program as advocated by President Bush would not occur. The purpose of the group then
shifted towards creating a basis for future evolution of space exploration. One of the
ongoing activitiesof the group, before and after the election, was definitionof a new
Mars architecture approach.
In August of 1992, a meeting of the Working Group, including outside reviewers,
focused on rationales for Mars missions. In addition to the usual science objectives,this
meeting recognized an important function of Mars missions as assessing the future
habitabilityof Mars for human settlement.
Architecture definitionby the working group was strongly influenced by two factors:
(a) The penalty of requiring the outgoing leg and orbit capture of a Mars conjunction
profile to be compatible with opposition-type return to Earth, and (b) some of the
concepts and ideas of the Mars Direct profile.
The Working Group undertook to define a Mars surface architecture that is
sufficientlyredundant and robust that it can serve as an abort safe haven, eliminating
the need to design missions to always return to Earth to effect abort. It was not within
scope of the STCAEM study to deal with surface architectures; it was simply taken as
given that the surface architecture is adequate. STCAEM did perform analyses and
review of the Working Group transportation architecture, as described in the following
section.
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2.2 STCAEM REVIEW OF JSC WORKING GROUP ARCHITECTURE
2.2.1 Architecture Summary
The Working Group's reference architecture employs three launches from Earth
direct to Mars for cargo delivery and one additional launch for the erew mission the
following opportunity. During the crew mission launch period, two cargo launches to
support the following crew mission are also launched. The composite mission profile is
diagramed in figure 2-9, taken from the JSC reference mission description. In addition
to surface cargo, the cargo missions deliver the crew ascent vehicle and the Earth return
vehicle. The former is fueled with in-situ propellants after landing (but prior to the crew
departing Earth) and the latter is parked in Mars orbit, fully fueled, awaiting use at the
completion of the crew mission. Both the crew ascent vehicle and the Earth return
vehicle use methane and oxygen propellants. Methane was selected for the ascent
vehicle because this provides an 18:1 gain for the hydrogen delivered whereas simply
making oxygen and using hydrogen from Earth provides 7:1 gain. Methane was selected
for the Earth return for engine/propulsion commonality with the ascent vehicle and
because the storage temperature for methane is about 70 K warmer than for hydrogen.
Mars
Mars Surface
Surface
Earth _
Orb,t
Ascent/TEl '
Vehicles for
2012 Miss,on
Crew for
2012 Miss,on
Figure 2-9. Composite Mission Profile for the JSCWorking Group Mars Mission
Earth
Orb,t
Earth's
Surface
DSS/D61S-10070/DISK l/D16/246-3/9:54 A
16
D615-10070
The erew mission also goes on a direct launch from Earth. The mission vehicle
ineludes an aerobrake for Mars arrival, a transfer/surface habitat, other small surface
eargo such as a rover, and a landing stage. The transfer habitat goes to the surface to
beeome part of the surface infrastrueture. The habitat for the return transfer is already
parked in Mars orbit before the crew leaves Earth because it is part of the Earth return
vehiele. The Earth return vehiele and the ascent vehicle for the following mission
opportunity are delivered to Mars as cargo, arriving there about the same time as the
eurrent crew. These are available as backup for the return trip.
Several variations on the referenee arehiteeture were described, but all operated on
the same basle eoneept. The review provided here is generally applicable to these
variations.
2.2.2 Review Viewpoint
What one looks for in any new arehiteeture is advances in understanding as well as
improved features and eharaeteristies. Weaknesses and drawbacks are somewhat less
important provided they are identified and flagged for future work. This review
identifies both with the idea that the current reference arehiteeture is the latest word,
but not the last word, in Mars arehiteeture development. Forthcoming studies, it is
presumed, will continue to make improvements.
2.2.3 Plaudits for the Reference Architecture
Abort - The referenee architecture successfully challenges the unstated assumption
that "abort" always means return to Earth. Adopting the notion of an adequate safe
haven on Mars eliminates severe eonstraints on certain portions of the mission profile
design. However, this architecture relies almost entirely on abort to Mars surfaee.
Fast Opposition - Earlier arehiteeture studies, ineluding the STCAEM trades
deseribed above, were distorted by considering propulsion system performance potential
for "fast opposition" profiles as a primary evaluation eriterion to the point that systems
sueh as electric propulsion were not optimized to show their strong points to good
advantage. The reference architecture removes that emphasis by pointing out the
inherent advantage of the eonjunetion profile: an order of magnitude more stay time on
Mars for the investment in each human mission. Removing this emphasis also eases
eleetrie propulsion performanee requirements.
Surface 6_/stems- Inherent in the conceptual advances above is the idea of a robust
and redundant surfaee arehiteeture that ean be depended on as a safe haven. While the
STCAEM study was not involved in Mars surface systems, obtaining a realistie definition
of surface activities and surface systems is essential to the evolution of transportation
arehiteetures because of abort signifieanee as well as understanding eargo delivery
requirements. The reference arehiteeture made important eontributions in this area.
17
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/rt-S|O2 Materials - It almost goes without saying that use of in-situ materials is
important to any efficient architecture with long-range potential. The reference
architecture places emphasis on early use of in-situ materials; this is especially
important since there has been a tendency in the technology community to think of
in-situ materials technology as something that can comfortably be deferred. The
long-range evolution of Mars architectures may well be paced by the development of in-
situ materials technology.
2.2.4 Critiques of the Reference Architecture
Abort - While the reference architecture made a significant step forward in
understanding Mars mission aborts, the arrangement of the architecture eliminates
several abort modes that should not be eliminated. Two examples are: (a) Abort from a
failure during trans-Mars injection is eliminated because the crew mission vehicle does
not include an Earth entry module; (b) Abort from the descent to Mars, or after a
landing in the wrong location, is eliminated because the descent system does not include
an ascent vehicle. Also, if an ascent were made to the Earth return vehicle, it does not
have sufficient consumables to sustain the crew until an Earth return opportunity.
The abort analysis is described in detail in Section 3 of this volume.
Growth and Evolution - In some ways the reference architecture is commendable in
this area; for example, it inherently adds to the surface infrastructure on every mission.
However, it gives very little consideration to the long-range evolution of Mars surface
operations and transportation technology. By not considering these evolutions, it seems
to presume that they will not occur, or at least makes no provisions for them.
Problems and Penalties - Certain aspects of the architecture appear motivated
primarily to eliminate problems for which the "cure" seems worse than the disease.
Eliminating Earth orbit operations is a prime example. Earth orbit assembly does not
seem to be much of a problem unless it involves extensive EVA. The division of the crew
mission systems which causes the abort problems noted above is driven by the need to
divide the mission into equal trans-Mars masses to suit the direct launch constraint.
A second example is the use of methane in-situ propellant, ln-situ propellant is
essential to the workability of the Mars Direct architecture; without it, launching the
Earth return habitat from the surface of Mars to its return trajectory would require a
completely impractical Mars landing mass. Both methane and hydrogen have advantages
and disadvantages in this application and which is the best propellant has not been
conclusively demonstrated. In the present reference architecture, in-situ methane
serves only to fuel the ascent vehicle. The increase in landing mass without in-situ
propellant is about 20%. Use of hydrogen, with its higher [sp, in the Earth return stage
parked in Mars orbit would decrease the delivery mass.
18
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Technology Menu - The architecture introduces five new technologies which must be
regarded as risky from the program management point of view; (a) nuclear thermal
propulsion; (b) aerocapture at Mars; (c) nuclear electric power for Mars surface
application; (d) in-situ propellant production; and (e) robotic assembly of the initial base
under conditions of severe communications time delay. (Shuttle had three - its engine,
its TPS, and its data management system.)
it is recommended that consideration be given to (a) eliminating either nuclear
propulsion or aerocapture; (b) evaluating whether solar/regenerable fuel cell energy can
be used on the first mission, i.e., with natural sunlight for the bio-chamber and day-only
operation for in-situ propellant production; (c) restricting use of in-situ propellant
production to fueling surface rovers, with growth to ascent vehicle use; and
(d) evaluating whether a surface base can be devised which is usable in as-landed
condition if necessary. Required robotic assembly is no more than the surface mobility
needed to move base elements to within reasonable proximity to one another.
Interconnectlon would be attempted as an enhancing feature; (e) Devising a surface base
and mission architecture that can sustain failure of any one Earth launch.
2.3 CURRENT ISSUES
The issues evaluated in this section respond to the STCAEM statements of work for
Technical Directives 16 and 17. These issues have, for the most part, not been in the
mainstream of analyses and trades from prior architecture studies. Taken together with
the review of the JSC Working Group architecture in the previous section, these provide
the basis for the general review of Mars architectures in the following section.
2.3.1 Evolution to Crew Rotation and Resupply Operations
Conjunction-class visits to Mars are logical for the first few human missions
whether the reference architecture or another is used. If one presumes that the purposes
of Mars exploration lead to permanent surface operations, a change in profile may be
needed. Sequences of conjunction profile missions leave gaps of several months in
presence, unless crew members stay for more than one synodic period, as illustrated in
figure 2-10. As also illustrated in the figure, sequences of opposition profiles permit a
regular crew rotation and resupply operation with continuous occupancy of a surface
base. This offers a logical step between a base phase and a settlement in which people
may stay indefinitely.
Valid reasons exist for permanent human presence on Mars whether or not a
settlement phase is initiated. Certain scientific research benefits from long-term
continuous operations. Gaps in base occupancy with a sequence of conjunction missions
may occur at scientifically inopportune times. In-situ food growth is expected to reduce
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Figure 2-10. Achieving Permanent Presence on Mars ACS132
subsistence resupply Cargo requirements by half or more; operation of a bioregenerative
lifesupport system willbe seriouslycompromised by periodic shutdown and restart.
Direet subsistence requirements for a crew, assuming a life support system that
regenerates all water and breathing atmosphere, include food and life support
consumables such as filters,hygiene items and medical supplies. The mass requirement
is about 4 kg per person per day, of which more than half is food. A bioregenerative
system is expected to evolve to essentiallycomplete food supply capability,but should
be backed up by an adequate emergency reserve food supply (3 years recommended)
before it is permitted to be critical to survival. The recommended approaeh to this is to
overproduee long-term storable foodstuffs with the bioregenerative system until the
reserve is built up, and to consume and replenish the reserve regularly so that food
residence time in the reserve does not exceed the 3 years' emergency supply. For a
six-person base, the direct subsistence resupply for one synodic period is slightlyless
than 20 t.,dropping to less than 10 t. when bioregenerative food production reaches full
capacity. Figures 2-11 and 2-12 compare resupply scenarios with and without a
bioregenerative food supply (calledbio-ehamber in the Figures). These scenarios are for
conjunction sequences with crew stay durations of almost 4 years. Figures 2-13 and 2-14
compare supply inventories for these scenarios. With the bio-ehamber, one 50-t. eargo
flightper opportunity delivers the needed subsistence supplies and enough capacity for
current estimates of spares (see below). With out the bio-ehamber, one cargo flightdoes
not quite satisfy subsistence requirements. Section 5 of thisvolume presents additional
information on these results.
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Figure 2-12. Mars Resupply and Evolution, Surface Consumables with Bio-Chamber Support
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Additional resupply is required for base systems spares and for scientific and
technological operations. Valid estimates do not exist for either of these. STCAEM has
used 296 of gross mass per year for spares, which comes to 6 to 7 t. per synodic period
for a six-person base. Masses for scientificand technological operations depend entirely
on the nature of the operations,not yet defined.
Energy for base and surface transport operations must be regenerable or nuclear, or
surface transport willbe extremely limited. Nuclear plants willrequire replacement on
intervalsprobably no greater than 20 years and possibly much less. A solar/RFC system
might get by with depot-level (piece-part)repair of fuel cellsand eleetrolyzers,in which
case itsresupply would be lessof a burden than nuclear, but the initialinstallationwill
be about a football fieldof solar arrays (for80 kW average)* and mass of RFC equipment
more or lessequivalent to the mass of a nuclear power system.
*(Solar flux = 525 Watts/m2)(Atmosphere transmission 0.8)(daylnight 0.5)
(non-tracking 21n)(arrayefficiency 0.15)(storagenet efficiency 0.8)= 16 Wlm2.
Low and high thrust systems fly trajectories which are similar from the overall
architecture point of view; that is, either system can perform opposition-like and
conjunction-like profiles. Therefore, the discussion of transition to crew rotation and
resupply applies to either propulsion technology. As described below in section 2.3.3,low
thrust systems are more sensitive to reductions in transfer time than high thrust
systems; therefore, low thrust systems must be specifically assessed against desired
transfer time constraints.
2.3.2 In-Situ Production of Propellants on the Moon and Mars
Lunar oxygen - The potential value of producing oxygen from the lunar regolith has
been recognized since the 1960s. Lunar rocks are about half oxygen, but this is a new
process field since oxygen is readily available on Earth from the atmosphere. The
OINeill space colonization proposals stirred up academic interest in specific production
processes, and dozens of candidate processes have been identified. Many have been
demonstrated on a laboratory scale, a few with actual lunar materials from the Apollo
samples.
The STCAEM study as well as many others identifiedbenefits of using lunar oxygen
in an Earth-Moon transportation system. Relevant to this report is the use of lunar
oxygen in Mars transportation,also considered by the study. The candidate lunar oxygen
architecture presumed delivery of lunar oxygen to a transportation node at lunar
libration point L2, where it is used to supply a eryogenie/aerobraking Mars transfer
vehicle with oxygen. Hydrogen issupplied from Earth, and in thisarchitecture, hydrogen
from Earth is also used in the cryogenic lunar transportation system between the lunar
surface and L2. This transportation system obtains its oxygen on the lunar surface and
itshydrogen at L2, where itisdelivered from Earth. Mars cargo payloads and crews are
delivered to L2 from Earth by a lunar-type transportation system
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Somewhat surprisingly, even if hydrogen must be supplied from Earth, use of lunar
oxygen saves as much as 300 t. equivalent mass in low Earth orbit for each mission
compared to basing in low Earth orbit. When the estimated mass delivery requirements
and eost of emplaeing the lunar oxygen production system are considered, the time
required to recoup the investment in lunar oxygen production is several Mars
opportunities. The return on the investment in lunar infrastructures is poor.
Lunar Hydrogen Production - Later in the study it was eonsidered that produetion of
propellant for a nuclear thermal propulsion system could beeome an attractive option, if
feasible. The performance of a nuelear rocket is poor with any propellant other than
hydrogen. Hydrogen is, of course, present in the lunar regolith as a result of solar wind
implantation. Produeibility is generally viewed as poor, sinee concentration is only 50
parts per million by mass. (This eoneentration estimate eomes from analysis of Apollo
lunar samples. The hydrogen is driven off by heating the bulk regolith.) Given the
representative regolith density of 2000 kg/m3, the density of hydrogen is about
0.1 kg/m3, somewhat greater than the density of hydrogen gas at STP. This sunests
that produeibility might be aeeeptable.
Aeeordingly, a brief study was made to obtain a crude estimate of the mining and
production system needed to extract hydrogen from the regolith. The analysis was
mainly assumptional but served to generate very preliminary estimates of equipment
size, mass and eost. These estimates in turn were used to estimate the eeonomie
feasibility of lunar hydrogen produetion as a source of nuclear reeker propellant for Mars
missions.
Estimates of required propellant production on the Moon were based on the L2
basing eoneept described below in Seetion 2.3.3. It was determined that a hydrogen
production rate of 100 t. per year is suitable for rough sizing of a produetion system.
Results are summarized in figures 2-15 and 2-16. Assuming nuclear power, and that
thermal heat for evolution of hydrogen from the regolith would be delivered direetly
from the reaetors rather than by means of electrical generation, the mass of produetion
equipment required on the Moon is about 600 t., not including a lunar habitat system
which might be needed to support maintenance and operations personnel. IR&D studies
of other applications of lunar hydrogen indicated that the mass and support requirements
of a lunar habitat systems are much less important than the mass of the hydrogen
production equipment itself. The payoff time for lunar hydrogen as a propellant supply
for a Mars nuelear thermal propulsion system is about 3 Mars opportunities. While the
estimates of lunar hydrogen produetion facilities are very erude, this approach is worthy
of further study as an evolutionary goal for low-cost Mars transfer propulsion.
Lunar Electric Propulsion Propellant - Lunar hydrogen or water produced from lunar
hydrogen and oxygen could be used in an eleetrie propulsion system. Current ion engine
technology uses heavier noble gases (argon to xenon), heavy alkali metals or mercury as
propellants. All are very scarce on the Moon. Light alkali metals, especially sodium, are
24
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not as scarce. Plasma thruster technology can use hydrogen and might use water. Some
pulsed plasma devices might eventually use almost anything. Presently, lunar hydrogen
appears to be the best bet based on state of the art of plasma thrusters and availability
of material.
Asteroids] Volatiles - Recently (August 1992)t volatiles were discovered evolving
from a near-Earth asteroid on photo plates taken sometime earlier. (The object was at
that time identified as a small comet.) Long-term dynamical simulations of the motions
of asteroidal and cometary bodies indicate that near-Earth asteroids come from the
outer solar system "deep freeze" by way of planetary gravity assists; many may have
been in the inner solar system for periods on the order of "only" 107 - 108 years. Objects
with average distance from the Sun 2 - 4 au probably retain interior volatiles over such
periods by formation of highly insulating surface layers of dust and slag. These objects
could be economic sources of water and perhaps other materials for propellant and other
uses.
This line of reasoning suggests that Mars t moons have been at Mars too long to be
good sources of volatiles.
The flight mechanics of access to these objects is similar to that for Venus and
Mars; windows of opportunity exist when an object has a near encounter with the Earth.
For an object with aphelion great enough to retain water over long periods, a window of
opportunity oeeurs every few years and the delta V to rendezvous with it is in the range
6 - 8 kin/see outbound and inbound; most of each delta V occurs departing and returning
to Earth. Identification of several such objects as volatiles carriers (there are hundreds
known to be in such orbits) would yield enough transfer opportunities to create a viable
resource.
Considerations of trip time, risk and cost cause us to think of robotic mining
vehicles as the way to acquire propellant from these asteroids. A typical mission profile
departs Earth during a near approach, reaches the asteroid several months to a year or so
later, spends several months to more than a year at the asteroid extracting volatiles, and
a similar period returning to Earth. Two vehicle types have been proposed. The first, by
Zuppero and others, is a nuclear thermal water rocket with moderate lsp (-400) and very
low-mass, large water tanks. High delta Vs are attainable because of a presumed very
high mass ratio capability due to the low-mass water tanks. The other, proposed by G.
Woodcock, argues that the mass of mining and power equipment as well as practical tank
design considerations would reduce the mass ratio readily attainable. It uses nuclear
electric propulsion; the nuclear electric source is also useful to support mining
operations. A top-level economic analysis of the latter concept indicates that
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practical amounts of volatiles are available from several such asteroid sources, this in-
space source of propellant is likely to be more economic than lunar surface sources. In
either case, the best Earth-vicinity depot location is the lunar L2 libration point.
Asteroidal sources would enable Mars orbit also to be used as a depot location.
Mars Atmosphere as a Source - Mars' atmosphere consists mainly of carbon dioxide.
Three means of propellant production are possible. One, identified several years ago, is
to dissociate carbon dioxide into carbon monoxide and oxygen. Both can be liquefied and
burned in a rocket engine with estimated specific impulse about 250 seconds. The second
is to simply use the oxygen from this dissociation process with hydrogen or other fuel
brought from Earth. The third is to react hydrogen brought from Earth with carbon
dioxide to produce methane. Oxygen is a byproduct, and additional oxygen can be
produced to obtain the optimum mixture ratio for an oxygen-methane rocket engine. All
of these processes have at least been demonstrated in laboratory equipment on a
reasonable scale, and some are industrial processes on Earth.
While Mars* atmosphere is tenuous, typically 0.01 kg/m3 at the surface, a simple
calculation indicates that reasonable production rates should be achievable without
difficulty. Imagine a 10-era inlet pipe with flow velocity 10 m/see. The flow rate is 7.85
x 10-4 kg/see (of Mars atmosphere), which is 15 t. in a little more than 200 days.
Production rates relative to atmosphere inflow depend on what is being produced but are
roughly comparable to atmosphere inflow. Typical scenarios for MEV operations involve
production rates from 10 to 50 t. per year. Power consumption also varies with specific
product but is typically on the order of 1 kWe per ton per year. It is clear that
production of propellant from Mars atmosphere is not nearly as technically challenging
as production of oxygen or hydrogen from lunar regolith.
Some reusable MEV scenarios require all propellant to be obtained from Mars. Also,
the propulsion performance requirement for a reusable MEV demands at least the 375 Isp
of oxygen-methane and is better satisfied with oxygen-hydrogen performance. Mars'
regolith presumably has no hydrogen. However, it is anticipated that substantial
amounts of (frozen?) water will be found on Mars. Hydrogen and oxygen can readily be
produced from water by electrolysis. Power needs are somewhat more than for the
atmosphere production described above. The main issue is that we don't know where on
Mars or in what form water will be discovered. There is almost certainly water in the
polar caps but this is a very inconvenient location. Further assessment of water as a
propellant source needs more information on water availability on Mars.
Potential applications of Mars propellant are: (a) Fueling of Mars ascent vehicles as
in the JSC 1993 "reference architecture", (b) Fueling of reusable Mars excursion vehicles
(MEVs) as in one of the STCAEM seven architectures, (e) fueling of complete Earth
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return vehicles as in Zubrin's Mars Direct architecture, and (d) fueling of surface
mobility vehicles for Mars surface operations. The delta V for ascent from Mars to Mars
orbit appears to make refueling of orbit-based Earth return vehicles impractical, but no
thorough analysis has been done.
2.3.3 Review and Update of Alternate Mission lh'ofiles and Modes
This review provides an overview of current knowledge and architecture design
results for the alternative mission profiles applicable to human Mars missions. All
presently known profiles and architectures can be collected into the five groups
represented here.
Generic Conjunction Options. The synchronism of the conjunction profile employs
long wait times at Mars (normally more than a year) to access low-energy transfers from
Earth to Mars and Mars to Earth. The space vehicle makes one fewer revolutions around
the Sun than Earth, i. e. about 1-1/2 vs. 2-1/2. A conjunction profile may use relatively
high energies to obtain fast trips, but each transfer is near the minimum energy for the
particular trip time.
Chemical (usually cryogenic), chemical/aerobraking, nuclear thermal, and nuclear
and solar electric propulsion systems are all represented here. The generic conjunction
profile departs Earth, arrives at Mars by capture into a Mars orbit, executes a landing
using a landing craft (not the entire vehicle), uses a portion of the landing craft for an
ascent to rendezvous with the orbiting craft, and the orbiting craft is used for return to
Earth from Mars orbit. Many variations are possible, such as the JSC 1993 reference
architecture. It falls into this category because it uses conjunction-type transfers and
synchronism and because the craft for return to Earth is parked in Mars orbit.
The wait time in Mars orbit is enough that planetary oblateness perturbation of the
orbit line of nodes and line of apsides can be used to advantage for orbital alignment. A
high-thrust conjunction profile can obtain very nearly the full advantage of an elliptic
parking orbit at Mars. By properly selecting the orbit inclination and period, the lines of
nodes and apsides can be in near-ideal alignment for arrival and departure.
Consequently, conjunction profiles are marked by low Mars capture and departure delta
Vs, on the order of 1200 m/see for moderate transfer times. Orbital alignment is not an
issue for low-thrust profiles.
The lower delta Vs for conjunction profiles are somewhat offset by the greater
consumables requirements for the longer total mission durations. Consumables, however,
are outweighed by the propulsion requirements of higher delta V for opposition profiles.
The extra consumables for the roughly 500 days' greater duration are about 209b of a
mission habitat system mass (even if the mission habitat must carry consumables for the
entire duration, as may be the case when abort requirements are included), whereas in
the case of nuclear thermal propulsion the higher delta V of a typical opposition mission
represents about a 50% mass penalty.
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Conjunction profiles offer these advantages:
a. Long stay times at Mars with low to moderate delta V.
b. Less crew exposure to rigors of zero-g space travel and radiation environments.
c. Longer-duration launch and return windows
Conjunction profiles have these disadvantages:
a. Long total mission duration
b. Consecutive missions do not provide continuous presence at Mars unless crews
stay for almost 2 synodic periods, e.g. 1200 days.
Mars Direct - The Mars direct mission profile uses conjunction trajectories. As
indicated earlier, the Earth return habitat and its propulsion stage are placed on a Mars
transfer by a cryogenic propulsion system (nuclear could be used). Various renderings of
the architecture use aerocapture at Mars to enter an orbit for navigation update or
direct entry from the approach trajectory. The entire vehicle lands; nothing is left in
Mars orbit. On Mars, an electric powerplant, usuaUy described as nuclear, is roboticaly
emplaced and started. Included in the landing stage is a propellant production facility
which produces liquid methane and oxygen, using hydrogen brought from Earth, as
described above. This is started robotically and gradually fills the return system which
was landed empty. Before the crew departs Earth during the following mission
opportunity, the return system has been filled with propellant and ready to use. The
crew flies to Mars on a similar profile, bringing the main surface mission habitat. The
entire crew vehicle lands near the return system and the Mars surface mission begins. In
the usual rendering, a second return system travels to Mars during the crew mission
window, nominally for use by the next crew on the next mission opportunity. However,
this is available for backup for the current crew.
As described by its authors Zubrin and Baker, Mars direct is very efficient in terms
of launch requirements. Their mass estimates, especially for the Earth return habitat,
are low compared to other analysts. Mars direct was compared to other conjunction
profiles by STCAEM using consistent ground rules and mass estimating relationships, as
was shown in figure 2-4 earlier in Section 2.1.3, where it is called "surface rendezvous".
Mars direct combines surface and transportation system functions such that direct
transportation comparisons are misleading. Its effective mass efficiency is
approximately egual to a nuclear thermal rocket generic conjunction profile. Mars
direct obtains dual use of the habitats, i.e. for transportation and surface operations. A
series of separate cargo launches is not needed. Most of the return propellant is
obtained from Mars.
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The STCAEM fully reusable version of Mars direct proved less effective for its
intended purpose of permanent base support than a reusable NTR, NEP or SEP with a
Mars-based reusable Mars excursion vehicle (MEV).
Mars direct offers these advantages:
a. Dual use (transportationand surface) of habitats.
b. Mass efficient
e. Few vehicle system developments, e.g.the advance cargo and crew missions can use
the same aerobrake.
d. No Mars orbit operations needed
Mars direct has these disadvantages:
a. Requires significant robotic operations on Mars to prepare the return vehicle.
(There may be ways to reduce thisriskby tailoringa development strategy.)
b. Abort options are somewhat limited. In particular,a landing cannot be aborted and
must land close to the return vehicle.
e. Vehicle architecture cannot readily adapt to other profiles.
Generie Opposition Options (Ineluding Swingtff) - The synchronism of the opposition
profile accomplishes a Mars round trip in one opportunity window. The space vehicle
makes the same number of revolutions around the Sun as the Earth, usually about 1-1/2.
The trip from Earth to Mars occurs early in the Earth-Mars window, and the trip from
Mars to Earth, soon after Mars arrival,occurs late inthe (nearly concurrent) Mars-Earth
window. Since the profile isusing early and late parts of the windows to accomplish the
mission in a shorter time, the required energies are substantiallygreater than minimum.
The longer the mission stays at Mars, the greater the energy required. The optimum stay
time is zero.
The profilespends time at and near Mars, with a heliocentric angular rate lessthan
Earth. It must therefore spend compensating time closer to the Sun than Earth at a
higher angular rate to make the average equal to that of Earth. Opposition profiles
usually travel closer to the Sun, near the orbit of Venus, on one leg of the trip but not
the other. IfVenus happens to be in the vicinityduring the sunward pass, the trajectory
design can usually take advantage of a Venus gravity assist,making the profile of the
Venus swingby type. A Venus swingby can benefit on either leg of the trajectory and
occasionally both. Venus swingby altersthe nature of the trajectoriessuch that longer
stay time at Mars is energetically reasonable, and a Venus swingby profile will often
have an optimal stay time greater than zero.
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IfVenus swingby isnot practical(usuallybecause Venus does not cooperate by being
advantageously placed) a propulsive maneuver during the closest approach to the Sun
often called deep space burn or maneuver, may be beneficial.
The energy required for this profile normally rules out all-cryogenic propulsion
because the initialmass required is too great. Cryogeniclaerobraking, nuclear thermal,
nuclear electric and solar electric propulsion are all candidates. Electric propulsion
systems tend to be power-limited on this profile and may require longer duration than
high-thrustsystems.
A representative opposition profilesequence isthe same as a conjunction sequence,
except that a Venus swingby or deep-space burn may be interposed on one (possiblyboth)
transfers. The differences are (a) short rather than long Mars stay, and (b) the transfer
leg that passes closest to the Sun may approach a year in duration, whereas conjunction
transfers, unless the very lowest energies are used, normally require six to eight months.
The wait time in Mars orbit is not enough to get much help from oblateness
perturbations. If an elliptic orbit is chosen, selection of a low-energy profile must
include consideration of alignment losses on Mars orbit arrival and departure. The
influence of these losses can be enough to alter the choice of interplanetary trajectory.
A number of choices is usually available, e.g. outbound Venus swingby versus inbound
deep-space burn. They do not continuously blend into one another as is the case for
conjunction profiles. Because of higher energies and alignment problems, the Mars
capture and departure delta Vs for an opposition profile usually range between 2000 and
4000 m/sec. Even with the alignment problems, elliptic Mars orbits usually offer less
delta V than circular orbits.
Opposition profiles offer these advantages:
a. Shorter total mission duration, by about a year.
b. Synchronism permits continuous presence at Mars, with each mission operating in a
crew exchange mode.
Opposition profiles have these disadvantages:
a. Constrained stay time at Mars except in crew exchange mode.
b. Significantly higher mission energy
c. Nearly continuous (except for the short Mars stay) exposure of crews to the zero-g
and space radiation environments, for more than a year. (Artificial-g space vehicles
could be used.)
d. Short launch windows at Earth.
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Flyby/Dash and Related Cyelers - The notion of operating an opposition profile in a
crew exchange mode leads naturaLly to the flyby/dash and cycler profile concepts. The
idea is that if optimum stay time is short and the needed stay time, i.e. for crew
exchange, is also short, one can design a profile in which the interplanetary vehicle does
not stop at Mars and therefore requires much less delta V. (A Mars flyby with return to
Earth will often need some delta V at Mars.) Two concepts have been published. First, a
conventional opposition profile without Mars stopover can be used. Such Mars flyby
trajectories were published as early as the early 1960s. The Mars excursion vehicle, with
the crew, separates some time before Mars arrival and "dashes" ahead, arriving Mars a
few days in advance of the interplanetary vehicle. It lands, exchanges the crew, and lifts
off Mars at the right time for a hyperbolic rendezvous with the interplanetary vehicle (it
is on a hyperbolic, i.e. uneaptured, path relative to Mars).
If the interplanetary vehicle uses electric propulsion, it may slow down on approach
to Mars and speed up again after the hyperbolic rendezvous; this reduces the delta V
required of the ascent vehicle. Or it may use a gravity assisted capture in which the
Mars excursion vehicle lands at the time of the assist encounter and ascends after
capture is complete a few weeks later. (High thrust captures are always gravity-
assisted.)
The cycler profile adds another feature: the interplanetary trajectory is shaped and
controlled such that gravity assists at Earth and Mars cause the trajectory to "repeat"
every Earth-Mars synodic period. The interplanetary vehicle, once placed on this
trajectory, needs no further propulsion to continue repeating Earth and Mars encounters.
Unfortunately, because of the eccentricity of Mars _ orbit, the repeat pattern is
somewhat irregular and gravity assists alone do not work all the time. A modest amount
of low-thrust propulsion near aphelion is enough, and this could be supplied by solar
electric propulsion.
The nature of the cycler trajectory is one short leg, on the order of six months, and
one long leg, about 20 months. The entire trajectory repeats with the Earth-Mars
synodic period which averages 26 months. The short leg can be either Earth-Mars or
Mars-Earth but of course not both. As usually proposed, this scheme uses two cycling
spaceships, one on each type of trajectory, so that passengers can take advantage of the
short-leg trip time each way. "Small" taxi space vehicles are used to accomplish crew
embarking and debarking from the eyelets. These taxis perform aeroeapture and entry
upon arrival and have enough delta V to make hyperbolic rendezvous with the cycler for
crew departure (from either planet).
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A significant drawback of the cycler profile is that encounter velocities at Mars are
quite high, on the order of 8 to 12 kin/see. The "small" taxis turn out to be not so small.
The dash and cycler profiles have these advantages:
a. Less propulsion/delta V required for the large interplanetary vehicle. This becomes
a very important advantage if the interplanetary vehicle must provide massive
radiation shielding or other amenities that drive its mass to high values.
b. They tend to be reusable. The cycler is, and the dash profile is usually rendered that
way.
The dash and cycler profiles have these disadvantages:
a. Basically suitable only for crew exchange operations, i.e. very short stay times at
Mars.
b. Hyperbolic rendezvous requires precision timing of the Mars (and Earth, if required)
liftoff/departure maneuver. The "pushbutton" window is short, minutes at most, and
there is no second chance.
c. In the case of the cycler, encounter velocities at Mars are high.
Lunar/Asteroidal Propellants and L2 Basing - If propellants are obtained from the
Moon or from near-Earth asteroids, it does not make sense to bring these propellants to
low Earth orbit for use. It is more economical to use the propellants (energetically)
closer to the point of production. While this might seem to dictate launching from the
lunar surface, it really doesn't make sense to assemble or handle an interplanetary space
vehicle on the Moon in a gravity field. Trade studies indicate that for either source, the
lunar L2 libration point is the most advantageous staging base. L1 is slightly less favored
energetically. Earth-Sun L1 is energetically efficient, but travel times from Earth orbit
to this point are undesirably long, several weeks unless delta V penalties are accepted.
A representative mission profile is a conjunction-type with the nuclear rocket based
at the L2 libration point. This is dipected in figure 2-17, with delta Vs and a
representative mission sequence mass statement. The nuclear rocket is supplied with
hydrogen from the lunar surface, delivered by a conventional cryogenic lunar
transport/landing vehicle. The latter obtains all its propellant (hydrogen and oxygen)
from the Moon. Thus no propellant is supplied from Earth. A lunar transfer vehicle
system also transports Mars mission crews and support screws from Earth orbit to L2 and
back. Cargo bound for Mars, such as Mars excursion vehicles and surface base cargo, is
similarly transported from Earth.
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Lunar Coast 96 1
Lunar Swingby 2 4
L2 Arrival 17
Empty Mass 92
Earth Swingby A V
To From Mars I I00 miser
(C3 = 25, 500 km min. alt.)
Figure 2-17. Mission Mode: NTP Reusable, L2 Base, Expendable MEV
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It is also possible to think of electric propulsion systems operating from an L2
staging base. One of the STCAEM trades examined this question. It was concluded that
an L2 staging point was preferable to bringing the entire interplanetary vehicle to low
Earth orbit by means of a lengthy spiral maneuver. The STCAEM solution used a smaller
cargo-type electric propulsion system to resupply the interplanetary vehicle with
propellant and Mars cargo, and a conventional cryogenic propulsion system to transport
crews. It is possible to employ cryogenics for all resupply from low Earth orbit while
maintaining reasonable initial mass in Earth orbit, as su_ested in figure 2-18.
L2 basing has the following advantages;
a. Avoids reusable nuclear reactors being parked in low Earth orbit. (Note that the L2
point is not a stable orbit. An object "cast adrift" at L2 will probably eventually
impact either the Moon or the Earth.)
b. For low thrust propulsion systems, avoids lengthy spiral flights out of and into
Earth's deep gravity well. This is important because (1) solar electric systems will
suffer damage to the solar arrays due to van Allen belt passage; and (2) nuclear
electric systems will accumulate about twice as much run time per mission
compared to the L2 basing case.
e. Energetically and mass efficient for use of lunar or asteroidal propellants.
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Payload to Mars 140 t
(60-t hab, 80-t MEV)
@ Electric propuls=on to & from MarsJsp = 5000
~5 MWe, 10 kg/kWe
Return payload 60t hab
Future sources of propellant to L2:
• Lunar hydrogen
• Astero=dal volatlles
L2
®
Cryo-A/8
return from L2
550 m/sec
Cryo proputs=on
Earth to L2
3550 m/sec
Earth
Figure 2-18. Electric Propulsion, L2 Node
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L2 basing has the following disadvantages:
a. Expeeted to be somewhat more costly to attain initial mission eapability.
b. More eostly to transport people to and from the L2 point than to LEO. If significant
numbers of maintenance personnel are needed to prepare and maintain a Mars spaee
vehicle between missions, this could be an important disadvantage.
c. Launch window constraints exist for high-thrust missions using Moon and Earth
gravity assists for trans-Mars injection and Earth return arrival.
2.4 GENERAL ARCHITECTURE REVIEW AND EVALUATION
As stated in the introduetion of this report, the current phase of the STCAEM study
was also tasked to perform a general review and evaluation of Mars architectures. This
is provided in this section. An important caveat is that rationales and mission
descriptions for Mars are currently unsettled (see Seetion 2.6 below). Architecture
evaluation eriteria, which must be derived from these, are equally unsettled.
Consequently, a review and evaluation may at best be provisional and at worst
misleading.
DSStD615-10070/DISK 1/F35/246-3/11:22 A
35
D615-10070
2.4.1 Architectures Comparison
The Inherent Diffleulty of Mars Travel - Mars transportation and surface system
architectures must deal successfully with the great and variable (compared to historical
human missions) distance between Mars and Earth and the resulting higher performance
requirements and long trip times. One consequence of long trip times is that human
habitats must provide adequate accommodations for the duration. Consideration of
human environmental needs and consumables derives the habitat mass to roughly I0 t.
per person (this is like a space station) compared with 1 to 2 t. per person typical of the
Apollo, Lunar Module, and Shuttle cabins. The long duration and complexity of the
mission indicates a minimum crew of at least six and possibly eight. Habitat systems for
Mars transfer are estimated as 60 to 80 t. mass. The habitat mass for a 180-day one-way
transfer might be reduced to about 40 t. (six people).
The gravity well of Mars, in delta V terms, is about twice that of the Moon, and
about half that of Earth (the geopotentials differ by about factors of 10). Although
aerobraking can be used for Mars landing, Mars excursion vehicles approach twice the
mass of lunar ones; s typical gross mass value is 80 t. If an Earth entry vehicle is used
for crew return to Earth at the end of the mission, its mass would be 6 to 8 t. This is a
short-duration vehicle similar to Apollo command vehicle that serves to carry the crew
through the re-entry environment to safe landing on Earth.
Each Mars opportunity is different because Mars t orbit is significantly eccentric and
not in the same plane as that of Earth. The positions of the planets do not repeat
exactly, even over the approximate 17-year Earth/Mars synodic "cycle". However,
approximate values for delta Vs can be prescribed, such as presented in Table 2-1; while
they are not accurate enough for mission design they serve for rough comparisons of
propulsion systems.
Table 2-1. Representative Delta Vs for Mars Round Trip Missions
Earth Depart Mars" Arr,ve Mars Depart Deep-Space Earth to LOwManeuver Orb,t Arrive
Conjunct_on low 4100 1200 1200 N_R 4100
energy
Conjunction h,gh 4300 2400 2400 N,R 4300
energy (hard year)
Oppostt=on easy year 4300 2600 2600 N/R 4300
Opposition hard 4600 3000 2000 2000 4600
year
* Assumes 24-hour ellipt,¢ orb,t at Mars
Notes: (1) Opposltlon/sw,ngby m_ss,on delta Vs are s,mdar tO those stated here for Oppos,t,on easy year.
(2) Electric propulsion delta Vs are highly dependent on tr,p times.
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&s noted in the Figure above, the delta V for electric propulsion systems is highly
dependent on trip time. Figure 2-19 illustrates a typical dependence for a one-way Mars
transfer which departs Earth near the optimum departure time. The derivation of this
curve is discussed in more detail in Section 6 of this report.
Isp = 5000. Power = 15 MWe. Engine Mass = 100 t
25
DV (km/sec)
20
15
10
m DV
o PT
80
'40 Burn Time (%)
20
0
150 200 250 300 350 400 450
Tr,p T,me (days)
Figure 2- 19. Typical Dependence of Low-Thrust Delta V on Trip Time _,C_141
Table 2-2 provides a comparison of architectures in terms of propulsion
mechanization. This is different than the five mission profile groups defined above,
since a propulsion architecture is usually capable of carrying out more than one mission
profile. These seven propulsion mechanizations are different than the original STCAEM
seven as follows: Cryo all-propulsive and NTP are grouped together. Cryo aerobraking
is the same as the original. NEP and SEP are grouped together. The original STCAEM
version of Mars direct is replaced by the Zubrin/Baker concept of Mars direct. The
ExPO reference was not represented in the original seven. The L2/lunar oxygen
cryogenic scheme was determined not economically attractive and was dropped. The L2-
based NTP is new. There is a related cryogenic option (not evaluated) in which both
hydrogen and oxygen are obtained from the Moon. It does not have the economic
drawbacks of oxygen-only, but requires roughly twice the lunar propellant production
rates as the NTP option. The electric L2-based option is new.
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Table 2-2. Architecture Options Summery, Characteristics inTerms of How They
Accomplish Functions
Option
Nominal all-up
cryo or NTP
crew mission
Nominal all-up
cryo A/B
mission
Nommal all-up
NEP or SEP
crew m isslon
Mars Direct
ExPO reference
NTP, L2-based
Electric,
L2-based
Enter Return
Exit Earth Transfer Capture at Land on Ascend Depart Transfer Earth
Gravity Well tO Mars Mars Mars from Mars Mars to Earth Gravity crew to
Well Earth
_Com blned_h ig h.th rus_ Propulsive MEV
maneuver(s)
J
_Combmed Aerobrakmg MEVhigh-thrust
maneuver(s)
Propulsive LOW- Propulsive MEV
spiral thrust spiral
transfer
Combined high-thrust
maneuver(s)
_Combinedhlgh-thrus; "Aerobrakrng captur;
maneuver(s) and descentJent_re
vehicle
Crew & cargo, H_gh
lunar thrust
transportation
system
Crew a& LOW-
cargo, lunar thrust
transportation transfer
system
MEV ascent " ComTDmed "
stage h_gh-thrust
maneuver(s)
MEV ascent Combined
stage high-thrust
maneuver(s)
MEV ascent Propulsive Low-
stage spiral thrust
transfer
"Aerobrak_ng captur; _ _
Preposltloned Earth return vehicle
and descent/enbre fueled from Mars propellant
vehicle
Propulsive MEV
Prepos. "Preposm_ned Earth
ascent return vehicle
stage, Mars
propellant
MEV ascent Combined
stage h_gh-thrust
maneuver(s)
Balhsttc Crew
return
veh=cle
Ballistic Crew
return
vehicle
Propulsive Crew
spiral return
vehicle
BalhstJc Crew
return
vehicle
Balhstlc Crew
return
vehicle
Crew return by lunar
transportation system
Propuls,ve MEV MEV ascent Proputs=ve Low- Crew return by lunar
stage sp=ral thrust transportation systemtransfer
To obtain a complete mission arehiteeture, one must combine a mission profile, a
compatible surface mission definition, a means of delivering the surface cargo needed
for the surface mission, and one or more propulsion meehanizations for the cargo and
crew missions. [n some eases, such as Mars direet, there is little distinetion between
mission profile and propulsion mechanization categories, i. e. they beeome a matched
pair. In other eases, several propulsion meehanizations are applicable to a particular
mission profile. In the present evaluation, certain limitations were placed on all possible
combinations to limit the scope of the evaluation =
a. Only conjunction profiles were considered, in keeping with the current ExPO mission
arehiteeture study. Opposition profiles would in some eases alter evaluation results.
b. The surface cargo requirement of 150 t. landed before the first human mission to
Mars, identified by the ExPO study, was aeeepted without eritique.
e. It was assumed that eargo transportation to Mars would be aeeommodated by the
same propulsion technology selected for the crew system. Aceordingly, eargo
transportation issues were not included in the evaluation.
d. The evaluation was conducted by judgmental scoring based on available information
on the architectures. Calculations of architecture performance characteristics
were done in only a few instances.
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Table 2-3 compares several propulsion mechanizations according to qualitative
features, benefits and issues. This complements the advantages and disadvantages of the
mission profiles presented earlier. It is clear that all have good and bad features. The
STCAEM assessment is that any of these mechanizations could be the favorite under
plausible future determinations of Mars program rationale, mission strategy and
technology status.
Table 2-3. Architecture Options Summary
Note: All options take advantage of cargo pre-placement
Option
Nominal all-up NTP
crew rntSSlOn
Features
• All-propulsive
• Max_rnurn abort menu
• "Sortie" MEV
Nominal all-up cryo • Cryogemcs + aerobraklng
A/B mission • "Sortie" MEV
Mars direct • Conjunction/spht
• Prop/aerobrakmg
Direct land,ng
In-s=tu propellants
ExPO reference • Conjunct_on/spht
• Nuc & AJB opt=ons
• In-s=tu propellants
• Spht "sortie" MEV
Electric (NEP or SEP) • All-propulsive, low thrust
• "Sortie" MEV
Benefits
• Safety potential
• Insensitive to profile difficulty
issues
• NTP ground testing
• Reactor d_sposal
• No rellance on nuclear propuls=on •Aerobrakertsks
• Opposttuon capable • Profile sens_tlwty
• No Mars orbit ops • Rehance on robotics
•Mintmum Earth orbit Ops • Low IMLEO claim hlngeson
hght return hab
• NO Earth orbit ops • Rehance on robotics
• Reduced IMLEO • Lack of aborts
• M_mmurn Earth oblt ops • EPcost
• Reduced IMLEO • EP rehabdfty
Selection criteria are clearly dependent on program rationale and mission strategy.
To illustrate the point, table 2-4 includes selection eriteria consistent with the Synthesis
report selection of nuclear propulsion in 1991, and adds other criteria that appear to
have equal if not greater relevance today (summer 1993).
Table 2-4. Old and New Criteria for Architecture Evaluation
Old New
(1) Evolution to low recurring COSt and large passenger capacity, responding to settlement asa long-range X
wston. Even a major human sc=entJ_c exploration of Mars needs this;
(2) Low or at least reasonable cost to f_rst rn_ss=on H_ghest leverages: X X
(a) Modest-size commercial launch veh=cles;
(b) Commonahty of hardware, minimum no of development projects
(3) Cornrnonahty of overall architecture w=th other space actJwtJes X
• Future evolution of space transportation and operat=ons architecture should accept exploration as one
of its rnlsstons;
• Exploration program should accept the constraent of cornpat=bdlty with a reasonable overall
architecture.
(4) Multiple-use technology developments, t • benef=t=ng society on Earth, to make the near-term X
econom=c benefit of explorat=on =rnportant =n =ts own r_ght;
(5) Safety, because such a rn=ss=on _sr_sky at best; and X X
(6) Acceptable development and operat=onal risk cons=stent w,th themes 1 through 4. X X
(7) M_mmum mass _n low Earth orb=t (often used but not by STCAEM) X
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Table 2-5 shows scoring of the propulsion mechanizations for the two sets of
criteria, and figure 2-20 illustrates the total scores in bar chart format. That the scores
are overall greater with the greater number of criteria is simply due to more criteria
leading to higher scores. The importance of the Figure is that under criteria seen as
important during the Synthesis activity, nuclear thermal propulsion scores highest,
whereas when newer criteria are added, other options score higher. This serves to
underline the earlier assertion that selection of preferred architectures is sensitive to
program goals and rationales. Until these are resolved it is premature to select a "best"
architecture.
Table 2-5. Provisional Evaluation
Criteria
Architecture Evolution to LowCostto Common Multi-Use Safety DevlOps(Score # 1) LOW Rec w/General Technology Risk{Score #2] Cost Is_Mission Architecture
Cryo AJB No (0) Unclear (3) NO (0) No (0) Dubious (2) Hcgh (1)
(6)[6]
Synthes_s Better than Better than Some (t) No (0) Good (S) Moderate
NTP (13) [15] Cryo A,'B (2) Cryo AJB (4) (3)
Zubrtn Mars Potential (3) Depends on NO (0) Some (3) OK (3) H_gh (1)
Direct Robot=ca (4)(8) [14]
ExPO Mars Not Clear (2) Dubious; No (0) Some (3) Poor (0) Higher (0)
Surface too many
Rendezvous develop-
(2) [7] ments (2)
NTR/L2 Yes (S) Unclear (2) Possible (3) Yes (4) Good (S) Hsgh (1)
(Lun/AST H 2)
(5)[20]
NEP/SEP; Yes (S) Potential (1) Yes (S) Yes (S) SEP/good Moderate
LEP(8)(21] NEP/Maybe (2)(3)
2.5 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
Technology assessments have been done frequently during the various studies of
exploration missions since 1988. Most of these have strived to create an "absolute"
technology list. In fact, priorities for some technologies are architecture-dependent and
priorities for others may be sensitive to the amount of technology funding that may be
made available, and to technology developments embedded in current or planned
development activities for other missions. These points are diseussed in what follows.
2.5.1 Technology Candidates and Groups
The technology candidates were organized into four groups =
and power; aerobraking, and testability.
Life support; propulsion
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Cryo A/B
Synthesis NTP
Mars Direct
ExPO spilt
NTP-JLunar H2
"Old"
criteria
NEP/SEP
Cryo AJB
"Old" +
"New"
cr_terla
Synthesis NTP
Mars Direct
ExPO split
NT_Lunar H 2
NEPfSEP
I Dev/Ops R=sk
I Safety
I Multi-Use Tech*
]Common Arch.*
[_ Low Cost 1st Msn
I Low Rec Cost*
*'New" criteria
0 10 20
"Score" _cs_a2
Figure 2-20. Scored Evaluation re Long-Term Utility for Mars Exploration and Settlement
2.5.2 Technology considerations
Relative importance of technologies were assessed based on the following
eonsiderations:
a. Contributions to mission safety through enabling of architectures or mission profiles
that offer greater safety by virtue of fewer critical events and/or more accessible
abort modes.
b. Benefits through reduced use cost, typically because of greater reuse of space
hardware or reduced mass of Earth launch to conduct a mission.
c. Technology advancement cost, which must be evaluated relative to reduced use
cost.
d. Readiness timing, in terms of the present state of the technology versus the state
needed prior to a development program, the timing of the need in the overall
program framework, and the time needed to reaeh an adequate readiness level.
2.5.3 Teelmology Attributes
We concluded that technologies should be evaluated in terms of four attribute
categories (eaeh technology may have a characteristic in more than one category):
a. The current technology is "woefully inadequate" or nonexistent: something must be
done to bring the technology to the level required for application.
DSS/D615-10070/DISK 1/F41/246-3/11:22 A
41
D615-10070
b.
Co
do
Need for the technology is arehiteeture-driven_ that is, required by some
architectures but not others. In this case, the "somethin_ t that "must be done" can
be a change of architecture.
The ease for advancing the technology is basically a cost/benefit matter, i.e. its
priority is driven by investment versus payoff.
The technology has a very long lead time_ early research-oriented investment is
needed to to define the advancement path. In these cases, the eventual value of the
technology may also be in question and early research can clarify this point. Often,
significant progress can be made in these technologies at relatively low funding, and
a real success might have major payoff. These are therefore prime candidates for
investment if the available budget is small, because a significant return might be
realized, where a technology beyond the research stage may require substantial
funding to make any progress at all.
In addition, it is important to understand to what degree ongoing programs may be
advancing the technology, as in the ease of Space Station and physieo-ehemieal life
support.
2.5.4 Evaluation= Timing of Needs and Priorities
Table 2-6 presents a summary of the evaluations for each technology area. Most of
these are self-explanatory but the items on nuclear power and propulsion are
controversial and need special discussion.
Nuclear Power and Prppulsion - This area comprises nuclear thermal propulsion,
nuclear electric propulsion, nuclear electric power for other space uses, especially planet
surface power, and in the future, more advanced means of extracting useful propulsion or
power from the energy of nuclear reactions.
Nuclear technology is the target of much criticism because of association with
nuclear weaponry, nuclear powerplant accidents (which, even including Chernobyl, have
been relatively benign compared to the consequences of mining and burning coal), high
costs including severe cost overruns, worrisome and dangerous byproducts such as very
long-lived nuclear wastes, the highly arcane nature of the technology itself, and an
attitude occasionally exhibited by nuclear technologists of "it's too complicated for
others to understand; we know best how to make it work_ trust us". Not surprisingly,
there is a substantial public and political distrust of anything nuclear. This extends to
nuclear power and propulsion for space applications. The recently revealed fact that the
Air Force was developing a nuclear rocket in great secrecy does not make the situation
any better. To the present day, a clear and concise need for nuclear technology in space
has arisen only for RTGs; these have been used on several missions. Low and modest-
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Table 2-6.
Nuclear Thermal Propulsion
and pubhc safety of paramount _mportance but not clear there fs a technology _ssue.
• Selection of reactor d_sposal scheme may _dent_fy safety technology requirement
Use Costs:
_nt use cost benefit identdled over cryo propulsaon and cryo/aerobraklng.
• Benefit justified advancement and development cost m most Mars scenarios.
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
Major technology advancement budget _tem, _ $2 bdhon over 6 to 10 years.
Fuels technology advancements (first step of advancement program) has modest cost but recluJres new or upgraded test
reactor facilities.
• STCAEM trades recommended carb=de fuels technology, >900 Isp.
Readiness Timlnq:
1:irst Mars cargo m=ss=on for all-up test of system Lunar rehearsal test prov0des added r_sk reduct=on; advances need date
_2 years
CateqorJes:
• Current technology (NERVA) mothballed; far from flight ready
• Architecture-driven.
Payoff justifies _nvestment re cryo or cryo/aerobrak=ng, but nuclear or solar electric can be cost competlt=ve alternatives.
Leadttme_ 12 years to first fhght use; somewhat technology dependent NERVA technology _ 8-10 years; very
advanced _ 15 years.
Nuclear Electric Propulsion
safety and conttnuous nature of electr;c propulsion dr_ves need for long hfe and high rehabd_ty and redundancy
management.
• Selection of reactor d_sposal scheme may _dent_fy added techr;otogy requirements
Use Costs:
e--I_-_'ential for low use costs; reusableprofdes and low propellant resupply.
• Concepts for expendable NEP profiles defeat the advantages of NEP.
• NEP cost effectiveness potent=al Js very sensattve to tr=p t_me reclu_rements.
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• Major technology advancement budget _tem, >S2 bflhon over 10- 12 years.
• Commonahty potential with planet surface power should be fully exploited.
• STCAEM trades recommended modular potassium Rankme systems
Readiness T0minq:
• First Mars cargo mlsston for all-up test of system; should return tO Earth for dragnost_csand reuse
Cateqor_es:
• Current technology "woefully madecluate"
• Archttecture-drlven but must be considered jointly with planet surface power needs.
• Payoff justifies =nvestment re cryo or cryo aerobrak=ng Comparison to NTP must =nclude planet surface commonahty
• Lead t=me > 12 years to first fhght use; hfe testing requ=red; quahf_catlon hfe may be as great as 25,000 hours
Solar Electric Propulsion
ology advancement must demonstrate redundancy management method that cap_tahzes on great _nherent
redundancy of solar electric system
Use Costs:
e--'_-_'potential for low use costs; reusable profdes and low propellant supply
• SEP cost effectiveness potential _svery sensitive to tr_p t_me reclu=rements
• STCAEM trades showed that array product*on cost must be below _$200/watt for SEP to dehver economic benefit.
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
Issue tsdemonstration of low production cost for h=gh-performance hghtwe_ght arrays No estimates are available.
Readiness Tim_nq:
First Mars cargo miss=on for all-up test of system; no estimates of advancement t_me reclu_red; Beheved to be about 8
years includtng production cost demonstrat=on
Cate,clor=es:
• Cu(rent array performance/mass w_th_n factor of 2 of reasonable targets.
• Most aspects of product=on technology probably exist _n commeroal _ndustry.
• Archttecture-dependent. Planet surface power commonahty _squest=onable
• Payoff justtfies =nvestment if and only if arrayproc/uction cost is low.
• Lead t=me 8-10 years to first fhght use
Speoal Note:
SEP =snot suttable for outer solar system use
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Table 2-6. (Continued)
EVA(Suits)
lding requirement insuit desagn
= Safe operation must be preserved in daily routine use and over long life.
Use Costs:
e--_r'_ems absolutely essential for mlssfon; need for the technology is not just a matter of un-use cost.
• Benefit justified advancement and development cost m most Mars scenar=os.
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• EVA equipment technology advancement can be moderate _n cost.
• Operational equipment development is expensive because of the strict safety requirements.
• Essential to ensure that technology base _sadequate and fit for use dunng advancement phase to avoid full scale
development of inadequate equipment
Readiness Timinq:
• Operational systems for _nltlal Mars exploration phase.
Cateclor_es:
• Current technology "woefully _nadequate"
• In-use payoff for high durablhty and long-life systems.
• Not architecture-driven.
• Fully adequate operational systems only after field experience. Technology advancement should not strive for what _s
only achievable w=th field experience.
Cryogenic Fluids Management
s_afe___
• Inadequate technology leads to safety _ssues including fire and explosion and crews being stranded =n space due to loss of
propellant.
Use Costs:
_nology is essent=al for nuclear thermal and cryogemc propulsion.
• Cryo propulsion needed In landers even w_th alternative transfer propuls=on.
• Alternatives are costly by comparison
TechnoIoqy Advancement Cost:
• Depends on specific need. Can be modest to moderately expensive.
• This area has been plagued by high-cost space experiment proposals.
Readiness Timmq:
• High-performance insulation and tank pressure control for first lunar mlssaon. Full menu of capabd=ty for Mars; speofic
requirements are architecture-dependent.
Cateqories:
• Current technology "woefully inadequate"
• Not archMtecture-drlven (all architectures need =t) but spec=fic technology advancement plan needs to be coordinated
w_th architecture evolution.
Payoff justified the investment, One of the h_ghest payoff areas identified by STCAEM trades.
Lead t_me can be relatively short =f incremental fhght test strategy _sbu=lt =nto the architecture evolut=on
Aerobraking Thermal Protection Systems
Use Costs:
are not economically pract=cal without use of aerobrak_ng/3"PS for planetary entry and landing
Cost benefits will accrue to _ncreased technology capab=llty for reuse after severe entry heat=ng conditions
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• A few millions per year is adequate for materials development.
Actwe TPS, e.g. transpiration coohng, requires more expensive testing.
inadequately developed technology can severely _mpact system development costs, e g. shuttle tiles
Readiness Timinq:
Needed for initial missions; improvements can be inserted =nto program later.
Cateqories:
• Current technology is usable for all m_ssMon needs, but only for single-use heat shields _n most cases
• In part architecture-driven, eg. aerobrak_ng verses propuls=on for Mars capture
• Reuse payoff is arch=tecture-degendent.
• Materials development lead time depends on the material; typically 2-4 years.
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Table 2-6. (Continued)
Aerobraking GN&C
safety critical, hardware, software, and algorithms.
Use Costs:
• _ use cost _ssue; function _srequired to perform mlsston
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• One to a few millions per year, depending on how many paths/m_t_at_ves are undertaken.
Readiness Timinq:
• Needed for first missions. Improvements can be phased _n later.
Categories:
• Current technology generally adequate; marginal performance _n some cases.
• Architecture-driven re speofic apphcat_ons.
0 Major payoff for advanced techniques such as neural networks because of reductions m hardware/software costs.
• Lead time to devetop new techniques 2-4 years.
Lunar Transfer and Lander Engines
• Descent to landing and ascent are hfe-cr_t_cal funcbons,
• Successful propulsion operabon must be assured; redundancy =sa vahd solution.
Use Costs:
• _ particularly a use cost 4ssue; function is required to accomphsh mtsslon.
• Improved engine performance leads to lower use cost. High Isp _s tmportant,
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
Adequate technology advancement pace needs a few tens of mflhons per year.
New engine full-scale development _sat least a few hundred mJthons
• Minimum acceptable program _stoadd throtthng tO RL-10 derlvateve; development cost more or less 10% of new engine
Readiness Timin,q:
• Minimum capabilities needed for first lunar rnlsslon
• New engine could be phased m later _f desired,
Cateqortes:
• Current technology ts usable w_th throtthng and wtth testabdvty (see later sheet).
• Not architecture-driven.
• Moderate favorable cost/benefit ratron for new. h_gh-performance engine
• Lead time 2-4 years technology, 6-8 years for engine development
$peoal Note:
A new storable propellant or methane engine may be needed for Mars ascent. Technology advancement _sneeded m the
case of advanced storables,
8ioregenerative Life Support
Safety."
Not applicable to transfer vehicles
Benefits on Mars can be obtained through food reserves.
• If btoregen also used for atr and water, adequate backups must be provided
Use Costs:
• Large---eTong-range benefit for permanently occupied Mars s_tes; can reduce hfe support consumables by more than half
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• Near term _sresearch-oriented, modest cost, to estabhsh basic science
• Integrated systems expected to be typical of hfe support system costs
• Opportumty should be taken to obtain m-use expertence on space station where btoregen can "pay _ts way"
Readiness Tfmmq:
• Prototype systems for Mars exploration phase
• Operabona/systems for Mars permance phase
Cateqones:
• Physico-chemical ts adequate until settlement
• In-use payoff for Mars surface as soon as serviceable systems are avadable.
• Not archttecture-dr_ven.
• Very long lead to operational systems; research and development justified to determine reahst_c technology advancement
and development paths and schedules
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Table 2-6. (Continued)
In-Situ Propeliants and Fluids
• Not a primary technology _ssue. Crew safety sets requ,rements on process rehabdity as source of hfeocr_tlcal propellant
and how used in architecture.
Use Costs:
_orable when properly ,nserted _nto architecture, assuming current estimates of performance/mass characteristics
are valid.
• Very sensitive to ratio of annual production/installation mass; needs to approach I or better (except for hydrogen).
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• Early process research inexpensive; $1 million/year recommended
, Artemis.class experiments on Moon are few mdl,ons.
Experimental prototypes during early human lunar mission _ S100 million.
Oxygen/methane form Mars atmosphere may not need technology expertments on Mars.
Readiness Timinq:
. Lunar propellant _ 50 t./year _n t_me for permanent occupancy phase.
, Mars propellant timing architecture-dependent.
Cateqories:
• No technology (beyond laboratory bench-top experiments) presently exists.
• Some of the Mars methane processes have been used ,n terrestrial industry.
• Architecture-driven.
• High payoff
• Lead time requ,rements presently not well-understood.
In-Situ Structures
quently not recogn=zed that the most useful _n-sltu der=ved structures wdl have to safely contain _ I arm pressure.
• Will be subject to the usual stringent safety requ=rements, e.g, like aircraft cabin.
Use Costs:
_h benefit before a settlement or _ndustrlahzatlon phase.
• Settlement or industrialization probably cannot be affordable without th,s technology.
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• Unknown.
• Some ongoing university research; should be expanded.
Readiness Timlnc]:
• Unknown; probably not less than 20 years
Cateqories:
No technology exists beyond a few very small exper,ments w,th analogous mater,als.
Program goal driven; not arch_tecture-dr,venVery high payoff if and when needed
• Lead time unknown.
• Appropriate to expand un,verslty research to better define the technical poss_bdJtles and problems
Testability
safety critical.
• Issue is safe and rehable operation of systems after long per,ods _n space, and how to prov,de testabd_ty that assures very
high confidence systems will work when called upon.
Use Costs:
• Not a use cost issue, except that not hay,rig th_s technology could drive us to h_gh-cost mtssaon designs and operational
practtces to ensure adequate safety
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• Unknown; specific technology requirements not _dentd_ed (even the functional requirement _s ,ncompletely known)
Readiness Timlnq:
• Needed for first missions.
• Mars requirements is more dtfftcult than lunar because of longer times and greater d_fficulty of rescue
Cateqories:
• Current technology "woefully =nadequate"
• Artificial intelligence won't solve this one. It does not appear to be an _nvent,on problem The _ssue how to assure that a
system which is not operating wdl when called upon
• Not architecture-driven.
Payoff appears to be h_gh
Lead time unknown. The specific technology requDrement needs to be defined
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Table 2-6. (Continued)
Physico-Chemical Life Support
uate durability for long-duration missions is essenttal.
• Mature hardware more tmportant than latest h_ghest-performance gadgets.
Use Costs:
_sure on water and oxygen.
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• Space Station contribution not clear
• Russian contribution not clear.
• If hardware maturity and durability must be accomplished through technology and development programs it will be
expensive and probably inadequate.
Readiness Tirnlnq:
• In time for first Mars mission.
Cateclories:
• Inac_equate; durability presently _snot adequate for a Mars mtssaon.
• Not architecture-driven.
• Open life support would cost over $I bflhon more per m_ss=on just for launch.
• Lead time is _ 10 years of _n-use testsng but space station use counts.
Aerobraking Structures
safety critical re structural failure
Use Costs:
structural mass has moderate to h_gh leverage on use costs.
• Deployable or robot_cally assembled structures may have great leverage on space operations cost.
Technoloqy Advancement Cost:
• Highly application-dependent.
• Generally in the few rnflhons to few tens of mflhons per year.
Readiness Timinq:
• Needed for first missions; improvements can be phased =n later.
Cateqoraes:
• Current technology is adequate.
• In part architecture-driven; eg, aerobrak=ng versus propulsion for Mars capture
i Payoff for higher-performance structures _salmost universally very good.Materials lead tfmes are notoriously long, up to decadesDesign application lead t_mes are short, 2-3 years or less.
level nuclear technology programs have existed in the DoE and NASA for many years
based on a general perception that they will be needed "someday". In the past year,
politicaltolerance and support for these activitiesbased on potential future need has
apparently evaporated. The programs are being shut down, apparently based on
piecemeal decisions made in the vacuum of lack of clear policy.
This isall to make the point that nuclear teehnology isnot a question of priority,it
isa question of national poliey. Space teehnology has beeome politieized,at least to the
point where advocacy by expert teehnologists because something is"good technology" or
beeause of potential future need, is not enough. Apollo lifted off for the Moon on
engines funded by the Air Force for four years before Apollo started because "we ought
to have a million-pound-thrust engine". Today that doesn't work. The U. S. needs a
national policy on the development and application of nuclear technology in space. No
policy is a policy to shut down existing programs and not develop space nuclear
technologies.
Development of nuclear technology policy for space applications should recognize
several considerations:
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a. While there are alternatives for many of the proposed future applications of nuclear
space power or propulsion, they will generally cost more and take longer; that is why
nuclear technology was recommended for these in the first place.
b. Nuclear technology development needs continuous long-term support to maintain the
research and test facilities and to develop and maintain the needed human expertise
and analytical tools.
e. Nuclear space systems need to be designed for long life and high reliability, and the
technology needs to support this. Mission studies often push the technology to
performance limits to minimize mass, but this does not minimize cost or maximize
safety. Most studies have given little consideration to how end-of-life nuclear
systems will be dealt with, or what it will cost. The utility of nuclear technology in
space, in the broadest sense, is enhanced by long life; we should think in terms of
system design life of 20 to 100 years.
d. Nuclear technology is essential to the long-range future of space exploration and
development. Humankind will probably never leave the inner solar system without
some practical form of advanced nuclear propulsion.
Testability - Space systems have a serious reliability and testability deficiency.
Commercial airlines are held up to public criticism if they do not achieve an on-time
dispatch reliability of about 9596. Modern jetliners are comparable in complexity (parts
count, etc.) to space vehicles. The on-time dispatch reliability of the space shuttle is
poor, much less than 5095. Unless one drives an old clunker, the on-time dispatch
reliability of a personal automobile is on the order of 99.995 Autos are of course less
complex than space vehicles, but how much less? Also, the cost of auto hardware (per
pound) is less than 0.195 that for typical space vehicles.
Many shuttle launch delay problems are caused by failures or instrumentation
problems in hardware that cannot be functionally tested until the last few seconds of
countdown, when subsystems are started up for flight. If these items could be
adequately tested during launch preparations, fewer launch delays would occur because
failures could be detected and corrected in advance.
It is not practical to consider using a hardware/software/test/operations technology
that achieves 1095 dispatch reliability for exploration-class missions. Too many things
must work to get a mission launched and to achieve mission success and safe return of a
crew. If a launch from Mars encounters hardware failures, one eantt obtain replacement
parts by scavenging them from another vehicle. Improvements must be made:
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a. Higher hardware/software reliability through maturity and through design for
reliability instead of simply relying on redundancy for safety.
b. Improvements in design and advancements in technology to enable adequate testing
of dormant systems (such as a Mars ascent propulsion system that will not be called
upon to operate until ascent from Mars). Abort and rescue mission options depend
on timely knowledge that a critical system is non-operable.
c. Improvements in quality practices to minimize the chance of failure due to faulty
design or workmanship.
Finally,on testabilitya warning: Artificialintelligenceisnot a panacea and may be
of no help at all. The technology of automated testing and diagnostics for systems which
are operating is far advanced. Artificialintelligence is sometimes used, but ordinary
software also works well. The issue is to adequately test a system which is not
operating, and artificialintelligenceoffers no help here. It willbe necessary to get into
the inner workings of each criticalsubsystem and ascertain,test point by test point:
a. Isthisitem testable? How?
b. If not,can itbe redesigned to make it more testable? (For example, a criticalvalve
could be designed to go through a test cycle which determines that the actuators
and sensors are working and the valve is not "stuck", without opening the valve and
permitting flow.)
e. Ifnot, can the system be redesigned to eliminate the item or make ittestable?
d. What are the specific technology advancements and advanced developments needed
to demonstrate testability?
2.5.5 Funding Constraints, Technical Capabilities, and Projected Readiness
Funding currently available for exploration-related technology development is not
enough to take on major technology advancement projects. The best strategy is to use
the modest resources available to make advancements in research-level technologies.
Three categories are recommended: bioregenerative life support (some research is
already going on in this area), in-sftumaterials processing, and testability. University
research isunder way in in-s/t_materials and could be expanded.
In testability,new research should be focused on the issues described above,
covering testabilityfor dormant systems. It isrecommended that propulsion systems be
the prime subject of initialinvestigations,and that initialresearch concentrate on
identifying design features and technology advancements at the propulsion system
component level which could become the subject of laboratory technology advancement
programs.
0SS/061S-10070/DISK 1/F49/246-3/11:22 A
49
D615-10070
When additional funding becomes available, the technology areas listed earlier in
table 2-6 should be considered for funding. Each will require annual funding in the low
tens of millions to make reasonable progress. It is better to adequately fund one or two
areas than to inadequately fund all.
While the lander engine area is ranked relatively low in priority on the premise that
an adequate lander engine can be developed without a technology advancement program,
consideration should be given to the state of rocket propulsion technology in the U. S.
There are no significant technology advancement programs or engine developments
presently under way. One beneficial approach might be to combine a program in
testability with one in lander/aseent engine development
Space nuclear technology, as mentioned above, needs formulation of a national
policy. Advancements in fuel form teehnology, for nuclear thermal propulsion reactors
and nuclear electric power reactors, needs funding on the order of tens of millions
annually. Power conversion machine technology needs at least $10 million annually;
Brayton and potassium Rankine equipment should be funded.
To be ready for incorporation into full-scale development programs, nuclear
technology needs to be carried to the level of prototype rocket reactors and engines, and
prototype electric powerplants. The notion that reactors and power conversion systems
need not be coupled together for integrated testing may be acceptable for low power
thermoelectric conversion systems but is not appropriate to high-power dynamic thermal
cycle systems. Both nuclear thermal propulsion and nuclear electric power systems will
require major new or refurbished test facilities for this phase of development. The
funding requirements could grow to hundreds of millions annually. The funding
requirements for this phase of technology advancement is a further reason for a national
policy on nuclear power and propulsion technology for space applications.
2.5.6 Summary of Teehnolol_ Recommendations
a. Initiate "seed money" funding of research-oriented areas: bioregenerative life
support, in-situ materials, and testability.
b. Fund technology advancement areas in priority order (see table 2-7) as funding
becomes available. It is better to fund some areas adequately than all inadequately.
c. Develop a national policy on nuclear power and propulsion for space applications. A
key part of this recommendation is to analyze future needs and alternative energy
sources so that the policy can be based on potential mission needs and on the
consequences of not having nuclear power and propulsion technology available when
needed. NASA should take the lead in developing such policy for civil space
applications, coordinating with DoD to identify common interests.
A further summary is provided in table 2-7.
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Table 2- 7. Technology Conclusions
National R&D Policy Issue: Nuclear Propulsion and Power
• Needed technology funding is large compared to current space R&T budget.
• Policy issue, not a priority _ssue. With policy _n place, prtortty wdl fall out.
Technoloqy Advancement Fund=nq Recommende(_ _n pr=orJty order
• EVA suits.
• Cryogenic flu0ds management.
• Aerobraklng TPS
• Aerobraking GN&C.
• High-performance solar array production cost reductuon (to $200NV (_ 4 MWe/yr).
• Lander engines.
Technoloqy Research Fundinq Recommended; equal priority
Bioregenerat_ve hfe support
ln-$itu materials: propellants and structures.
Need to Understand the Technolocly Requirements: Testabd_ty
Technology for automated diagnostics of operating hardware _smainly _n hand.
How tO test non-operating cr=tlcal system, • g, lander engines?
- Not an AI question; need an integrated techn=cal approach
- Anticipate the technical approach wdl _dent=fy component technologies.
Relationship to Current Proqrams
• Phys0co-chemlcal hfe support.
• Aerobraking structures.
2.6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS
This is the final report for the STCAEM study. The study lasted four years, covered
almost all of the period of the SEI activity initiated by President Bush, and continued for
several months after the 1992 election, which effectively marked the end of SEI.
Accordingly, it seems appropriate that this report make recommendations for future
work which go beyond the strict boundaries of the statement of work. These
recommendations are aimed at specifying the kinds of analyses that could place the
exploration of Mars on the U. S. national agenda as an activity highly relevant to
national needs and goals.
2.6.1 The Rationale Problem
Clearly, there was a rationale problem with SEI, as suggested by figure 2-21.
President Bush's speeches on the subject did not establish rationale beyond "leadership".
While leadership may be an important rationale, it is necessary to state clearly why
exploration of Mars establishes, or contributes to, leadership. This was missing.
• It's not a cold war ,mperat_ve hke Apollo
• The Supercolhder seems to be at the upper edge of poht=cally feasible cost for a "b_g sc,ence" project
• Nuclear rockets and Iong-durat=on space bah,tats don't seem to have much to do w,th nat,onal compet,t,veness or
economic growth.
• The env=ronmental connect=on, although ,t ex=sts. ,s tenuous
• "Spmoffs" don't work or SEI would have got some funding
• Pres=dentmal advocacy _sn't enough for a lengthy program Adm,n,stratlons change
• Internattonal cooperat,on can be a h,ghly benef,c,al ,mplementat,on but ,t's not a rat,onale
• "Because _t's there" _sprobably better than any of the above (The leadersh,p thang; ,t's the k ,nd of th_ng that world
leader nations do)
• St=mulus for excellence =n young people ,s a good one But what turns them on ,s a space program they can be part of
S_x people to Mars Jsnot that.
Figure 2-2 t. The Rationale Problem for Human Mars Missions
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NASA attempted to develop rationale after the fact, by observing that space
exploration stimulates education, creates jobs, and so forth. These were in the nature of
"spinoff" rationales simply by being after the fact of setting the goal by the President.
It was never clear how Mars exploration would reduce the deficit, improve national
competitiveness, reduce crime, solve health care, or clean up the environment. In fact,
it might contribute to all these things but an effective case was not made. The goals of
a space exploration program must be actually derived from national needs and goals, and
widely reeoguized as having been so derived. Otherwise, rationales relating said space
program to these needs and goals are widely regarded as fabrications even if they are
substantially accurate.
It is useful to consider historical precedents for initiation of major space programs.
Apollo was simply a Cold War imperative. Its purpose was to demonstrate the
superiority of U. S. technology, in a field which the Soviets had promoted as the premier
arena of peaceful superpower competition in the eyes of world opinion. Valiant efforts
on the part of NASA to obtain funding to extend Apollo to a lunar base, even a
temporary one, were not successful. Once Apollo succeeded, a lunar base was not a Cold
War imperative.
Sk'ylab was approved as a flight experiment, in a time when major flight experiments
could be approved if the price was right and important technical advances were
promised.
The shuttle and the space station were both supported on the basis of economic
considerations. Shuttle was intended to reduce the cost of space transportation and the
space station is intended to become a national laboratory in orbit, serving many lines of
research and development. Both these programs maintain the U. S. civilian manned
space flight institution without large annual funding peaks such as needed by Apollo.
Space science missions are supported for their scientific return and their
contributions to education. It appears unlikely that a new, costly exploration program
can be funded on the basis of scientific return. The Superconducting Supereollider seems
to be at the upper edge of feasible cost for a "big science" program, and exploration of
Mars will be much more costly than that.
Presidential advocacy also did not serve to get SEI moving.
International cooperation is a highly beneficial implementation, but by itself is not a
rationale for Mars exploration. International cooperation can be a part of any space
activity.
Two of the rationales offered for Mars exploration are promising. "Because it's
there" is probably better than any of the above. Exploring Mars is the kind of thing that
world leader nations do. A group of world leader nations can of course work together to
make the endeavor truly international. Stimulus for excellence in young people is also
DSS/D615-10070/DISK 1/F521246-3/11:22 A
52
D815-10070
promising. It is argued that people need a vision of a hopeful future. But that vision
needs to depict a space program many people can aspire to participate in. The SEI
scenarios of six people to Mars dontt offer that vision.
2.6.2 Settlement as Vision and Rationale
The vision that fits better than any other is already mentioned in national space
policy: "Expand human presence into the Solar System". It can begin with settlement of
Mars. Development of the Moon as a resource base and industrial park is also a part of
this vision, but Mars is the logical settlement goal. It is the most habitable planet in the
Solar System after Earth. Not actually very habitable because of its severe
environment, Mars has a reasonable day/night cycle, some atmosphere, and all of the raw
materials needed to construct a civilization. Some investigators have put forth plausible
schemes for "terraformin_', i.e. altering Mars' environment to the point that people
could live there without spacesuits. Mars is also seen a treasure trove of science
ineluding planetology, Solar System history, and paleobiolo_. Some scientists speculate
that life may still exist on Mars in sheltered areas where energy is available, such as
underground pockets of liquid water heated by low-level voleanie activity.
The main reasons for Mars settlement according to this vision are not science, but
eeonomics, the romance of a frontier, and advancement of human civilization. Dr.
Thomas Paine described ten reasons for settling Mars, summarized in figure 2-22.
Economtc Development - long term investment m a creative new growth economy
Limitless Growth Potential - vast untapped resources, ehmmate hm_ts to growth
National Pr_de and Leadership - hstory's greatest h_gh-tech adventure
Rehg=ous, Ideological and Hunam_st=c Values preserve hfe and expand [humamty]
Mart=an Descendants growth offamd_es, race and ethmc groups on new worlds
A Fresh Start owhzat_on working toward hmttless future for mank=nd
Techmcal Pdgr=m's Haven techmcally or=anted frontier soc=et_es
HPgh Product=v=ty Systems Dr=ver development of rehable robotec production
Research and Exploration - Umque R&D base and techmcal soc=ety for research
Prototype Extraterrestr=al Commumty for future generat=ons to [use farther outl
Figure 2-22. Dr. Tom Paine's Reasons for Mars Settlement (Abridged)
The settlement vision sets high aspirations for the human species and asks a
profound question; Are we humans a one-planet species or is it possible to expand our
habitat beyond Earth, into the solar system, someday beyond?
As Apollo pictures of Earth as a "blue marble" in the blackness of space changed
human perspectives about Earth, either a yes or no answer to the settlement question
will cause humanity to view its relationship to the home planet differently, and design a
future here on Earth for a sustainable future, while trying to create a future that
reaches beyond Earth.
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This vision offers a Mars settlement devoted to exploration and science on a new
world which will eventually become a second home for mankind, in the process,
important development in addition to science will occur. Suggestions for missions
beyond science include:
a. Development of settlement construction technology
b. Development of closed environment agriculture (bioregenerative) food production
technology
e. Development of closed cycle waste management technology
d. Development and maintenance of an independent agricultural gene pool (easily
worth the cost of settlement if settlement is done cost-effectively)
e. Development of advanced robotics and AI technology
f. Development of terraforming science.
This kind of program could draw broad public support. There is a place in it for
people, eventually a great many people.
2.6.3 Eeonomie Faetors
Historically, settlements have produced major advances in products and services,
technology, science and the arts, and societal and political ideas. All have economic
value as weU as values beyond economics.
While the long-range economics of Mars settlement is highly uncertain and has not
been analyzed, four points can be made:
a. Settlement is the least expensive way (to the sponsoring states) to maintain a
permanent human presence on Mars more than a few people.
b. A sizable settlement on Mars, even if mainly scientific, might generate as many as
100 "commercial" passenger trips per Mars opportunity, representing a substantial
space business opportunity.
c. One can imagine "slots" in settlement billeting being sold for enough (say $50
million) to make a profit transporting people to Mars.
d. There is, of course, no cost to Earth for anything the settlers make for themselves
through self-sufficiency.
One of the main questions on settlement economics is the cost of transportation to
Mars. Rough calculations indicate an eventual trip price, based on known technology,
about $30 million per round trip, including cost of money. This calculation is
summarized as follows"
The eventual cost of a 100-passenger "Mars-liner" is argued to be:
a. $5 Billion for a 25 MWe solar electric propulsion system at $200/W (100 for array
and 100 for propulsion equipment);
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b. $3 Billionfor a crew module mass for I00 passengers, 600 t. @ $50001kg.
c. Vehicle value is $8 billion;writeoff per mission $1.6 billionwith the writeoff
occurring over 5 mission opportunities (12 years). Including cost of money at 8%,
the investment isamortized in about 20 years.
d. Resupply isestimated as 800 t.at $1500/kg delivery cost; the resupply cost is $1.2
billion
e. The cost per passenger comes to $2.8 billion1100= $28 million.
It is presumed that transport service between Mars orbit and Mars surface will be
via reusable MEV based on Mars, supplied with propellant produced on Mars. An earlier
STCAEM report included a concept study for such a vehicle.
The solar-electric vehicle cost is dependent on array costs which have here been
postulated at a value one order of magnitude less than present-day solar array production
costs. This reduction can be justified on the basis of production rate and automation.
A rough cost estimate was also made for the nuclear thermal rocket/L2 basing/lunar
hydrogen architecture described above. NTP/L2/lunar hydrogen comes out less, at about
$20 million, but the lunar hydrogen production cost estimate is highly uncertain, based on
a cursory production system concept analysis.
Many people in the world today have earned income (i.e. not investment) with net
present value exceeding this amount. These people are apparently "worth" $30 million, if
one assumes "efficient markets". The question is, can people be worth that much on
Mars?
A major related issue is "what degree of self-sufficiency is reasonably achievable?"
The cost to deliver habitation and other facilities from Earth for large numbers of people
is prohibitive. Self-sufficiency for a settlement must mean more than life support and
propellants; it is a complete functioning economy. This economy is largely undefined:
We dontt know what it would produce, or how; we donit know what it would import or
export; and we dontt understand how the economy would work and grow as a function of
size or time. To understand the economic benefits and affordability of a settlement
program, these questions need to be addressed. While we cannot obtain complete
answers with today's knowledge, much can be learned that is presently unknown. One
key result of such analysis will be definition of questions that must be answered by
research and by Mars exploration itself.
2.6.4 Proposed Approach to Future Program and Architecture Definition
While the appropriateness of human settlement as a rationale for Mars is explored
and developed, at the same time it is important to develop plans for the definable future
parts of the program, both human and robotic. Mars exploration began a generation ago
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with Mariner 4 and continues with Mars Observer. Current mission concepts such as
MESUR fit into the obvious need to understand Mars better. Reasonable estimates of
exploration activities on Mars should be achievable through at least the first few human
missions. Figure 2-23 presents a few representative questions, some of which can be
answered by study and some by spacecraft or humans at Mars. These are by no means
exhaustive or necessarily top priority; they are meant to indicate the nature of questions
that lead to a program definition and to suggest developing a hierarchical ordering of
questions that leads directly into a program/mission requirements format.
Is it
technically
feasible?
Are the durations
acceptable for human
missions?
What is the surface of
Mars really like? (i.e.,
suitable for surface
mobility? chemically
safe?)
Can we grow food there
in a bio-regenerative
system ?
Can/Should
Humankind
Settle Mars?
I
Is it I
economically
beneficial?
What isthe most
economical way to "do
Mars" ?
What is the cost to the first
mission?
What is the recurring cost?
Early? After evolution?
What are the economic
impacts of Mars
settlement: Near Term ? Far
Term?
Is there accessible and
usable water? Etc.
EtC.
I
I Arethere other benefits ]
which override or
enhance economical
considerations?
What can we learn
scientifically that has direct or
indirect benefit here on Earth?
What effect would a Mars
settlement program have on
education? Onbusiness? On
peoples' attitudes? Etc.
What multi-use technologies
would be enhanced?
Etc.
Figure 2-23. Sample Questions and Demonstrations
Mars exploration studies, ever since the von Braun proposal of 1952, have been
strong on how to get to Mars and back and weak on what people will actually do on Mars.
(Automated mission studies have done a much better job of what their robots will do.)
With a defined program rationale and goals, a hierarchy of questions should lead directly
to definition of human activities. This, in turn, should enhance public interest in Mars
exploration since people easily relate to what people do, especially if it is exciting. Thus
rationale development and planning details of actual missions for Mars explorers go hand
in hand. As this report and the earlier STCAEM reports show, there are many acceptable
ways for humans to get to Mars and back. It's urgent to concentrate on what happens
when the human explorers arrive on the red planet.
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A settlement program has open-ended goals but can have strictly bounded
commitments; that is, it can be defined and approved piecemeal, with each approval
commitment having defined goals, costs, schedules, results, and future options. We
already know that early steps towards self-suffieieneywill reduce the cost of human
operations on Mars A settlement program could have an end point as limited as a few
conjunction-class missions with food and propellant production. If things go well, a
settlement program, after many incrementally-approved segments, could be as ambitious
as millionsof people on a terraformed Mars.
In either case, the firstfew decades of the program, the part we can define now, are
similar.
The definable phase is intended to establish the feasibilityand economics of
settlement. It consists of answering questions and conducting demonstrations. The
questions can be placed in a hierarchical order conducive to producing program
requirements. A program plan produced by thisapproach has several virtues:
a. The questions and demonstrations can be economically ordered based on value of
knowledge provided and cost of obtaining it.
b. The issue of human versus robotics missions and the program schedule fallout from
this.
c. Itisneither necessary nor desirable to set arbitrary dates for missions.
d. The technology program can similarlybe economically derived.
2.7 Architecture Assessment Coneluding Thoughts
STCAEM created a comprehensive set of transportation design and operations
concepts and a supporting data base for all foreseeable phases of a human exploration
program, using technical tools and techniques which did not exist when similar studies
were done in the 1960s. The study emphasized rationales and conclusions, in order to
understand the meaning of results. The STCAEM study is complete, but the exploration
of Mars has justbegun. This section has concluded with a discussion of what was learned
and where to go from here:
a. Without an adequate program rationale,there isno Mars program fast enough, cheap
enough, or "better" enough to be funded and stay funded.
b. STCAEM probably did not find the best possiblearchitectures.
c. What is "best" is not knowable without rationale.
d. It is essential to have a rationale and program plan tightly linked to national goals
and strategies.
e. Producing these is more difficult work than designing architectures but far more
important!
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3.0 ABORT AME88MENT FOR MARS TRANSPORTATION ARCHITECTURES
Interplanetary mission design entails complex analyses and trade studies involving
trajectory design, Earth ground operations, life support, and other vital concerns. One
important part of this mission design process is mission abort planning. Abort planning
involves choosing an abort strategy that enables attainment of scientific and exploration
objectives while enhancing crew safety to the maximum extent praeticable. As a part of
1993 study activities, STCAEM conducted an abort assessment investigating conjunction
class missions that utilize "to-surface" abort strategy. It was found convenient to
compare abort-to-surface strategies with more conventional stratetdes that inelude
missions with flyby aborts and on-orbit abort. Section 3.1 defines the abort strategies
that were analyzed in this study.
This report summarizes the results of the analysis which accomplished a semi-
quantitative assessment of mission design impact on Mars architectures that utilize
abort-to-surface strategies. Emphasis in this study was placed on conjunction missions
with abort-to-surface mission strategyl. In particular, this study looked at the 2009
ExPO reference mission2 with comparison data provided for the follow-on 2011 mission
and the 2018 mission. Note that the 2011 mission opportunity is a "hard" year in the
Earth-Mars 15 year synodic cycle and the 2018 year is the "easy" year in the cycle.
"Hard" and "easy" refer to the round trip energy requirements.
3.1 ABORT APPROACH ]FOR MISSION ARCHITECTURES
An earlier phase of STCAEM identified Mars flyby aborts for 2014-2020
opportunities3. The abort trajectories identified in this previous study were for NTP
mis s that assumed "all-up" manned phases: included in the outbound phase on the
manned mission are the capture and return propellant, CRV, an outbound and return
habitat, and extra consumables for abort events that require extended in-space stays.
Abort issues are more involved for "split" manned transfer (e.g. the ExPO reference)
than for "all-up" missions. The greater complexity is due in part from the distributing
the pieces of the total mission among several Mars flights.
3.1.1 Abort Definitions (to-surface, to-orbit, flyby, events, ete.)
Several abort strategies are referred to in this report. These are "Abort-to-
Surfaee", "Abort-to-Orbit", Flyby, and "Return-Next-Chanee it. Conjunction class
missions are generally planned with Abort-to-Surface and Abort-to-Orbit modes.
Return-Next-Chance with Abort-to-Orbit is the typical abort planning scheme for an
opposition class mission.
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A strict Abort-to-Surface is a mode of abort that was adopted by the ExPO for their
reference mission. Abort-to-Surface devotes as few resources of the mission as possible
to up-front contingencies for abort. If some event occurs that normally requires abort,
the strict Abort-to-Surface mission philosophy dictates that the crew go to Mars surface
and if possible return to Earth at the end of the mission, or continue on the surface until
a rescue can be mounted. This rescue could use the next nominal mission re-configured
to perform the necessary rescue function. If a catastrophic event occurs that precludes
the crew from remaining on surface to end-of-mission (EOM), the mission and crew wig
be lost.
The Abort-to-Orbit mission mode is usually in combination with the other abort
modes. Abort-to-Orbit simply allows for sufficient consumables on-board the MTV or
the ETV to sustain the crew in case of certain abort events. Thus, if some event dictates
that the crew can not go to the surface after a nominal arrival, they can remain on-orbit
until an EOM return. Another example that would call for an Abort-to-Orbit could be an
early return to orbit, requiring an an EOM return or a rescue mission.
All-up missions generally employ the Return-Next-Chance al_ortstrategy. With all-
up mission contingencies, the crew can stay in orbit,on the surface, or in some cases
immediately return, depending on the the time and characteristics of the abort event.
The Return-Next-Chance strategy can increase the the number of possible ways to
recoup from an abort event, and therefore the Return-Next-Chance strategy may be
more flexible.
3.1.2 Mars Arehtteetures and Standard Abort Modes
Several Mars transportation architectures are examined in this abort analysis:
Nominal NTP, Cryo-Aerobrake (Cryo-AB), Mars Direct, ExPO Reference, Modified
ExPO, and a nominal electric. The standard abort modes for these architectures are
described in figure 3-1 and the discussion below.
Architecture
Generic NTP
(e.g. Synthes_s)
CryoAB
(e g 90 day)
Mars Direct
(ala Zubrln)
ExPO Baseline
Modbfled ExPO
Generic Electric
(STCAEM)
M,SsIon Type
Oppos0t_on
Oppos,t_on
Abort Approach
Return tO Earth whenever poss=ble
Return to Earth whenever possible
ConJunct=on Abort-to-Surface
ConJunction Abort-to-Surface (st r,ctly)
Conjunction Abort-tO-$ urface/Abort-to-Or b_t
Conjunct=on or
Oppos=t=on
Abort-to-Surface or return on
reduced power
Figure 3- I. Architectures and Abort Options
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3.1.2.1 Nominal NTP and Cryo--AB. The first nominal NTP mission, as delineated in the
Synthesis Report4, and the eryo-A/B mission, as defined in the 90 day study5, are
opposition class missions with Mars stay times of 30 to 100 days. Opposition missions are
possible every 2.2 years and therefore, rescue missions are can be mounted on roughly
two year intervals.
The conventional abort strategy chosen for these two architectures is Return-Next-
Chance. If an abort event that is not related to main vehicle propulsion occurs before
the nominal departure (within 30 to 100 days), the opposition class vehicle has adequate
fuel to depart early. If the abort event precludes an early departure, the crew can go to
the surface or remain in orbit until the a rescue mission can be mounted. Another option
that may be possible if the crew can not leave on a nominal departure would be to
modify the parking orbit period to leave at the following opportunity.
3.1.2.2 Mars Direct, ExPO Baseline, Modified ExPO. Mars Direct, ExPO Baseline, and
the Modified ExPO mission are conjunction style missions. Thus, the missions are
approximately 9 years apart with long stay times (500-600 days) between return
opportunities. Each of these mission architectures employ abort-to-surface in their
mission design. Mars Direct and the ExPO Baseline have an abort mode of strictly
Abort-to-Surface, but the Modified ExPO additionally employs Abort-to-Orbit and Mars
flyby.
One of the disadvantages of the conjunction style mission is related to rescue
opportunities. The return opportunity falls several months before the next mission
arrival from Earth. This return constraint is related to the physics of interplanetary
transfer. Thus, conjunction arrival/return opportunity constraints aggravate the abort
scenario by requiring additional living space and consumables for the rescue crew over
the duration of another opportunity (approximately 2 years, including transfer time).
Consumables concerns are further addressed in section 3.6.
3.1.2.3 Generie Electric (Propulsion). The generic electric mission can fall into the
eategory of conjunction or opposition type missions because of the flexible
characteristics of electric propulsion. An electric mission can be either nuclear powered
or solar powered.
The abort approach employed in nominal electric mission is Abort-to-Surface or
return on reduced power. A reduced power return will entail a longer return trip, but,
the windows of opportunity are significantly wider than a conventionally powered
mission. If an Abort-to-Surface is required, then the electric mission will incur the same
consequences as described in sections 3.1.2.1 and 3.1.2.2.
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3.2 ABORT FLOW FOR TYPICAL MISSIONS
In this section, abort flow for the generic NTP, ExPO baseline, and the generic
electric are compared. This comparison will provide the general characteristics of the
each flow and also indicate the similarities and differences between the abort modes of
the architectures.
3.2.1 Generic NTP
The generic NTP mission, as indicated in figure 3-2, is broken into nine primary
events: Trans-Mars Injection (TMI), Early Trans-Mars Coast, Late Trans-Mars Coast,
Mars Orbit Capture (MOC), Prepare for Descent, Descent, Surface Mission, Ascent,
Trans-Earth Injection (TEI), and Earth Aero Entry. This delineation of the mission events
was chosen for clarity and convenience to illustrate certain abort modes.
Precondition: Remotely ]
Emplace and Check Out
Mars Surface Bas
I
I tn,t,ateCrewM,ss,onJ
I
L__ Trans'Mars I=,..|l_iEarlyTrans'[====Ib.[ LateTrans JInjection M rs Coast M rs Coast
I I I
I MarsOrbltCapture
I
I
Fail to Capture:
N
Crew_ Lo_
I
[ Wrong Orb,t Abort: J
I
I I
Earth May be be Poss,ble; May
Poss=ble or Rescue Requ,re Rescue
i 1
I for Descent I =r I ........ I_'F'i M,ss,on I_F'I .... J_'F" I Inlectlonh J
I I I II
Abort: Return
to--_5"V Jn Mars
Orbit for EOM
Return to Earth
or Rescue
Lander D=sabled:
Wait =n Mars
Orbit for EOM
Return to Earth
or Rescue
I
I Crash: I (No Capabd,ty
I,T_w I I forearlyReturn
lSurvlves, l I to Earth,)
IRescue II Ascent to lPVI l and EOM Return
I to Earth or EOM
I Rescue
I I
Fad to [ [ Ascent
I LiftOff: I Fildure:
I Rescu------_eJ
Misszon
Loss
On Earth I
Return
Trajectory
NoAbort
Figure 3-2. Generic NTP Abort Flow
Under each of the primary events of shown in figure 3-1 are one or two typical abort
events. For example, under the Early Trans-Mars Coast is an event that indicates that
an anomalous event has occurred, such as transfer habitat malfunction, precluding long-
term use. The abort mode for this event dictates immediate return to Earth. Note that
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this event cannot be complete loss of propulsion because there can be no immediate
return without propulsion. Each event under a primary event is either shaded gray or is
not shaded. A non shaded event indicates that there exists a way to abort the event, and
the shaded events indicate that no way to abort has been identified or enabled. For all
subsequent abort flow charts, this shading convention is used.
This discussion does not purport to exhaust possible abort related events. The
anomalous events designated as "No Abort" cases were assumed not to have an abort
(a) because of the prohibitively high cost in delta-V required to correct the trajectory,
target an Earth return trajectory, or (b) the abort event has no known way of escape.
For this generic NTP mission, there are three primary events that have no abort
scenarios. First, if the MOC maneuver fails to occur correctly, the vehicle could fail to
capture and the mission and crew would be lost. Second, if ascent failure occurs after
lift off the crew could crash or miss rendezvous with the return vessel, again resulting in
mission and crew loss. Third, if the TEl fails in such a way that the vehicle is placed on
an interplanetary trajectory that does not intercept Earth, or if a habitation failure
occurs during the return transfer, the mission and crew will be lost.
3.2.2 ELPO Reference
For the ExPO Reference mission flow, figure 3-3, the primary events are identical
to the corresponding events of the Nominal NTP mission, but the secondary abort events
are different. Note the increase in the number of anomalous events in which no abort
has been enabled. It should be noted that this is true for the same abort events that
were identified in the generic NTP mission.
An explanation of this reduction in number of events that have aborts is found in the
abort strategy for the reference mission: Abort-to-Surface. As was previously
described, the reference mission places almost no abort contingencies in the manned
phase of the mission, other than on the surface. Thus for the first three primary events,
TEl, Early Trans-Mars Coast, and Late Trans-Mars Coast, there is no CRV on the
outbound vehicle, precluding an Earth return. For MOC and Prepare for Descent, there
are not adequate consumables on board the outbound vehicle for a stay in orbit until a
rescue could be mounted on the next opportunity. The surface phase of the mission
assumes abort-to-surface. This abort philosophy is inherently an effective abort
approach once the crew is on the surface, but it should be pointed out that there are not
adequate consumable on the Earth return vehicle in the event the crew wishes to go to
orbit early to await rescue or EOM return.
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Figure 3-3. ExPO Baseline Abort Flow
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3.9..3 Propulsive versus Aerobrake Man Capture
The ExPO reference has two options for capture at Mars. The first option is
propulsive capture with, most likely, an NTP system. A propulsive choice of eapture ean
make sense for the mission because the NTP is used for TMI and can therefore easily
(and perhaps economically) be used at Mars capture. An additional reason that a
propulsive Mars eapture would be effective for the manned phase of this mission is that
there will be abort propellant on board for a powered Mars flyby or a non-powered flyby
with a deep space maneuver on the return leg. The second option is aerobrake capture at
Mars. Aerobrake capture can reduce [MLEO by eliminating the fuel needed at Mars for
capture. Also, aerobrake descent is required for Mars landing, allowinK for the savings
that a common capture and descent brake may brinK.
In fi_,mre 3-4, propulsive and aerobrake Mars capture are juxtaposed to contrast
differences in their abort capability. There is no difference in the number of potential
aborts unless the CRV is included on the outbound vehicle. For the aerobrake mission, if
the CRV were ineluded on the outbound vehiele, the first three primary events generally
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have no abort because of no propulsion system on the aerobrake case. An exception to
this is a free return Mars flyby abort for Late Trans-Mars Coast (if s free return is
possible). Note that "common" in figure 3-4 means that the "No Abort" is true for the
propulsive capture and the aerobrake capture. Also, given the strict split strategy of the
ExPO baseline mission, there is no ascent vehicle on the manned outbound mission to
Mars, resulting in a "No Abort" for the Descent phase of the mission It is pointed out
also that it' something goes amiss in the MOC and the base can not be reached with the
descent vehicle, then no abort is possible since the crew does not have adequate
consumables on board to maintain them until a rescue or EOM return can be executed.
Abort Event Phase Mars Propulswe Capture
Trans-Mars InJection No Abort (no CRV)
Early Trans-Mars Coast NO AbOrt (no CRV)
Late Trans-Mars Coast
Mars Capture
(fail to capture)
Mars Capture
(Wrong orbit)
No Abort (No CRV) Free Return
Of avadable), Powered Flyby, Non-
powered flyby/DSM
No Abort (common)
No abort _f surface base unreachable
(to -surface only)
Mars Aerobrake Capture
I
No Abort (No CRV or propellant)
No Abort (No CRV or Propellant)
NO Abort (no CRV or propellant)
Free Return (=f available)
No Abort (common)
NO abort _f surface base unreachable
(to -surface only)
Prepare for Descent No Abort ef descent vehicle disabled No Abort _f descent vehicle d_sabled
(no provtslons on orbit) (no prowsJons on orbit)
Descent No abort =fan ascent veh|cle _snot No abort =fan ascent veh,cle =snot
part of lander (Spht) part of lander (Spht)
Surface M_ss=on No abort (to-surface only) (no NO abort (to-surface only) (no
(need to leave surface early) prows_ons on return veh_cte) prows_ons on return vehfcle)
Ascent Fadure No Abort (common) No Abort (common)
Trans-Earth Injection NO Abort (common) No Abort (common)
(miss target return veloc=ty)
Figure 3-4. Propulsive versesAerobrake Capture at Mars
3.2.4 Generic Electric
An abort flow chart for the generic electric mission is found in figure 3-5. This
chart indicates that there are fewer primary events for an electric mission than a
conventional mission. For example, the outbound phase and the capture phase are
combined into one event block, the first primary event shown in figure 3-5. Therefore
there are fewer events that can go awry. However, the likelihood of a partial loss of
power, leading to a return to Earth on reduced power, is estimated to be high compared
to the likelihood of a failure in a high-thrust propulsion system.
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Figure 3-5. Generic Electric Abort Flow
3.3 RECOMMENDED ABORT FIXES TO THE ExPO REFERENCE MISSION
3.3.1 Abort Fixes Summary
An abort in this study is classified as relating to trajectories, hardware, and
consumables. We make recommendations in this section that can be thought of as adding
abort options in the abort strategy for the NASA ExPO baseline mission. These
recommendation are made with the goal in mind of keeping the Abort-to-Surface
philosophy intact, but planning for contingencies outside of the strict Abort-to-Surface
mission mode. These contingencies are not considered too "expensive". Most of the
expensive abort scenarios involve providing high delta-V trajectory response to the abort
event. Our recommendations avoid planning for high deita-V (high IMLEO) trajectories
in abort scenarios.
The "fixes" listecl in figure 3-6 directly affect the mission in terms of the above
mentioned abort classification. For example, the first of the abort fixes is to place a
CRV on the outbound manned phase of the ExPO mission. If the CRV is not needed, it
may be jettisoned before descent. Note that the CRV could serve as a supply cache in
the event of an on-orbit abort. This CRV inclusion in the manned phase is a hardware fix
to the abort deficiency. Another possible abort fix for this primary event could involve a
rendezvous of the manned Mars transfer vehicle with the previously placed return
vehicle. A rendezvous is a trajectory answer that may not be too expensive.
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Additions to Abort Strategy Corre_=on Type
Place a CRV on piloted Mars transfer vehicle or allow for co-orbit capture and
rendezvous with the Earth return vehicl e
On-orbit abort mode _ncluded in abort strateqy
• "stay-time" consumables should be on Mars transfer vehicle t
• "stay-time" consumables should be on Earth return Vehicle*
• consumables adequate for a free return or powered flyby
Abort from descent contmqency included =n abort strateqy
• requires integrated descent/ascent vehicle on manned mission
• allows abort to ETV
Provide propulsive capture for manned Mars transfer vehicle
may provide earlytrans-Mars abort
: provides Mars flyby abort, Dowered or DSM
*3-burn Mars departure if rescue vehicle rendezvous with Mars transfer vehicle
Hardware
Trajectories
Consumables
Hardware
Hardware
t rajector_es
Figure 3-6. Additions to Abort Strategy
3.3.2 Qualitative Impact of Flzu (Modified Baseline Abort Flow)
By incorporating the fixes into the abort strategy, a very significant increase can be
made in the number of enabled aborts. It was shown in section 3.2.2 that there were 8
out of 13 abort events that the ExPO mission did not allow some method of recovery.
The modified ExPO baseline mission flow shown in figure 3-7 indicates that the
propulsive capture case reduces the no recovery incidences to 3 out of 12. On the same
figure, the aerobrake capture ease is also shown. For aeroeapture, there remains no
abort for the TEl and Early Trans-Mars coasts because of no propulsion. But the
remainder of the aerobrake mission has the same reduction in non-recoverable aborts as
the propulsive capture ease. One other point that should be noted from figure 3-7 is the
reduced chance of mission and crew loss due to s propulsion failure at TEL Additional
consumables on the ETV means that in the event of TEl failure, the crew can survive
until repairs are made or a rescue can be mounted for the next opportunity.
3.4 MISSION FAILURE CATEGORIES
An event leading to an abort can result in several outcomes. First, corrections
could be made with no mission or crew loss. For example, the crew could abort-to-
surface, the mission could be completed, and a successful rescue is undertaken. The
second ease to consider consists of a loss of mission, but the crew is returned safely to
Earth. An example of this kind of abort could entail the following scenario: Habitat on
Mars is remotely detected as having irreversibly malfunctioned, the crew conducts a
Mars flyby, and the subsequent return to Earth is suecessfuUy completed. This abort
scenario entail a mission loss but the crew is safely returned to Earth. A third case that
is considered could be a crew loss (e.g. ascent vehicle misses rendezvous with Earth
return vehicle). Of course, if the crew is lost, then the mission is defined as lost even if
all mission experiments are completed and all data are returned to Earth.
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Therefore, the data shown in this section is differentiated into the three categories,
viz. "mission loss", "crew loss", and "mission sueeess". These three categories are taken
as mutually exclusive events, simplifying the probability computations.
in this section, we show results of an investigation into the relative probability of
mission failure for four mission modes that have been studied in this report: generic
NTP, ExPO Reference, Modified ExPO, and generic electric, see figure 3-8. Relative
probability of failure implies that the validity of the data used to create figure 3-8 only
has basis in a comparison of the missions, it is not intended for use in measuring the
absolute chances of success of any particular mission.
The salient results of this mission failure analysis ean be summarized in the
following points:
a. The generic NTP mission has the lowest overall probability of mission failure.
b. The ExPO has the highest probability of crew loss and next to the highest overall
probability of failure.
e. The modified ExPO mission has slightly greater overall probability of mission failure
than the generic NTP and significantly less chance of crew loss than the ExPO
reference.
6?
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d. The generic electric mission has the lowest probability of crew loss and the highest
overall probability of mission failure.
Thus, the crew and mission safety can be enhanced by making the changes to the
ExPO reference abort strategy recommended in section 3.3. Another point of interest in
the figure 3-8 is the greater overall chance of failure of the generic eleetric mission.
Electric propulsion technology is in the early stages of technology maturity for
interplanetary missions and required operation times are long. The probability of failure
for each of the primary propulsion events of the mission is estimated to be higher than
the analogous event for conventional missions.
J
Relative Probab_thy
of Fa=lure
• .Cuerter_. . ET_P.Q . Mod.. . .Generic
NTP Ref ExPO Electr=c
M_ss_on Modes A¢_143
Figure 3-8. Mission Failure Estimates
3.5 TIMING OF MISSION AND ABORT OPPORTUNITIES
Mission opportunities are comprised of cargo missions, the manned mission phases,
as well as abort and rescue missions. This section shows on a time line the opportunity
phases that we identified. In particular, the missions that are included in this part of the
study are the 2009 ExPO reference and a nominal follow-on mission in 2011.
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3.5.1 Cargo Missions
The 2009 reference mission time line is shown in figure 3-9. The three cargo
missions supporting the 2009 mission are shown with the title "2007 Cargo Missions".
These missions leave about 2 years in advance of the manned mission in 2009. These
cargo missions traverse type II, low energy, trajectories with a launch window of
approximately 40 days. Thus the cargo launch must be launched on a short 13 day
centers. Likewise, the cargo mission supporting the 2011 mission are launched 2 years in
advance in 2009. The launch window is somewhat wider in 2009 than in 2007, providing
approximately 16 day launch centers. Note that the cargo missions supporting an
aborted reference mission are shown in figure 3-9 as the third set of cargo missions.
Faster cargo missions can be flown in the event of an aborted mission, but the cargo will
reach the stranded astronauts well after the nominal departure time. An exception to
this late cargo arrival can be made if the outbound leg of the "Reference Abort 1" is
used as a cargo mission. Abort 1 would allow the cargo to arrive near the time of
nominal departure; at this time the ground supplies may be nearly depleted. It should be
noted, however, that Abort 1 must be launched from Earth approximately one third into
the nominal mission stay. Therefore, the need for this cargo mission must be known very
early in the mission for launch to be achieved. In addition, an Abort 1 cargo mission
would be a relatively high energy cargo mission because of its opposition profile (Venus
swingby on leg to Mars) on the Earth/Mars leg.
3.5.2 2009 Reference Mission
The characteristics of the 2009 reference mission are presented here along with the
related abort and rescue opportunities. The actual launch time, trip times, and stay
times are those provided by the ExPO Mars Transportation Working Group. Boeing
ascertained the abort opportunities associated with this mission. The 2009 mission
departs Earth on October 30 of 2009 and arrives 180 days later on April 28 of 2010. The
nominal stay time is 540 days on the surface of Mars. Mars departure is October 20 of
2011, with a 180 day return ending on April 17 of 2012. Total trip time is 900 days.
3.5.2.1 Flyby Aborts for the 2009 Opportunity. Several flyby abort opportunities were
identified in this study of the manned phase of the the 2009 mission. Those missions are
delineated in figure 3-9 as "Free Return" and "flyby with DSM". Of course, the only part
of the mission that abort options are provided for is the manned phase of the mission.
Two kinds of flyby aborts are considered for this study. First, if the mission uses
aerobrake capture at Mars, the only abort cases that apply are abort-to-surface and
unpowered flyby. The flyby must be a free return because of no propulsion for a powered
flyby is provided on a mission utilizing aerobrake capture. For total flyby mission
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duration of up to nearly three years, a free return flyby was not found for this mission.
Yet a free return may be possible6, hence the question mark at the end of the free
return designator in figure 3-9. Second, if the mission incorporates a propulsive Mars
capture, then capture propellant and propulsion may be used to perform a powered Mars
flyby or, as shown in figure 3-10, a non-powered Mars flyby with a deep space maneuver
(DSM) on the Earth return leg may be used. In either flyby case, the long Earth return
time (->600 days) will require significantly more consumables on the MTV than are
nominally planned for on the ExPO mission. Flyby aborts also require a CRV for the
direct Earth capture and descent. Thus a strictabort to surface requirement precludes
the use of flyby abort options.
3.5.2.2 Rescue Missions for the 2009 Opportunity. Rescue missions are delineated in
figure 3-10 as "Reference Abort 1", "Reference Abort 2", and "Reference Abort 3". For
the remainder of this discussion, the abort missions are referred to as abort 1, abort 2, or
abort 3, respectively.
Abort 1 is the earliest rescue opportunity identified for the 2009 mission, it is an
opposition class mission, requiring a Venus gravity assist on the outbound leg and a short
stay time of approximately 30 days. Note that the return end date is on August 31 of
2012, a 328 day return. This leg of the mission can be shortened from a relatively long
type II trajectory to a much shorter type I transfer without a large increase in Mars
departure C3. It is unlikely that this abort opportunity will be used, except in very
special circumstances, because of the relatively large delta-V required to execute the
mission (see section 3.7 for delta-V tables).
Abort 2 is actually the next nominal manned mission in 2011. It is possible to used
the next mission as an unmanned or partially manned rescue mission. This mission
requires that the crew from the previous 2009 mission and the crew (if any) from abort 2
remain at Mars through another opportunity (until nominal departure in December 2013).
This long stay time translates to increases in crew quarters and consumables for those at
Mars. Note that abort 2 is a conjunction class mission, requiring less propellant than
abort 1.
Abort 3 is an opposition class mission requiring a deep space maneuver on the Earth
return leg and a Mars stay time of approximately 30 day. Thus, analogous to Abort 1,
Abort 3 is a relatively high energy mission, it would not normally be used for rescue
because of the relatively high cost in delta-V (see section 3.7). This mission has the
same outbound leg as the nominal 2011 mission (200 days), but utilizes an opposition
profile for the return leg and requires 294 days for return.
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3.5.3 2011 Nominal Mission
The characteristics of the 2011 nominal mission are now described along with the
related abort and rescue opportunities. The actual launch time, trip times, and stay
times for all of the 2011 cases were were found by STCAEM analyses. The 2011 mission
leaves in December 11 of 2011 and arrives 200 days later in June 21 of 2012, see
figure 3-10. Note that this is a 200 day transfer (longer than the 2009 outbound transfer)
because this mission occurs in the high energy part of the 15 year synodic Earth/Mars
cycle. This means that the 2011 transfer time is longer for the same 2009 Earth C3L.
The nominal stay time is 555 days on the surface of Mars. Mars departure is December
28 of 2013, with a 160 day return ending on June 6 of 2014. Total trip duration is 915
days. Note that at the top of figure 3-I0, nominal type I Mars outbound and Earth return
mission are shown for the 2011, 2013, and 2016 opportunities. These type I missions are
shown to provide some general opportunity frame of reference to compare with the
nominal 2011 mission.
3.5.3.1 Flyby Aborts for 2011 Opportunity. Several Mars flyby abort options were
identifiedin thisstudy for the 2011 mission. These flyby opportunities are delineated in
figure 3-10 as "Free Return", "Flyby Abort 1","Flyby Abort 2", and "Flyby Abort 3".
The two other flyby abort cases, flyby abort 2 and flyby abort 3, can be flown only
for missions that have propulsive capture/return propellant and a CRV on the outbound
mission. These mission are usually ealled "all-up" missions because they generally have
the MTV and ETV as an integral part of the outbound vehicle. It can be seen from the
time line, figure 3-10, that the flyby Abort 2 and Abort 3 are significantly shorter than
the free return and flyby Abort 1, but a split aerobraking mission can not perform these
aborts (no capture and return propellant on MTV).
3.5.3.2 Rescue Missions for 2011 Opportunity. The 2011 rescue missions are depicted in
figure 3-10 as "Abort 1", and "Abort 2". For the remainder of section 3.5.2.2,the abort
missions willbe referred to as abort 1 and abort 2 respectively.
Abort 1 is an opposition class mission, requiring a Venus gravity assiston the return
leg and a short stay time on the order of 30-100 days. The outbound leg of this mission is
identicalto the nominal conjunction class mission outbound leg. The return end date is
July 26, 2015. It is unlikely that this mission opportunity will be used because of the
relativelylarge delta-V required to execute the mission (see section 3.7).
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Abort 2 is actually the next nominal manned mission in 2014. As was explained for
the 2009 reference mission, it is possible to used the next mission as an unmanned or
partially manned rescue mission. This mission requires that the crew from the previous
2011 mission and the crew (if any) from the Abort 2 mission remain at Mars through
another opportunity (until nominal departure in December 2015). This long stay time
translates to increases in crew quarters volume and consumables for those at Mars.
Note that abort 2 is a conjunction class mission, requiring less propellant to perform than
Abort I.
3.6 RESCUE OPTIONS AND CONSUMABLES
3.6.1 Consumables Required for lteseue Operations
The initial October 9, 1992 NASA Mars mission status report from JSC set a
consumable allotment for the primary Mars base at 26 tonnes, coming as part of the first
three cargo/base buildup flights. In addition a small 6-crew Bio-Chamber was to be
another part of the 150 t total initial base mass delivered on these same flights. This
was to last for the first manned mission, of approximately 600 days and keep a 2 to 3
year reserve for an abort-to-surface contingency. Using 4 kg per person per day as a
general eonsumable number that includes water, both drinking and hygiene, food, air,
packaging and medical and life support spares, a crew of 6 over 600 days uses 14,400 kg
(14.4 t) of consumables. The reserves of 11.6 t, if used at the same rate, are good for
483 days; therefore all the consumables cover a total of 1,083 days. For a 2 year abort,
the additional stay time beyond the named mission is 730 days (with 10 days additional
reserve for possible error), leaving a total of 1330 days that must be covered by surface
consumables. There is a short fall of 247 days between what is sent and what is required
in case of a failure of the ascent or return vehicles that must be covered by additional
resources. Additional consumables could be sent on a direct cargo mission to make up
this difference. However, there may or may not be a direct cargo supply flight that will
arrive in the 483 days available, depending on when the condition that prevents return is
discovered. The timing of the flight opportunities was shown in figure 3-10.
While the NASA study estimated that the bio-ehamber could support the crew for
the entire 600 day mission, there is some question at to whether this is a reliable
resource. It is true that it will be very beneficial to supplement the delivered
consumables for psychological reasons, if nothing else; but the first bio-ehamber has the
possibility of crop failure, a breakdown in biological isolation, or mechanical failure. It
appear too great a risk to rely on the initial bio-ehamber for significant resources on the
first manned mission. The percentage of support the bio-chamber could reasonably
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supply to extend the consumables is not known. The first mission was considered a trial
to "debug" the bio-chamber system, so that on subsequent missions, which call for a
larger bio-ehamber, the techniques for operating the system and the percentage of
support it can give would be well established.
3.6.2 Options for Mounting Crew Rescue Missions
As can be seen from the flight opportunities shown in figure 3-9, two possible time
frames for rescue exist: a conjunction mission (late) and an opposition mission (early).
For each of these opportunities, three kinds of rescue options present themselves:
(a) sending an unmanned rescue vehicle, (b) sending a reduced crew (3 crew) rescue
vehicle and (e) using the next mission to exchange the crew. An overview of these
options can be found in figure 3-11. For the unmanned rescue vehicle it is assumed that
no one on the surface is injured or impaired and that all the crew is on the surface
(abort-to-surface). The rescue vehicle must be autonomous, have one eaeh of the return
transit habitat, engines and return propellant allotment, CRV, lander with ascent and
additional consumables for the extended stay. The question here is the degree of
autonomy needed and the access to the appropriate capture orbit. If the late option is
chosen an additional cargo flight will be needed to support the Mars crew on the surface.
Rescue Optlon"
#I, Unmanned
Rescue
Chara_ertsttcs
Autonomous vehicle; no crew
=mpa_rment on Mars surface
Comments
Requires no space or consumables for add_ttonal crew on
surface or m Mars orbit; what degree of autonomy _s
reclulred)
#2, Three-man Rescue veh,cle manned w=th 3 crew; For part or all of an add_t=onal opportunJty, prov=s=ons and
Rescue may or may not be Mars surface space needed for 3 extra crew
crew _mpairment;
#3, Crew Exchange Rescue vehicle manned with 6 crew; For part or all of an additional oppor_unnty, prows=ons and
Rescue may or may not be Mars surface space needed for 6 extra crew
crew _mpa_rment;
" Rescue approach is to use the next m_ss_on's vehicle(s) m a rescue mode
Figure 3-11. Options for Rescue
With the three-man rescue vehicle all the Mars crew will also be on the surface.
Some of the surface crew could be injured. The rescue vehicle must have the return
habitat with engines and return propellant allotment, either two CRVs or a single CRV
modified for nine crew, either two ]anders or a single lander modified for nine and
additional consumables for nine crew to remain on Mars and return at the next
opportunity. The open items here are the capture orbit, additional consumables, and
room on the surface and return vehicle for nine crew. An additional cargo flight may be
needed.
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The crew exchange mission simply replaees the crew that is stranded with the next
crew. The original crew may or may not have someone injured and all are on the
surface. The return vehicle is a regular six-crew mission with the full return habitat
engines and propellant, one six crew CRV, one or possibly two landers and consumables
for the Mars original surface crew plus the additional six crew with provisions for the
crew remaining on the surface. If two landers/aseent vehicles are brought, an exchange
may proeeed as part of a regular mission, provided the ascent vehicle is all that failed on
the first mission and the return vehiele is operable and in an aeeessible orbit. If not, the
seeond crew is stranded on the departure of the first crew. In addition to the concerns
of the three-manned reseue seenario there is the problem of 12 people on the surfaee or
in orbit for some time (100 to 512 days) that must be supported. Fi_re 3-12 shows the
consumables per mission phase for eaeh of these three reseue modes in both the early
and late opportunities. The aeeessibility of the eonsumables, their storage and the
durations that the aborts impose must be considered in the mission planning and risk
assess ment.
Outbound Stay t,me Return Consumables TotalConsumables
Mission Type Consumables (Orbit or surface) Consumables lef_ on surface Consumables
4,800 kg 3,800 kg _ 21.960 kgNominal2011 (555 day
surface stay crew of 6)
Unmanned early*
13,320 kg
2,400 kg 6,720 kg 9,120 kg
........................................................... I- I- l- m=. 4 •
Rescue late** _ 12,288 kg ' 5,520 kg 17.808 kg
Rescue with early 2,100 kg 3,600 kg 10,080 kg _ 15,780 kg
3 personnel late 2,100 kg 18.432 kg 8,280 kg 28,812 kg
Exchange early 4,200 kg 4,800 kg 6,720 kg 19,920 kg *°* 35.640 kg
Personnel late 4,200 kg 24,576 kg 5,520 kg 19,920 kg °°° 54,160 kg
Nominal 2014 4,2OO kg 12,288 kg 5.520 kg _ 22,008 kg
(512 day surface stay
6crew)
Note: 4 kglday per person is an average value for consumables
* The earliest rescue mission Opportunity, valid for problems found ,n the first part of the m.ss_on; consists of
175 days outbound, 100 days at Mars, 280 days return
** The earliest rescue mission Opportunity vahd for problems found m the last part of the mission; cons,sis of
175 days outbound, 512 days at Mars, 230 days return
*** The mission consists of replacing the stranded crew with the next mission, therefore the next mission supplies
must be brought/dehvered to sustain the 2016 opportunity
Figure 3-12. Consumables per Nominal & Rescue Mission by Phase
3.6.3 Typleal Abort/Rescue Tree, 2011 Mission
In an overview of abort conditions that can be analyzed for risk assessment
(probability of failure) several abort trees were generated. A typieal abort tree for the
2011 mission after capture at Mars is given in figure 3-13. The abort options 1, 2 and 3
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I Abort Scenanos ]After Mars Descent:
bring ----I---_AVOn nominal mission _I_ _l_
..''" ...... -.. [ Ascent Veh,cle [ Return Veh,cle ]
' 2ndAVcont,ngency ;_ D,sabledon / ,s O,sabled ,n
send by cargo on prevlous I Icannot leave on I I
launchw,ndow I _ kn°we_'1.__ I
knowearly I _ send AV on next can f Abort _1
• I _ or brlng Wlth rescue ( ODDortunltv II
f c_..4 ............ _ _ vehicle _ _-- i* "t/I
energy cargo _ I I r
mtsston Leaveonnominalreturn I I ..... f Abort \
I -- I -- • (' Leave early, oppos,t,on r( turn_ _" (. 2nd )
I I "_", _ "<abort,) _11 1 .,_
, .......... ±_ I \ -z--•
..''" -''-.. I _ / I I i largestresupply; T
( same vehicle w)th mod6red , I _ Rescue O_t,ons 1 2 3 / needed for next /
_-._ parking orb=t .-'" I _ " ' ' /" and part of the /
............. I / /
next nom,na, m_ss,on J _ _ oOu 'ndterSest_cuOeYmea;s_,loon
Rescue options 1.2.3 large resupply
Figure 3-13. Surface Abort Tree
refer to the the options stated above and the opportunities 1 and 2 refer to the
opposition and conjunction mission opportunities also mentioned above. These and the
flyby aborts can be seen in figure 3-10. The reference to "know early" and "know late"
indicates to when a problem is identified in the course of the surface stay and whether
there is time to react and use to the next available abort scenario or be forced to choose
another path home. This tree covers only the options available if there is a problem
discovered on either the ascent vehicle or the on-orbit Earth return vehicle. This can
happen well into the surface stay. These discoveries can occur towards the end of the
mission surface stay, where when the discovery of the problem takes place can make a
difference in available choices. It also points out that it is important to know if the on-
orbit Earth return vehicle is operable while the crew is still on the surface. If the fault
is discovered on-orbit, then unless there is another descent/ascent vehicle is available,
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the crew is stuck on orbit and stranded away from the consumables supply. The chart
line for the return vehicle disabled shows only the options that exist if the return vehicle
condition is known from the surface. Any other condition would have no abort option.
The chart lines descending from the ascent vehicle disabled on the surface, indicate that
there are more options, if an ascent vehicle can be sent as part of an early cargo flight.
Other options and opportunities remain the same as with the return vehicle disabled.
Where a large cache or resupply of consumables is needed to perform these aborts it is
marked on the chart.
This chart and other abort trees are only the starting point for a thorough abort
analysis, which was beyond the scope of the present study.
3.T ANALYSES METHODOLOGY AND SUPPORTING DATA
Section 3.1 through section 3.6 summarize an analysis evaluating and identifying
implications of abort options for several mission profiles. This section describes the
technical supporting data for the analyses of the previously mentioned sections.
Vehicle performance data (Earth/Mars launch window and delta-V) is provided for a
set of missions that include the 2009 ExPO reference, a follow-on 2011 conjunction
missions, and a 2018 conjunction mission. The 2009 and 2011 missions fall in a "hard"
part of the 15 1/2 year Earth/Mars synodic cycle. The 2018 mission falls in an "easy"
part of the synodic cycle. In this report, "hard" or "easy" means that the mission
requires relatively high or relatively low delta-V for a mission of set interplanetary
transfer duration. Considered in the study are nominal mission and the type I and type II
minimums for the 2011 and 2018 cases. Also investigated in this analysis are rescue
mission scenarios that are consistent with an abort-to-surface requirement. Rescue
scenarios that are covered included cases that entail direct and Venus swingby
trajectories.
Earth and Mars launch window contour data (C3L and Vhp) was generated by
Boeing's PLANET code. Further, PLANET generated the trajectory data used in delta-V
computations. Listed below is a list of ground rules followed in the analysis of the 2011
and 2018 missions. The 2009 mission profiles were taken directly from data supplied by
the Mars Transportation Working Group as listed in the references.
Vhp_. 7 km/s
C3L < 28 km3/s2
transfer time = 150 clays for 2018 out and return (easy year)
transfer time = 200 days for 2011 outbound (hard year)
transfer time = 160 days for 2011 return (hard year)
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rescue missions may use combination of direct and VSB trajectories
Early rescue - VSB/Direet , Direct/VSB, VSB/VSB.
Late rescue - Conjunction mission; crew must stay from nominal return to next
opportunity
Full-up missions only
The trajectory data and contours were generated for this report by use of two codes:
PLANET and MIDAS. These are Lambert-based codes, using "patched conics" to
simulate interplanetary trajectories. From the trajectory data for a range of Earth
departure, Mars arrival, Mars departure and Earth return dates, Planet was used to
generated contours of C3L and Vhp used in the Earth and Mars launch window analysis.
It was also used to find optimal elliptical parking orbits and thereby predict the delta-V
for the Mars orbit capture and Mars departure maneuvers. PLANET optimizes the
parking orbit for minimum departure delta-V by searching over a range of arrival
inclinations and periods. This search finds the best arrival conditions for minimizing of
apsidal misalignment losses from departure from an elliptical orbit. The misalignment
losses include plane change and apsidal rotation required to target the correct Mars
departure V-infinity vector. Parking orbit operational constraints such as arrival
periapsis lighting angle and arrival periapsis latitude can be included in the parking orbit
optimization process.
MIDAS is a NASA code that was used in this analysis to predict the performance
required for flyby aborts at Mars. It is a patched conic based program that utilizes a
gradient search routine to optimize the trajectory delta-V for a mission. It, however,
can not be used as to find optimal parking orbits because it assumes periapsis-to-
periapsis burns at arrival and departure. Thus, MIDAS does not take into account apsidal
misalignment losses during Mars departure from an elliptical parking orbit.
3.V.1 Launch Window Analysis
Analysis of launch windows consists of determining the time interval that a mission
opportunity can be launched. This process includes determining the inclusive dates over
which the launches may occur such that those launches meet the mission launch energy
constraints. Equivalently, the launch dates are chosen that fall within the launch vehicle
payload capability and meet the overall mission requirements. Acceptable launch
windows were identified for the 2009 ExPO reference mission, the follow-on 2011
conjunction mission, and the 2018 conjunction mission.
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3.7.1.1 2007 Cariro Missions. The 2007 cargo mission supporting the 2009 mission was
investigated. This cargo mission was broken into 3 flights with each flown on a type [I
trajectory. Type lI trajeetories are defined as transfers that require more than 180
degrees for the mission leg in question. As shown in figure 3-14, the top lobe of the
eontours represent the type II trajectories and the bottom lobe represents the type I
trajectories. The first contour of figure 3-14 shows the launch energy window, C3L, as
a dark strip on the upper lobe. From the contour it can be determined that the available
launch window will allow 3 launches with approximately 20 day centers. This window,
from the second contour of figure 3-14, maintains the Vhp at Mars arrival to a maximum
of 5 km/s. A 5 km/s Vhp will allow direet Mars entry with little resulting thermal
radiation and minimal concomitant TPS requirements.
3.7.1.2 2009 ExPO Mars Outbound Window. Following the determination of the first
cargo mission launch window, figure 3-15 shows the Earth Launeh and Mars arrival
window for the 2009 ExPO reference mission. The eomponents of this mission are the
2 cargo missions launched on type 1I trajectories and the manned vehicle launch on a type
[ trajectory as indicated in the figure. The cargo missions can be launehed within a
window of approximately 60 days in duration. The reference mission was chosen as 180
day outbound transfer time to Mars. On the figure, the mission optimized for aerobrske
is labeled on the 180 day line as AB. Likewise, the all propulsive ease is indicated as AP
on the 180 day line. The aerobrake ease falls farther to the right on the line because the
Earth C3L is lower and the Vhp as Mars is higher: optimal for the aerobrake ease. This is
contrasted with the AP ease which falls farther to the right on the 180 day line. The AP
case has a higher Earth C3L than the AB case, but has significantly lower Mars Vhp:
optimal for the all propulsive case.
The 180 day transfer time yields a window a approximately 35 days for a maximum
C3L of 28. If one assumes 200 day returns, as shown by the 200 day line in figure 3-15,
the window is only a few days longer, but the Earth C3L drops to a minimum of 20
km2/s2 and Mars Vhp can be at a minimum of less that 3 km/s.
3.7.1.3 2009 ExPO Earth Return Window. The Earth return window is shown in
figure 3-16. The reference mission has a 180 day, type I Earth return trajectory. A type
II trajectory could be a a bit lower in Mars departure C3L, but the transfer time would
be greater. Thus, for a type II return trajectory, the in space time that the astronauts
must endure would increase. Note that the chosen Mars departure and Earth arrival date
corresponds to an Earth arrival Vhp of approximately 8.9 km/s. This Earth arrival Vhp is
probably exorbitant in terms of TPS requirements for the return vehicle. A way to
reduce this relatively high Vhp can be seen from the figure 3-16. As can be determined
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from the Earth return Vhp portion of figure 3-16, this arrival condition could be
improved by increasing the Earth return transfer time to 200 days, yielding a return Vhp
of less that 7 km/s and requiring only 20 additional days of in-space transfer.
3.7.1.4 2009 Rescue Missions. In this section emphasis is placed on a launch window
comparison for two possible modes of rescue for the 2009 ExPO mission. An analysis was
performed to show the Earth launch windows and Mars arrival windows for a Venus
gravity assist case and a deep space maneuver case. The window analysis was completed
for the VSB and DSM cases over an identical and relevant mission space time frame.
Note that this window is for a part of mission space that corresponds to the earliest
rescue mission feasible from Earth. Practically, this mission could only be used in the
case of very early knowledge of the need for a rescue. Given the high delta-V
requirements and/or the long transfer times required for these missions, a more likely
use of this mission that remains relevant to rescue operations would be to use the
outbound leg of this mission to place cargo at Mars in the event that nominal departure
can not occur. The cargo can reach Mars before nominal departure of the 2009 mission.
The Earth C3L and Mars arrival contours for the VSB case and the DSM case are
shown in figures 3-17 and 3-18 respectively. Some general remarks are in order. The
Earth launeh windows for the VSB and DSM eases are narrow. For a maximum C3L
between 28 and 29, the VSB ease has a launch window of approximately 10 days and the
DSM ease has a window of approximately 15 days. If, however, the requirement for Mars
arrival Vhp is 5 km/s or less, the window is effectively reduced to 4 days for the VSB
ease. For the DSM ease, the Vhp limitation effectively precludes missions because there
does not exist any part of the window with Mars arrival Vhp of 5 km/s or less.
In particular, figure 3-17 indicates at the dot a possible propulsive capture mission.
Note the very narrow window that maintains the C3L below 29 and a low Vhp of just
under 5 km/s. If this mission incorporates aerobrake assisted Mars capture, the lower
dot indicates that the window would be wider, with the C3L lower and the Vhp limit of
-<7 km/s allowing a signifieantly wider window of approximately 10 days. Nevertheless,
a 10 day launch window is considered operationally narrow and may be unacceptable for
a real mission.
3.7.1.5 2011 and 2018 Missions. Similar analyses was performed on the 2011 and 2018
missions. We do not provide the details of the launch window analysis for the 2011 and
2018 missions in this report, but the resulting delta-V and parking orbit data are given in
section 3.7.2.
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3.7.2 Delta-V Budgets and Trajectory Data
A product of the mission and performance analysis is trajectory and delta-V data.
This data is shown in figures 3-19 through 3-22 and can be used to compare the 2009
reference mission with follow-on 2011 and 2018 missions for nominal, minimum energy
type I,and minimum energy type IItrajectories.
Opportunity LaunchDate
Out Stay Return M=ss=on Earth TMI* Mars Mars Earth P 0 Total
Durabon C3L Vhp C3L Vhp Oelta-V Delta-VT_me (days) (m/s)(days) (days) (days) krn2/s2 (kin/s) km2/s 2 (kin/s) (kin/s) (m/s)
2009 Return 9/13/07 344 1154 180 1678 1343 4160 2.522 1761 886 2780 6940
Vehicle 2454356.5
2009Crew 10/30/09 180 N/A N/A 180 2009 4156 6531 N/A N/A 0 4156
Aerobrake 2455134.5
2009Crew 11/19/09 180 N/A N/A 180 2936 4839 5.304 N/A N/A 2610 7449
Propulswe 24551545
2011 12/4/11 200 555 160 915 14 15 4191 5.400 2705 690 5560 9751
Nominal 24559000
2011 Type t 11/14/11 245 447 248 940 9 79 3998 4 000 6 36 6 00 3360 7358
minfmum 2455880.0
2011 Type II 10/30/11 310 387 338 1025 959 3989 2.700 5 82 5 10 2620 6609
mmtmum 2455865.0
2018 6/10/18 150 625 151 926 18.13 4364 3500 22 18 320 3630 7994
Nominal 2458280 0
2018Typel 5/6/18 196 565 191 952 796 3916 3000 11 36 330 3260 7176
minimum 24582450
2018Typell 5/1/18 255 533 263 1051 898 3962 3500 14 24 430 3250 7212
mlntmum 24582400
* TMI losses mclude g-loss of 300 m/s and plane change of 100 m/s
Figure 3-19. 2009 and2011 Mission Trajectory Data
Opportunity Launch Out Stay Return Abort Earth
Time (days) Duration C3LDate (days) (days) (days)
2009 12/11/10 32843 30 280
VBS/D_rect 2455532
2009 (2011 21/4/11 200 555 160
Nominal) 2455900
2009 12/4/11 200 30 294 8
DirectJDSM 2455900
2011 Abort 1/17/14 1175 100 280
dlrectJVS8 2456675
2011 (2014 1/17/14 1175 512 230
Nominal) 2456675
2018 Abort 7/19/20 150 25 365
D_rect_S8 2459200
km2/s2
6385 2868 4812 49 1607
915 1415 4191 54 2705
5248 1383 4127 55 3755
555 1391 4180 622 4223
917 1371 4171 626 5 70
540 1625 4278 450 2769
TMI Mars Mars Earth P O Total
Vhp C3L Vhp Delta-V Delta-V
(m/s) (kin/s) km2/s 2 (kin/s) (kin/s) (m/s)
7 0 4730 9542
6 9 5560 9751
4 8 was not was not
computed computed
55 8390 11510
5 4 5120 9291
4 5 4998 9276
* TMI losses include g-loss of 300 m/s and plane change of 100 m/s
Figure 3-20. RescueMissions Trajectory Data
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tnchnatJon Period Per,apsls Per,apsts MOC t TEl AML
Opportunity (deg) (hours) L,ght,ng Latitude (m/s) (m/s) (m/s)(deg) (deg)
2009 Return 144 246 -16 36 890 1890 326
Vehicle
2009 Crew 23 4 24.6 1 55 -4 8 0 N/A N/A
Aerobrake
2009 Crew 20.7 24 6 5.2 -58 2610 N/A N/A
Propulsive
2011 30 12.6 5.5 -27 2880 2680 66
Nominal
2011 Type I 30 19.6 10 -28 1900 1460 418
minimum
2011 Type II 20 12.6 42 -18 1120 1500 582
minimum
2018 20 126 41 -14 1530 2100 139
Nominal
2018 Type I 50 96 41 -30 1340 1920 436
minimum
20198 Type II 10 12.6 82 -8 1560 1690 39
minimum
* g-losses for MOC, TEl are 50 mls and 30 m/$ respecttvely; TEl _ncludes the AML
Figure 3-21. Parking Orbit Da ta for 2009, 2011, and 2018 Missions
P.O
Delta-V
(km_)
2780
0
2610
5560
3360
2620
3630
3260
3250
Opportun,ty
2011Abo_
D,rectJVSBIn2014
Inchnation Period
(deg) (hours)
40 14.6
2018 Abort 10
DJrectNSB in 2020
24 6
Per_aps=s Perlaps=s
Lighting Latitude
(deg) (deg)
7 2 34
48 2.6
PO
MOC = TEl AML Delta-V
(m/s) (m/s) (m/s) (ken/s)
3460 3870 263 7330
2238 2760 201 4998
* g-losses for MOC, TEl are 50 m/s and 30 m/s respectively; TEl ,ncludes the AML
Figure 3-22. Parking Orbit Data for Selected Rescue Opportunities
General trajectory data are provided in figures 3-19 and 3-20. Nominal trajectory
data for the referenee mission, a nominal 2011 mission, and type I and type [I comparison
missions are given in figure 3-19. Trajectory data for a set of typical rescue mission are
provided in figure 3-20. This data ineludes launch dates, outbound transfer time, Mars
stay time, and return transfer time Included in these figure also are Earth/Mars
departure C3L and arrival Vhp. Note that the TM[ value include an estimated Earth
departure g-loss and a computed 3-burn Earth departure plane change loss?. The parking
orbit delta-V is the addition of MOC and TEI, including estimated g-losses and computed
spsidal misalignment losses at Mars departure8.
Mars elliptical parking orbit data are provided in figures 3-21 and 3-22. Parking
orbit data for the reference 2009, a nominal 2011, and type [ and type II 2011/2018
missions are shown in figure 3-21. For comparison purposes, parking orbit data for
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selected rescue missions are indicated in figure 3-22. These data of figures 3-21 and
3-21 are for optimal elliptical parking orbits that meet the operational constraint for
manned missions of periapsis lighting angle z 5 degrees. It can be seen from figure 3-21
that this constraint is not met, hence the 1.55 degrees light angle. The reason that the
reference mission can not have adequate arrival lighting is based on the Sun/Mars
lighting geometry at arrival. The part of the 2009 reference mission that places the
return vehicle in Mars orbit is unmanned and does not descend to the surface, and
therefore the negative lighting angle is irrelevant.
3.7.3 Failure Analysis
The mission/abort event trees used to model mission success and loss probabilities
were more detailed than indicated by the figures presented earlier in this seciton,
typically having about 30 events. This additional detail was needed to follow each abort
sequence through to its end points, in order to obtain the probabiltiy distribution between
mission success, mission loss, and erew loss. In order to avoid human error in the
calculations (which are tedious), a computer code was developed with a convenient GUI
to perform the calculations. The code was validated by repeating calculations of
mission/abort event trees prepared earlier in the STCAEM contract, analyzed manually
and carefully checked at that earlier time.
DSS/D615-10070/DISK 1/H89/246-3/1:50 P
89
D615-10070
4.0 LUNAR SYNERGISM
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This investigation explored what could be done and what would be useful to do in a
lunar test bed. The study was done in four main parts: a) a description of lunar evolution
options that would permit testing of known required Mars major elements, b) a workup
of the schedule of mission timing and launch requirements based on previous STCAEM
work on First Lunar Outpost (FLO) and using a delivered launch capacity of 30 metric
tonnes, e) a listing of elements and operations to be tested with a description of what
the test objectives will be and an evaluation of the type of testing that could be
accomplished within the time frame for incorporation into Mars mission systems and the
expected resources available, d) an estimate of the impacts of lunar testing on a Mars
mission schedule by using information on current and past programs for development and
performance flows, and e) a trace of the heritage of the Mars Habitat through the FLO
and past trade studies.
4.2 GENERAL APPROACH
This study started with the elements and operations from schemes outlined in the
October 9,1992 NASA in-house Mars mission status report. As the elements were refined
and developed they were incorporated into the lunar trial scenarios. For the full
scenario development, which would dictate the timing of events, the FLO evolution was
used as a starting program into which the Mars lunar testbed could be logically folded
without interrupting lunar exploration and science. The items selected for lunar testing
included specific elements of hardware and software, operations in the form of the ways
to conduct tasks, the methodology to be used in conducting tasks and operations, and
human interrelationships. All would directly benefit from a lunar trial as opposed to
using a terrestrial test alone. That is; the items tested would derive some benefit from
lunar testing that could not be achieved from a ground test alone. To this end, three
different evolution schemes were generated that accomplished the trials at different
times and with different operational intensities. All three use the 180 day trial as the
arrival of the simulated Mars habitat (one tier elliptical structure) and it is from here
that the chart showing the impact of a lunar habitat trial are taken for the later Mars
mission impact study. Certain subsystems can and will be tested prior to the Mars
habitat and were incorporated into the impact study timing.
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4.3 DESCRIPTION OF OPTIONS
The three FLO derived evolution options investigated share this mueh in eommon:
the mission uses four outpost missions of six erew to establish the base and build reserves
for a 180-day mission that proeeeds without a resupply flight and allows an on-orbit test
of the Mars NTP or eryogenie engines. At the end of this time there is the possibility of
moving the base or a part of it to a more desirable site as a result of the outpost
exploration.
The "baseline" option, seleeted only as a starting point, eontinues with a 360 day
mission that begins after initial restoeking to allow a safety margin in ease of an
improper eargo delivery or other delay. After the Bio-ehamber and a small lunar regolith
oxygen plant for base atmosphere produetion arrives 135 days into the manned mission,
there is a period of 225 days of erew isolation whieh reeeives no "paekages from home"
in the form of a eargo flight. This is roughly the duration of a Mars transit leg. The next
mission in the baseline seenario is a 512 day mission that is an analog of the Mars surfaee
durations expected, exeept that it will be resupplied every 90 days. The final manned
mission shown in the baseline seenario is of undetermined length and begins the trial of a
ground nuelear power supply.
The first alternative mission does not do the 360 day mission but goes direetly into a
512 day mission. In this first alternative seenario the 512 day mission begins like the 360
day mission but eontinues to be supported by resupply landers. There is no extended
isolation time without eargo eontaet.
The "umbilical cord" is still in plaee. The last noted manned mission is the one of
undetermined length that tests the ground nuelear power supply. It has been moved
forward as far as the eurrently known teehnology status will permit.
The seeond alternative also does not do the 360 day mission, but stoekpiles supplies
for the 512 day mission so the erew ean spend the entire time in true isolation, without a
resupply lander. This would mimie the isolation of a Mars surfaee stay for the first Mars
manned mission and would be a fairly aeeurate test of systems and personnel together.
It does require a number of unmanned eargo missions over a 2 year period during whieh
time no lunar seienee or exploration takes plaee. Again, as in the first alternative, the
ground nuelear power supply mission follows as soon as it appears the teehnolo_
permits.
For each of these scenarios a timeline sehedule and a tabulated flight manifest
schedule are given. The flight manifest sehedule shows the hardware, material, supplies
brought, supplies on hand at the beginning of the mission, the type of spares brought and
present at mission start, the stay time that ean be supported at mission start and the
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launch centers between flights. Figures 4-1 and 4-2 are the timeline and tabulated
schedule respectively for the "baseline" scenario. Figures 4-3 and 4-4 are the timeline
and schedule for the first alternative and figures 4-5 and 4-6 are for the second
alternative.
4.4 BENEFITS OF LUNAR TESTING AND TEST OBJECTIVES
A compilation of the elements of a Mars mission that could benefit from testing on
the lunar surface was generated and is presented in figure 4-7. For each system, the
subsystems that should undergo testing have been identified with an indication of needs
in both the lunar and Mars environments. A commentary on the differences and needs
for each subsystem segment is noted in the list of elements. This list of similarities and
differences provided an insight into how much the lunar testing can help determine
hardware, software, technique and interpersonal action modifications that must be
instituted before committing the Mars mission first launch. From these items, specific
tests and test objectives were established for analogs of the Mars systems or conditions
for which lunar testing will provide data. These, together with the rationale of how the
lunar test will impact the Mars equipment and operations are shown in figure 4-8.
Specific listed items have some comment in the rationale statements on the criticality
of hardware, software, system operations and tasks before and during the Mars mission
to insure mission safety and success.
It should also be noted that we have not mounted a mission of this scale and
complexity outside Earth orbit since December 1972, the last Apollo mission. The
administrative and overall operations infrastructure are historical in nature. That is,
many of the people and end to end institutions have been lost or diverted into other types
of projects. These institutional frameworks and personnel expertise may be better
redeveloped in a project that includes a near-Earth analog, that returns useful science,
that will not totally usurp all resources and could be placed on hold for the main Mars
effort if required.
4.5 SCHEDULE ANALYSES
Development schedules for identified critical long lead items were derived for
comparison with each other to determine the critical elements with the greatest
development time (long tent poles). They include the nuclear engine, ground nuclear
power supply, the habitat, offloader and bio-ehamber. These schedules comprise
figures 4-9 and 4-10. Program elements were categorized as (a) common base or
common development, (b) lunar hardware, and (e) Mars hardware. These are shown in the
figures with different shadings as indicated on the key at the bottom. They include the
lunar testing as a separate series of block time and allow for the results of these tests to
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Ftight Mission Hardware Material Supplies Supplleson Spares Spareson Supported Launch
NO. Type brought brought brought surface brought surface Staytlme center
1 cargo Outpost Habitat on one 45 one 45 contingency _contingency one 4S
lander terrestrial terrestrial terrestrial
day stay day stay day stay
2 manned rover, rover spares/ one 4S contingency contingency one 45 6
soence supply terrestrial terrestrial _nonths
allocation _ day stay day stay
3 manned rover, rover one 45 one 4S contingency contingency I one 45
science terrestrial terrestrial terrestrial months
day stay day stay day stay I
LPLM with LPLM with one 4S one 45 critical critical one 45 • 64 cargo
airJock atrlock terrestrial terrestrial initial initial terrestrial _nonths
day stay day stay day stay I
S manned science spares/ one 45 @ mission critical critical one 45 day, _F 6
supply terrestrial start, two initial + initial + extended months
allocation? day stay 45 day stays stay or abort •
6 cargo surface surface one4S @mission fulllmtlal + full initial + one45 day, • 6
Habitat, Habitat terrestrial start, two extended months
scmnce day stay 45 day stays stay or abort I
7 manned science spares/ one 45 @ mission full initial + full initial + one 45 day, • 6
supply terrestrial start, two extended months
allocation? day stay 45 day stays stay or abort I
8 cargo #2LPLM #2LPLM one4S @mission fullmltlal+ fullinltlal+ onegOday, • 6
terrestrial start, three extended months
day stay 45 day stays stay or abort I
months
9 manned science spares/ one 45 day, @ mission full initial + full m_tlal, one t80 day,
180 day supply extended start, four extended
duration allocation? stay or abort 45 day stays stay or abort
Miss=on Hardware Material Supplies
Flight No. Type brought brought brought
10 cargo .PLM # 3 with ! LPLM # 3 w_th one 90
begin 3 a=rtock & s_de a_rlock & side terrestrial
fhghts/yr connection connect=on day stay*
11 ca rgo surface Su trace
HabRtat #2 Habitat #2
12 cargo
Figure 4-2. Baseline FLO Site Evolution
Suppheson Spares Spares on
surface brought surface
none as full
recluired _n,tlal +
one 45 135 terrestrial as full
terrestrial daystay @ reclu=red m_tlal +
day stay start
LPLM #4with LPLM #4w_th : one 90 225terrestrlai as full
a_rlock & side airlock & side terrestrial day stay @ required m=t_al +
connection connection day stay start
13 manned scmnce scmnce one 45 270 terrestrial as full
II begin 4 360 day terrestrial day stay @ reclulred mat_al +
flights/yr duration day stay start
jj 14 cargo LPLM#Sw_th LPLM#$wIth one90 360@cargo as full45 day alrlock & side a=rlock & side terrestrial miss=on arrival reclu=red m_t_al ÷
centers connection connection day stay
r 15 cargo !LPLM #6w_th LPLM #6with one90 360@cargo as full
airlock & side a_rlock & s_de terrestrial mission arrival reclu_red _n_t_al +
connection connection day stay
16 cargo Bio-chamber B_o-chamber _ 315 @cargo as full
& small & small mission atrial reclu_red _nlt_al ÷
oxygen plant oxygen plant
17 manned Pressurized Pressurized one 45 90 @ miss=on as full
S 12 day rover rover terrestrial arrtvat required _n_t_al ÷
duration day stay
18 cargo
Supported Launch
Stayt=me center
one 90 120
terrestrial J_aysday stay**
one 135 V120
terrestrial days
day stay** wL120one 225
terrestrial Vdays
day stay** J
270 days WIIF120
Vdays
I
315 days wJF4s
Td ays
I
Td _S
360 days ays
315days- _r45
(mission + ) days
I
LPLM #7w=th ! LPLM #7 with
alrlock & side a_rlock & side
connection connect=on
one 90 180 @ cargo as full
terrestrial m_sslon arrival reclu_red _n_t_al +
day stay
* LPLM repacked with a reduction of spares and an increase in consumables
** Manned fhghts on hold pending decision on base placement and supply buddup
Note: some launches on 45 day centers and some on g0 day centers
Figure 4-2. Baseline FLO Site Evolution (Sheet 2)
135 days- W|lf225
end 360 Vdays
day begin
512 day I
180 days ! lJJ_!)0
467 days of Vdays
m _ss_on left
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Fhght Mission Hardware Material
No Type brought brought
19 cargo LPLM #8wrth LPLM #8w_th
airlock & sfde a_rlock & s_de
connection connection
20 cargo LPLM #g with LPLM #g with
airlock & side alrlock & $_de
connection connection
21 cargo
22
23
Supported Launch
Stayt;me center
180 days 377 go
days leftof ldays
mission
180 days 289 90
days left of Jdays
mission &
180@cargo as full 180 days 197 • 90
m_ssaon required =n_t_al + days left of Idays
arrrvaJ mfssJon &
80 @cargo as full 180 days 107 • go
mlssmon requ0red inlttal + days left of Jdays
arrlvaJ mission 4,
Supphes Suppheson Spares Spares on
brought surface brought surface
oneg0 180 @cargo as !full
terrestrfal m_ss_on requ=red initial +
day stay arrival
one90 180 @cargo as full
terrestrtal m_ss_on required _mt=al +
day stay arrival
LPLM#10wlth LPLM#1Owmth oneg0
airlock & s_de afrlock & smde terrestrial
connectton connection day stay
cargo LPLM #11w=th LPLM #11 with oneg0
airlock&smde a_rlock&s=de terrestrial
connectfon connect=on day stay
manned* science scmence one 45
terrestrial
day stay
118@ as full 118 days of next •107
m_ssJon reclu_red m_t=al + m_ss=on (next Idays
arrtval cargo 45 days) &
24 cargo LPLM#12w4th LPLM #12w_th onegO 163@ as full 163 days of stay " 45
alrJock & side a_rlock & s=de terrestrial mass,on requfred in_t=al + covered days
connection connection day stay arr_vat r
25 cargo Ground Ground none 118@ as full 18 days of stay •45
Nuclear power Nuclear power rn_ss¢on required _n=t=al + covered (next days
reactor reactor arrival cargo g0 J
days)** .L
26 cargo LPLM#13w_th= LPLM #13w_th one90 118@ as full 135days-end •90
a_rlock & s_de a_rlock & s_de terrestrial m_ss=on requrred _n_t_al + 360 day beg=n days
connect=on connectton day stay arrival 512 day J
= This manned m=ss=on arr=ves _n 107 days
** 28 days of reserve consumables ava=fable ,f next g0 days resupply delayed
Figure 4-2. Baseline FLO Site Evolution (Sheet 3)
be incorporated into development, and possible alteration, of both Mars hardware and
Mars operations teehniques sueh as the resupply operations, laboratory analysis
techniques, ground seareh and reeonnaissanee surfaee missions, dust control and other
listed items. All of the development schedules were based on systems similar in
eonfiffuration, employment of new teehnology, complexity and operations requirements
for first item development, assembly, eheekout and proeessing times. The primary
information came from the Boeing Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) and Saturn vehieles. All
development schedules are first cut approximations.
The first development sehedule, figure 4-9 has not only the NTP engine and nuelear
surface power sehedules, but development lines for the then (April-May 1993) eurrently
known and funded nuclear power/propulsion systems. This shows that if either the NTP
or nuclear surface power programs require the "current programs" development, then
there is likely to be a technology based impact on their development. The funding for
these "current programs" has changed (decreased) sinee the time this comparison was
made, making that situation, if it exists, worse. The NTP and nuclear surfaee power
time]ines are based on work previously done as part of the STCAEM trade studies for
NTP (NTR) engine development and NEP/dual use power/ground power reaetor systems
development known at that time. This information has been updated as far as design
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Flight Mission
NO. Type
1 cargo
2 manned
3 manned
4 cargo
5 manned
6 cargo
7 manned
8 cargo
9 manned
180 day
duratton
Hardware Matenal Supphes Suppheson Spares Spareson
brought brought brought surface brought surface
Outpost Hab_taton one 45 one 45 contingency contingency
lander terrestrial terrestrial
day stay day stay
Supported
Staytlme
one45
terrestrial
day stay
Launch
center
rOver, rover spares/ one 45
soence supply terrestrial
allocabon) day stay
rover, rover one 45 one 4S
science terrestrral terrestr=al
day stay day stay
contingency contingency
contingency contingency
LPLM w_th, LPLM w_th one 45 one 45 cr=t=cal critical
aJrlock a_rlock terrestrial terrestrial m_t_al _n_t_al
one 4.5 6
terrestrialdayone stay4S _ths
terrestrtal months
day stay |
one 45 V6
terrestr=al months
day stay day stay
soence spares/ one 45 @ m_ss=on cr=tzcal critical
supply terrestrial start, two initial + initial +
allocatlon_ day stay 45 day stays
surface surface one 45 @ m_ss=on
Habitat, Hab=tat terrestrtal start, two
soence day stay 45 day stays
fullmtt0al+ fulltnit_al+
day stay _1rone45 day, 6
extended months
stay or abort |
one 45 day, _6
extended months
stay or abort |
one 45 day, _1'6
extended months
stay or abort
extended
stay or abort
one 180day, V6
extended months
stay or abort
science spares/ one 45 @ mission full _n_t_al ÷ full m_t_al +
supply terrestrial start, two
allocat=on) day stay 45 day stays
#2LPLM #2LPLM one 45 @miss=on fultmftlal+ fullm_t_at+
terrestrial start, three
day stay ! 45 day stays
science spares/ one 45 day, @ mission full initial + full imtlal +
supply extended start, four
allocatJon_ stay or abort 4S day stays
Figure 4"4. FLO Site Evolution - First Alternative
M_SSlOn
Flight No. Type
10 cargo
begin 3
flights/yr
11 cargo
12 cargo
13 manned
begin4 512day
flights/yr duration
14 cargo
15 cargo
16 cargo
17 cargo
18 cargo
Hardware Mater_al Supphes Supphes on Spares
brought brought brought surface brought
LPLM#3w_th LPLM#3w_th one 90 none as
a_rlock & s_de a=rlock & smde terrestr0al requ=red
connectLon connectmon day stay I
surface Surface one 45' 135 terrestrial as
Habatat #2 Habitat #2 terrestrial day stay @ requ=red
day stay start
LPLM#4w_th LPLM#4w_th oneg0 225terrestnal as
amrlock & s=de amrlock & s_de terrestrmal day stay @ Ireclu=red
connectton connect,on day stay start
pressurized pressurized one 45 270 terrestr=al as
rover rover terrestrial day stay @ required
day stay start
LPLM#5w_th LPLM #Swmth onegO 270@cargo as
a=rtock&s_de a=rlock&s,de terrestrial m=ss=onarrlval requ=red
connection connect=on day stay
LPLM #6w=th LPLM #6w_th onegO 270@cargo as
airlock &stde a_rlock & s_de terrestr=al m=ss_on arrwal required
connecbon connectmon day stay
Bio-chamber Bmo-chamber ) 180 @cargo as
& small & small mtss_on arrival requ=red
oxygen plant oxygen plant
LPLM#7wtth LPLM#7wmth oneg0 180@m_ssmoni as
airlock & smde a=rlock & s=de terrestrial arr=val requ=red
connection connection day stay
LPLM #8w_th LPLM #8wmth onegO 180@cargo as
a_rlock&s_de a=rlock&s=de terrestrtal mtss_onarr_val requ,red
connection connectton day stay
* LPLM repacked with a reduct=on of spares and an increase m consumables
** Manned flights on hold pending deos=on on base placement and supply buddup
Spares on Supported Launch
surface Stay_=me center
full onegO 120
_net=al + terrestrial days
day stay*" 1
full one 135 _r120
=n=t=al + terrestr=al days
day stay** _L
full one22S V120
=n_t=al ÷ terrestrial days
day stay*" _,full 270 days 20
m_t,al + oays
full 270 days _Fgo
mmt*al÷ !422daysof days
miss=on left I
full
=n=t=al ÷
270 days Vg0
322 days of .days
m,ssion left, _dgaOyfull 180 days-
m,t_al ÷ 242 days of s
m*ss_on leftl l
full 180 days- V90
m_t_al + 152 daysof days
m_ss_on left I
full 180 days Vg0
m_t_al + 62 days of days
m_ss_on left
Figure 4-4. FLO Site Evolution- First Alternative (Sheet 2)
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Flight Mission Hardware Material Supplies Supphes on
NO. Type brought brought brought surface
19 manned* science science one 45 163 @cargo
begin next terrestrial mission
mission day stay arrival
20 cargo
21 cargo
LPLM#9wlth LPLM#9w_th onegO 163 @cargo
a*rlock & Side a_rlock & Side terrestrial miss=on
connection connection day stay arrival
LPLM#1Ow_th LPLM#1Ow_th onegO 163 @cargo
airlock & side alrlock & side terrestrial miss=on
connection connection day stay arrival
22 cargo LPLM #11 w_th LPLM #11with one90 163 @cargo
airlock & s_de atrlock & s,de terrestrial mission
connection connect=on day stay arrival
23 cargo LPLM #12 with LPLM #12 with one90 163@
airlock & side alrlock & side terrestrial mission
connection connection day stay arrival
24 cargo Ground Ground none 73 @
Nuclear power Nuclear Dower mlssMon
reactor reactor arrival
25 cargo LPLM#13wlth LPLM #13with oneg0 116@
airlock & side a_rlock & side terrestrial mission
connection connect=on day stay arrival
Spares iSpares on Supported Launch
brought surface Staytime center
as full 163 days end 62
required initial + 512 day days
m ISSIOR I
as full 163 days _llrg0
reclu=red ,nlt_al + "days
I
as full 163 days _lrg0
reclulred initial + Vdays
I
as full t63 days _lrg0
required imt,al + daysI
as full 163 days V107
reclulred I initial + ldays
as full 73 days** of V45
required mltaal + stay covered days
(next cargo
45 days) _
as full 118days "45
required initial + days
* This manned mission arrives _n 62 days
** early resupply of 90 day consumables required
Figure 4-4. FLO Site Evolution - First Alternative(Sheet 3)
fabrication and testing schedules based on the assumption that work has continued at
various places such as NASA Lewis Research Center and that many concepts and designs
are still being explored. The process then requires investigation and selection of one of
these options, reducing some of the design, development and testing times.
Figure 4-10 contains the development schedules for the habitat, the module
offloader and the bio-ehamber. All these schedules include a lunar development branch.
Of these the bio-ehamber takes the longest time, but while it was the longest, the first
mission could be performed without it. The offloader, which will be needed, while it is
designed, developed and tested in conjunction with the habitat, it is not required for the
first manned lunar mission, and lags slightly in the need date. it has a development
schedule shorter than the habitat and it is not needed as early, leaving the habitat as the
longest critical-path element for the first manned Mars mission.
The lunar impact schedules, figure 4-11 and 4-12, compare the development
schedule of the NTP engine and the habitat with and without a lunar testing development
branch. In the case of both systems, but particularly the habitat, some time is spent in
development producing a system for which operations will be analogous in both the lunar
and Mars environments, i. e. a lunar system similar enough to provide feedback data to a
Mars design. The "price" is time for doing this that can be subtracted from the
development schedule of a design that works strictly for the Mars environment. Hence
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Flight
No
1
Mission
Type
cargo
Hardware Material Supphes Suppheson Spares Spareson Supported
brought brought brought surface brought surface Staytlme
Outpost Habitat on one 45 one 45 contingency contingency one 45
lander terrestrtal terrestrial terrestrial
day stay day stay day stay
Launch
center
manned rover, rover spares/ one 45
scaence supply terrestrial
allocation _ day stay
contingency contingency one45 6
terrestnaldayst y r Onths
manned
ca rgo
manned
rover, rover one 45 one 45
soence terrestrral terrestrtal
day stay day stay
contingency contingency
LPLM with LPLM wath one 45 one 45 critical critical
a_rlock airlock terrestrial terrestrial initial mltlal
day stay day stay
science spares/ one 45 @ mission cr=tical critical
45 • 6one
terrestrial months
day stayone 45 6
terrestrial months
day stay _one 45 day, n6thsextended osupply terrestrial start, two m_tlal + m=t_al +
allocat=on_ day stay 45 day stays
6 cargo surface surface one 45 @ mission
Habitat, Habitat terrestrial start, twO
soence day stay 45 day stays
7 manned scaence fulllnltlal+ full_nltlal+
full m=t=al + futl_nltlal+
stay or abort /
one4S day, _ n6thsextended o
stay or abort |
one 45 day, .L 6
extended _lonths
spares/ one 45 @ mission
supply terrestrial start, two
allocation'_ day stay 45 day stays stay or abort
#2 LPLM #2 LPLM one 45 @mission full mlttal + full matlal + one 90 day,
terrestrial start, three extended
day stay 45 day stays stay or abort
soence spares/ one 45 day, @ mlsston full m_t=al + full initial ÷ one 180 day, 16
supply extended start, four extended _nths
aitocatton? stay or abort 45 day stays stay or abort
cargo
_lro6ths
manned
180 day
duration
Figure 4-6. FLO Site Evolution - Second Alternative
Flight NO.
10
begin 4
fhghts/yr
11
12
13
14
15
MISSIOn
Type
cargo
cargo
cargo
cargo
cargo
cargo
16 cargo
17 manned
512 day
duration
18 cargo
Hardware Material Supphes Supplies on Spares Spareson
brought brought brought surface brought surface
LPLM#3with LPLM#3wlth one90 none as full
airlock & side alrlock & side terrestrial required mtt_al÷
connection connection day stay"
surface Surface one 45 135 terrestrial as full
Habitat #2 Hab=tat #2 terrestrial day stay@ required qn#tJal+
day stay start
LPLM #4 w_th LPLM #4 with one 90 225 terrestrial as full
alrlock & side alrlock & slde terrestrial day stay @ required mltial ÷
connection connectton day stay start
LPLM #Swtth LPLM#Swlth oneg0 315terrestrwal as
alrlock & side alrlock & side terrestrial day stay @ requtred
connection connectton day stay start
LPLM#6wIth LPLM #6with oneg0 405@cargo as
alrlock & side alrlock & side terrestrial m_ssmon arrwal required
connect=on connect=on day stay
LPLM#7w_th LPLM #7w_th onegO 4gS@cargo as
a_rlock & side a_rlock & s_de terrestrial m_sslon arrwal! reclu_red
connect=on connection day stay
LPLM#8wlth LPLM #8with one90 585(_cargo as
airlock & side a#rlock & side terrestrial mission arrival required
con nectmon connection day stay
pressurized pressurized one 45 630 terrestrial as
rover rover terrestrial day stay @ required
day stay start
Bio-chamber B_o-chamber _ 540 @ cargo as
& small & small m=sston arrival required
oxygen plant oxygen plant
* LPLM repacked with a reductton of spares and an mcrease _n consumables
** Manned flights on hold pending decks=on on base placement and supply buddup
Figure 4-6.
Supported Launch
Stayt_me center
one 90 g0
terrestrial ldaysday tay" _
one 135 V90
terrestrial ldaysday tay" _
one 225 V90
terrestrial days
day stay*" _full 315 days go
m_tlal, days
I
Vgo
days
ays
full 405 days
m_t,al +
full 495 days
_nlt_al ÷
full $85 days
#nmt=ai+
full 630 days
_mttal +
full
nn_tnal +
itdays
0
ays
FLO Site Evolution - Second AIternative (Sheet 2)
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Flight Miss=on Hardware Mater_al
No Type brought brought
19 manned* soence soence
begin next
mission
20 cargo LPLM #gwlth LPLM #9 w_th
alrlock & s_de a_rlock & Side
connectaon connection
21 cargo LPLM#10w_th LPLM#10wtth
alrlock &stde alrlock & side
connection connection
22 cargo LPLM # 11 w_th LPLM # 11 with
airlock & side a_rlock & s_de
con nect_on con nectlon
23 cargo LPLM #12w_th LPLM#12w_th
airlock & side a_rlock & s_de
conneCtiOn connectton
24 cargo Ground Ground
Nuclear power Nuclear power
reactor reaCtor
Supphes Suppheson Spares Spareson Supported Launch
brought surface brought surface Stay_tme center
one45 73 @cargo as full 73 days** 512
terrestrtal mission required initial ÷ end 512 day days
day stay arrival m_ss_on J
oneg0 118@cargo as full 118days _1 r45
terrestrial m_sslon required imttal + days
day stay arr,val _d/aaSyoneg0 163 @cargo as full 163 days
terrestrial m_ss_on required _n_tlal + s
day stay arrival J
oneg0 163 @cargo as full 163 days
terrestr=al m,sslon required initial + s
day stay arrival /
one 90 163 @ as full 163 days _IF 90
terrestr=al mlsston required =n=ttat ÷ days
day stay arrival 1
none 73@ as full 73 days _Vgo
mfssJon required mMt_al + (next cargo days
arrival m0sston Jn 45 /
days) L
25 cargo LPLM #13wtth LPLM #13w_thi oneg0 118@ as full 118days V45
a_rlock & side a=rlock & side terrestrial m_ss_on required m_t_al + days
con nect_on connecteon day stay arrival J
* Th_s manned m_ssion arrtves m 62 days
** early resupply of 90 day consumables required
Figure 4-6. FLO Site Evolution - Second Alternative(Sheet 3)
the difference in development and initial eheekout time for the Mars mission alone.
Using this as a point of departure for reducing the Mars-alone schedules as much as
possible for the required longest lead critical elements, it appears that the addition of
lunar testing adds four years to each of the sehedules.
4.6 HABITAT HERITAGE
The Mars Habitat used in the NASA in-house study is a three-tiered extended
elliptical structure, based in part, on a single tier (one deck) lunar configuration studied
as an alternative habitat strueture for the First Lunar Outpost. This lunar eonfiguration,
in turn, had its roots in the analyses presented in Long-Duration Habitat Study of March
1990 which was done as part of this contract. In that study a matrix of 5 crew sizes,
three module sizes and 6 diameters was analyzed under varying conditions of gravity,
orientation, topology and structure. From these data, 1480 distinct options were
generated of which 150 concepts were focused on as likely eandidates, including the
elliptiesl and extended elliptical family of eonfi_urations. The lunar elliptical habitat,
derived as an alternate FLO configuration, is shown in figure 4-13 with a volume analysis
given in figure 4-14. More information on this partieula_ lunar eonfiEuration can be
found in the FLO Alternatives section of the Space Transportation and Analysis for
Exploration Missions Phase Three Final Report, June 1993, D615-10062-2.
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System
All Surface
Modules
Lander/
Ascent
Vehicle
Habitat
Pressurized
Rover
Subsystem
Mobde Cradle
Surface Connectson
and Docking
mechamsm
Dust control
IResupply
Precision Landing
Off loading
Mechanism
Mechantcal portton
of vehicle health
management
Laboratory portion
• ISRU
• Medical
• Geophys,cal
Life Support
Systems
Lunar
• works in 1/6g
• telepersent to start, but
may evolve to
autonomous
• power is continuous
during the long lunar
day, .'. mobility, service
systems & recharging are
continuous during this
time
• connection techniques
done man-assisted, then
autonomous
• at all mechanBcal
Bnterface surfaces &
electronics
• supply and resupply
techniques established =n
lunar operation
• needs repeated landings
at one area (1 km circle)
,. Offload=ng of major
elements must be
verified
• verification of dormant
engine operabd_ty
surface and possibility
remote on orbit
• experiments =n extr-
act=on and analysis
processes 02 extraction
may be used for
atmospheric makeup
• physeolog=cal monltonng
_n reduced grawty
• physiological mon,tor,ng
of crew ,n long duration
confined conditions
• sensors, field
observations, etc
F_rst In-s_tu tests for long
durations
May or may not be
used/tested _n the lunar
environment. _f _t is. it wdl
come as a science payload
of St
Mars
• works in I/3 g
• may be autonomous to
start
• power is not continuous,
unless an RTG or other
source than solar used.
Solar cell arrangement
wdl be larger and
heawer
•connecttons must be
autonomous & done to
mmlmMze dust intrusion
• aeolian drwen dust
problem
• supply techniques
_nvolve larger quantities
of materJaland retrieval
of greater/larger? _tems
I• needs repeated landings
at one area (? circle) from
multiple orbits
offloadmg of major
etements must be
conducted in high dust
conditions
• verification of dormant
engine operability _n
both surface and remote
on orbit critical
, experiments tn
extraction and analysis
processes
• physiologtcal monltormng
,n reduced gravity
• phystologlcal maturating
of crew in long duration
confined condtt_ons
• sensors, field
observations, etc
Long duration LSS critical
tO mlsston
st _sestablished as part of
the tnlttal landed cargo
Comments
• use must be verd=ed on Moon
before Mars operations
• rapid power shifts during the
Mars day & night, must be
accounted for. _f the system is
not to be degraded rapidly and
have mobility move m "starts
& fits" and may have fatigue
fadure problems
• must be verified on the Moon
before Mars operations
, techniques must be verified on
the Moon before Mars
operations
• resupply techniques may have
to be modified for Mars
landing for Mars will be more
difficult, as the capture orbits
wdl be different for each
opportunity, then entry must be
to the same point
the difference in gravity and
possible configuration
differences =n the modules will
require a stronger and possibly
more elaborate mechanism
verification on on orbit engine
lop, rations cntlcal to abort to
surface, once the ascent iS
accomphshed, return tO Mars
base may not be possible
ISRU experiments wdl differ in
direction, lunar wdl lOOk for O,_.
H_ and material use; Mars wdl
look for H20. _ces. btolog_cal
evidence and material use
Mars physiological evaluation
wdl be on speed of recovery
from m_crogravity conditions to
partial gravity and detection of
any extraterrestrial pathogens
Sensors and systems will have tO
be modified from the lunar
equ,pment to Mars atmosphere
and dust conditions
Common systems under common
cond,tions
for lunar operations may requ,re
a s,ngle launch, a manned lander
with only the pressurized rover
& consumables
Figure 4-7. Common Lunar- Mars Elements
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System
Bio-
chamber
Software
Software
NTP/'Cryo
Subsystem
, Plant Growth
• BiD-
decontamination
Terrain traverse
program:
• Mobility
actuabon
• Visual
Interpretation
• Route
identification
program
IVHM:
• cOld engine start
verd_cat_on
• Habitat
verificat=on &
dormancy
• BiD-chamber
_solat_on &
dormancy
Data Management
& System
PrlorttfzatJon
Engine/propuls;on
system
Lunar
• 24 hr. mght-day cycle
maintained during lunar
day & night
• Prehmmary plant
select,ons for growth m
reducedgravlty
• a "long-day" cycle s_mdar
to an Earth polar summer
m_ght be tr_ed
• automabon techniques or
dormant ecolog,es should
first be tested here
techmques for not cross
contaminating the b=o-
chamber w,th fungh
bacteria, etc.. from the
crew or the selection of
uncontam matedttolerant
plants done here
Lunar terrain and sod are
known by Apollo work, but
work =n automation stdl
requ=red
Lunar sharp contrasts are
known from Apollo work.
automatton required
Apollo data and Lunar
Mapper wdl g_ve a more
deta,led _dea of landmarks
W=ll allowa lead brae for a
rescue lander to be sent
whde supphes are avaalable
The ab,htyto "wake up" &
mterrogate the systems
3rtor to m_ss=on comm=t
then "mothball" them add
to architecture flex_bd=ty &
extend system hfe
Operational testing ground
for Mars systems
TBD
:)rowdes an opportumty to
recover and evaluate an
engine that has been =n
space for a s,gmficant time
and perhaps repeatedly
fired
Mars
• 24 hr. mght-day cycle
maintained during the
Martian cycle or the
Martian day &ntght
m_ght be tested for use
• plant selections may be
refined, for those that
can tolerate a dormant
t_me period, or methods
developed to place the
Bmo-chamber in a
dormant state for
between m_ss_ons
• a techmque for testing
growth ,n the Mart,an
sod, without refection
from or to the sod
samples may be don m-
sltu
Mars sod consistency and
local terrain are not well
known
Mle scattering of hght may
cause different
perceptions
Mars ts not well known;
not =n specific detads.
Mars Rover or Sample
Return may improvethls
W=ll be crlt,cal for both
ascent and on-orbit
encjtnes as abort-to-
surtace =sprimary Option
Habitat cond0tton must be
known prior to orbit tnsert
For a long duration stay
the operat=on must be
,solated and dormancy/
seahng verlf=ed between
missions
TBD
Comments
Plant growth m Mars sod tnats
wmll involve e_ther an e_ternal
area isolated from the Mars
surface and the Base atmo-
sphere/systems or a section of
the Bwo-chamber that is _solated
from crew and Earth-based
operating systems (prevent=on of
cross-contammat=on between
crew, other plant exper=ments
and the Mars sod experiments).
These techmques need to be
_rowded =n the lunar Bio-
chamber trials
Sod character_st=cs wdl vary
w_dely between lunar an Mars
surfaces (presence of moisture,
cons=stency of dust. resultant
wear etc.) Th_s must be
accounted for m system
preparat=on
Visual perceptions wdl change
between the Moon and Mars.
due to atmosphere presence or
absence, reflection, dust. etc.
affect,ng both the depth
percept=on, and ground route
_dent=ficat=on
Th_s _smore of a concern for
Mars. where there _sa long
duratton between onset of the
problem and rescue capabd=ty
Remote venhcat=on of the
hab=tat conditions can save a
m=ssmonby know=ng needed
repa,rs prior tO m_ss_on comm=t
Cross contam_natton could be
cr_t=cal _n both =solated
enwronments The methods
must be provided pr=or to Mars
m iSslons
Cr_t,cal systems & momtor_ng
wdl have some specific aspects to
the Moon or Mars due to the
t=me for resupply/rescue For
lunar outpost/base priorities wtll
change w_th base expansion
An =n-space dormancy period
w=th/w;thout restart, can be
recovered for phystcai
exammatton on cool-down
Figure 4-7. Common Lunar- Mars Elements (Continued)
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System
All Surface
Modules
Subsystem
Mobile cradle
Lunar
verafy:
• operatnon of cradle
supports thorough
offload, transverse &
module connections
• operataon of cradle
suspensuon through
offtoad, transverse &
module connections
• operation of cradle
wheels through offload.
transverse & module
connect0ons
• structural support on t_e-
downs
• thermal insulation
through tie-downs
Mars
• cradle system must be
used on Mars for cargo
transport to form the base
• comparison of susDens,on
action in lg and 1/6g will
allow more accurate
estamate of 1/3g needs
• a lunar trial of wheels that
support muln-tonne
system over -> lkm will
help determine wheel life
per distance traveled
• establ0shed tie-down and
,nsulation techniques for
shift and slump conditions
in long duration
Comments
• w0thout a lunar trial, an
_ncreased risk of a
malfunctlon(_ Mars or
=ncreased mass to =nsure cradle
function
• suspension trnal simdar rusks to
cradle operation, potential
failure or 0ncreased mass
here a lunar tr=al uscrotlcal,
wheel fadure may ermine
the d,stance from the base
area that the cargo must land
a lunar trial wall help
determme heat flow and
support compensatnon under
temperature extremes, useful
since the Mars permafrost layer
usunknown and may effect
hab positioning & stab011ty
Surface • verify methods of • cargo components must • w,thout a Iongduration trial.
Connection and physacal connection be connected on Mars ,n vacuum wuth reduced gravity
Docking Mech. • establish methods of surface with pressurized and after transport, an
resource cross- (habntable) connections ,ncreased risk of phys,cal
connectnons (manned) pressurized connections faohng
dust exclusion on contamination due both dust contamlnat-'_'_-control on
regular, repeated to human activity, enter0ng and exat0ngthe
operations & connections landmg,& aeohan actiwty hob,table volume, check of
will effect tong term dust problem due to land0ng
habltabdlty
Resupply • estabhsh methods & • physical resupply will be • w_thout "real situation"
techmques of manual done (_ Mars from the endurance trials, long duratuon
and log module resupply onset, manual resupply physical effects may not be
physncal requirements w011g0ve msnght tO crew determined before Mars
endurance, log module launch and/or log module
wdl show 0nventory req reclu,rements not known
Lander/ Precision • ver,fy point to point • accuracy an landing from • for all precoslon landong
Ascent Landing nawgatnon accuracy several orbat lnchnatlons
Vehicle • test use of beacons for are required
guidance • beacon guidance may be
• estimate CEF size the only method for
(footprint) for landing "pmpoont" landing
• acceptable limit for
manned transport,
manned logistics transfer
& landing dust can be
determmed
Offloading • check of technique • s0m01ar offloadmg • with no lunar traal, nncreased
Mechanism - stabuluty techniques wdl be used r_sk of e_ther offloadnng
- terrann tolerance for Mars cargo & manned hangup @ Mars or _ncreased
- d,sconnects (disconnect flights mass to unsure offload funct,on
act,ons & loses)
portion of systems response t_me the system can be exoted veh,cle hea-_'J_--management
vehicle health (remote & manned) and how long it takes to system The physical change on
management • system actovat_on _n test check the system and reduced gravaty wdl effect both
with reduced gravity know the response is the activation level & response
correct tome If not conducted on the
Moon. the degree of change
may not be accounted for
cluest0ons, the methods and
hm,ts must be determuned
proof to the first Mars cargo
launch Thos,saquestlonnot
only of what terrain is
acceptable and where 0t ns. but
how tO access _t and the
hyslcal tolerances of the
ardware, software and
people These Cluest_ons can be
determ,ned by a lunar trial.
wh0ch a close approx=matlon
that allows change & retest
Figure 4-8. Lunar- Mars Testing Elements
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System
Habitat
Subsystem
Laboratory port_on
,. ISRU
• Med<al
Lunar
• estabhsh methods of
IRSU tests and waste
d_sposal
• estabhsh ISRU tool
usage IVA & EVA
Mars
• methods may be cr,t_cal to
Mars 0 2 & fuel productfon
• d,rect analog to Mars
requ=rements
Comments
• _f the systems and
techmques are not tested
on the Moon, then cross-
containment problems that
do not show m Earth or SSF
tests may develop (_ Mars
• _"e-s;a-bT,s-h-Io n-g-d-ur a-t,on - : Ma;s-w, I_ have%,ce t-he ..... : i a_; tes t_nq-a'_onecann"o_-
phys,cal health grawty, but phys<al operations reproduce the "on your
momtor,ng needs of and mental stress =n confined own" feeiinqs and
crew
• verify tool
requ_rementrJ
usefulness for crew
health
• establish long duration
psycholog<al health
momtormg needs of
the crew
areas on lunar tr,al for an
extended per=od wdt test the
physical and psychological
hm=tsthat can not be done on
Earth Tools. techmques and
countermeasures can be
0dentlfled & developed
tnvent_veness that the
isolation of a lunar trial can
produce (even
overwmtermgm Antarct<a)
espeoaily wtth the added
enwronmental
cons=derattons
• Geophys,caJ "ove_fy'sen_or"s;s_er_s"& ="c_lrect-ana_o_j_ol_la_s ..........................• shadows, hght,ng
field observat=on tech requirements ddferences sensor outputs
must be recreated on Earth
L,"f; S ;p%_)_t..... %check O[a'/Icommon -° .-Ion-q-d-ur a-t,on ]u"nar tr ,ai'is t-he- i : E-a_"t'hc _1eck _N-Ou_:_-h%V_t_)-"
Systems systems under "real best Mars analoq; more be run in a large man-rated
serwce" cond,t=ons frequent m and Out stresses vacuum system ($) for a long
than SSF time ($$)w_th human
regress/egress ($$$)
Pressurized • check of all common • long duration lunar trial ,sthe • ,n a terrestrial vacuum
Rover systems under "real best Mars analog; more mobd,ty may not be
serwce" conditions frequent use stresses under checked at the same time,
vacuum & dust than earth w=th any amount of dust
• Plant Growth • test plant selections • plant selection for reduced!Bio-
Ichamber
• B,o-
Oecontammatton
• estabhsh plant
dormancy/production
cycle
• verify plant material
storage techmque:
- crop storage
- waste product
(store/compost)
• verdy adequate
support mater,al
prowded
• ver,fy seals between
b,o-chamber/hwng and
working quarters
functmon
• verdy ,splat=on &
decontam tnat=on
system for :
- water
- air
- humidity
grawty & crew health must be
selected pr=or to Mars m,ss,ons
Plant hfe cycles in reduced
grawty must be estabhshed as
well as crop rotat=on, methods
of waste d_sposal
(bactertolog6cal content,
potential crop and crew
contammat,on) and proper
crop storage wroth ,solatmon
determined
• the same system that _sused #n
the lunar tr=alswdl be used _n
the Mars mBss_on system
• the same system that rs used _n
the lunar trials wdl be used _n
the Mars m=ss=on system
once comm,rted to a Mars
m,ss_on there will be no
chance to change the crops or
"freshen" the system, e,ther
by removal and
decontammat,ng the plant
waste products, the add,t,on
of new plant stock or
changing out the sod and
water systems Th,s ,s an area
contamination
• w=th reference tO the above
plant growth & crew health
needs these systems wdl be
more cr,t_cal on Mars w_ere
a problem must be dealt
w,th _n place and where the
potenhal for not only crew
contaminating the plants
but the Martian
envmronment through sOd
- waste products contact may pose a threat
"So_c_vare- - :terrain ;rave_se- ...........................................................
program:
• Mob,hty
actuation
• V,sual
tnterpretatron
• Route
tdenttficat=on
program
• verdy both
autonomous and
manned control
funct=on for the
hab,tat/Iog modules
• verdy the abd=ty to
d,stmgu_sh ground
hazards m all hghtmg
cond,t,ons
• verdy the abrl=ty to
track a beacon around
obstacles, follow tracks
and route markers
• cargo dehvered hab, b,o-
chamber and Iog,st=cs carr,ers
wdl have to move tothe base
area, w_th the crew performing
the =nter-connectlons
• wsualcond=t=ons may or may
not be better on Mars, but a
system working here wdl work
on Mars
• several forms of route
_dentificat_on & can be tr_ed
Several forms of regohth/sand
hrmness testing can be apphed
• lunar tr=al wdl help estabhsh
the terrain hm_ts, the extent
of mobd,ty to the base that
can be done by machines
alone and the amount
need,ng human gumdance,
the requ,rements for
computer capabd,ty,
weather beacons help, and
how much "base gather=ng"
can be done pr=or to crew
arr+val
Figure 4-8. Lunar- Mars Testing Elements (Continued)
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"ve_ fy contam_'na_on -
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balhng" program
"G ;t Tg -
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area. shutdown
procedures and
emergency sating
pr_or=t,es
test data save
priorities and retrieval
on restart
space(NTP)
vertfy funct,on after
long durat,on (180 -
512 days) _n space
(both)
retrieve propulsion
system and engine for
teardown, inspection
and evaluation (both)
-es _'a-b_s'h-m-e'th od_ & - -
techniques of manual
and log module
operational
requ,rements
Mars
critical for Mars mission crew
as it may determine
when to terminate the mission
Comments
lunar conditions permit a
real situation test of engine
component hmmts under
reduced grawty & dust
laden vacuum
as-_-t'_'ay determine when to situation, repeated use test
terminate the mission that will define reahstlc
requirements prtor to Mars
commit
critical for Mars mission as B,o- ,solar=on and reduced
c-'_'_oer may have to produce
part of the food supply ,n an
abort s_tuat=on
shutdown must safe some
habitable space and allow crew
to fix problem
. computer programs must
know, 8=save critical data; full
reprogramm=ng may take too
long
m Jss,on success-¥'_crew safe
return
engine restart critical to
m _ss_on success an_fe crew
return
methods of resupply wdl
closely parallel the ones used
on the lunar outpost,
gravity can't be reproduced
on Earth, _n an earth test
contamination may come
from outstde sources
"a-c-on_roITe-d_un%rt'e;t-w,_-'
determine the hm_ts of a
safe shutdown and the
amount of repair under
t,me constraints that can be
accomphshed IVA & EVA in
reduced gravity. This wdl
aid _n determm,ng when to
fix a problem at the start.
when to evacuate and how
to recover the systems.
gone a space trial can be
h,ghly instrumented, more
so than the m,ss_on vehicle.
Its functioning can be
examined remotely, refined
& retested ,n space The
NTP system, after a cool
down per,od can be
retrieved for an inspection
of parts Wear on
components, any
deterioration due to firing
or space related exposure
can be found and corrected
before a Mars commit
the hmltat,ons of machlner
and the waOd|ty Ot the
techmques of manual and
Ioq,st=cs module resuppl¥
must be identdied before
the Mars crew must perform
these functions & explore
over the 500- 600 day
period
Figure 4-8. Lunar- Mars Testing Elements (Concluded)
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Figure 4-13. FLO Ellipsoidal Habitat Option
Volume allocated ,n
Basehne FLO Hab
A,rlock Support 1 0
Depress Pump Assembly 1 0
SCPU's 2 0
EVA Stowage 3 0
AL controls/Hyperbaric Support 3 0
CHeCs/Stowage 3 0
Science 3 0
Soence Stowage 0 0
DMS Comm. 1 0
HygleneNVMF 2 0
Galley 2 0
Galley Stowage 4 0
Personal Stowage 1 0
Crlttcal ORU's 2 0
OPS Stowage 1 8
ECLS 14 0
Utd_ty "Standoff" volume 13 0
Airlock Intrusion 5 3
Rack "Swing" Space 4 8
Endcone Dist Systems 1 4
Usable Endcone Volume 1 6
Habitable Volume 31 7
Above Deck Below Distributed
Ceiling Level Deck Systems
0.0 0,0 1.5 0.0
1.0 0.0 0,0 10
00 2,2 0,0 00
0.0 0.0 2 0 0.0
0,0 2,2 O0 0.0
0.0 2,8 0.0 00
O0 2.8 0.0 0 0
0.0 0.0 1 2 0.0
0.0 Z,2 00 0.0
O0 2.8 0.0 O0
00 Z.0 0.0 00
0.0 0,8 4.0 0,0
0.0 0.0 2.2 0.0
O0 0.0 2.4 0 0
0 0 0.0 2.4 0 0
14,0 0.0 00 140
0.0 0,0 O0 7.9
0.2 1,5 0.2 0 2
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA
OO 42.5 0,0 0.0
Totals 101 6 J 15 2 61 8 17 7
Figure 4-14. Ellipsoidal FLO Hab Volume Analysis
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5.0 MARS RESUPPLY AND EVOLUTION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
As part of the operations analysis for a Mars evolution scenario, a preliminary
analysis for resupply to a Mars mission sequence that transitions from single manned
missions to permanent oeeupaney was generated. This satisfies the Statement of Work
requirement to analyze transition to crew rotation and resupply. For this analysis,
permanent oeeupaney was established by overlapping eonjunetion missions with a cargo
support launch between each manned flight. An alternative scenario does exist. It is
possible to employ conjunction and opposition missions alternately for building the base
and establishing permanent occupancy. This would be done by using a series of
conjunction missions to establish the base, then using opposition mission profiles to
perform permanent base crew rotation. The crew would not spend as long on the surface
as with overlapping conjunction missions (2 to 3 years versus 3 to 4 years). This second
scenario was not pursued for this analyses, but should be a subject of future study.
5.2 SCENARIO DESCRIPTION
Using the conjunction mission only series, and without changing the abort-to-surface
criteria, all consumables would be delivered in the cargo flights going directly to the
surface. The crew flights will have transit consumables on board, but these remain on
board and are not counted as part of the surface supplies. However, some consumables
may be brought to the surface as part of the extended missions manifests to cycle
through and augment surface supplies. The mass per day per person is estimated to be
4 kilograms (kg) divided as follows: 2.5 kg water, 0.7 kg dry food, 0.8 kg air/packaging/
other items. This number is without any mass allocation for spares, except medical and
life support systems. Two lines of inquiry were followed for crew consumables supplies,
one with the use of a large scale Bio-ehamber to grow food in situ and one without it. As
a starting safety requirement, a consumable reserve that would last for 2 to 3 years of
unsupported surface staytime, not including the Bio-chamber, was to be maintained after
the first manned mission in the event of a missed mission window, cargo flight failure or
other mishap.
The Bio-ehamber contribution to the consumables would be approximately 1.6 kg per
person, of that 1.0 kg per day is water and 0.6 kg is food. This accounts for the
difference between wet and dry food with some drinking water. Dry food, such as
cheese, nuts, sugar and spice items, and canned goods such as meat and fish would
comprise the remaining 0.1 kg of consumables, in all, this would comprise 40% of the
total transported consumables mass. A better percentage could be obtained, if there was
full closure on the water. For this study, this full water closure line was not done. The
Bio-ehamber for a crew of twelve (a permanent base with crew overlap) will have a mass
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between 50 and 60 tonnes; 7096 of whieh is ehamber mass with initial operating
equipment and the rest being spares, stores and refurbishment items speeifie to the Bio-
chamber. Some of these stores and the refurbishment items are not needed for the
initial ehamber operations, therefore, the chamber itself can be launched on a single
eargo flight, with any additional serviee items brought on a subsequent cargo mission as
base stores. The main 12 erew Bio-ehamber itself is to be a deployable system that will
eontain 120 to 140 eubie meters of &n-owing spaee.
A smaller setf-eontained system is included in the beginning cargo mass allotment
for the first manned Mars mission, but was not considered to be a main consumable
supply system. That is, for the purposes of this study, the original Bio-ehamber was not
eounted on to supply a significant amount of food and water. It was to aet as a
prototype for determining the best chamber operations, for psychological relief, food
variety and to investigate methods of food storage and waste disposal. Both Bio-
chambers will use a variety of methods of gTowing various erops in order to increase erop
production reliability. These will include, but not be limited to hydroponics, artifieial
soil, and natural soil For this study, it was considered that there would be no si&mifieant
eontribution to the consumables by the large Bio-ehamber until three months after its
initial deployment. This would allow time to checkout the systems, plant the crops and
have the first harvest series.
5.3 MARS RESUPPLY AND EVOLUTION CONSUMABLES WITH BIO-CHAMBER
SUPPORT
Figure 5-1 shows the schedule for establishing a Mars base through two single 6 crew
manned missions evolving to extended, overlapping missions each of 6 crew that place 12
crew at Mars continuously. Also shown on this schedule are the supporting cargo flights,
both to establish the base (first three cargo flights), cargo / base resupply flights and the
12-crew Bio-chamber flight. All of these cargo flights were considered to be 50 tonnes
delivered to the surfaee. The length of the missions, the duration of stay and transit
times, and the relationship of mission opportunities is based on relative generie
opportunities, with the exception of the first two missions. The first two missions are
based on the current 2011 and 2014 missions, the rest are relative opportunities in which
the actual dates of departure and arrival, the staytime and mission overlap are to be
determined.
Eaeh of the cargo mission has listed the amount of eargo mass (50 t.) and what
portion of that is devoted to consumables. The basis for these numbers is given in
figure 5-2. Note again that the required amount eonsumables is impacted by the large
Bio-ehamber only after it has been deployed three months. This figure give an
aeeounting of the eonsumables and their use throughout evolution transitions. At the
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Cargo/Resupply
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Consum- Brought
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Fhghts (kg) M0ss,on at m,ss=on ables used
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%total/kq ables(kg) ablesdays supported
0 26.000 1.083 6
1 -- 26,000 1,083 14,400 0 11,600 483 6
1 30.000 0 41.600 1.733 6
1 _ 41.600 1.733 12.288 0 29.312 1.221 6
30.000
40.000
m 0 59,312 2,471 6
40,000
40,000
59.312 2.471 19.200 40%three 46.928 1.955 6
(600 days months
tn=t,al a_er stag
m,sslon. 6.816
200 day
ex'tens=on)
86,928 1,811 28,800 40% 69,648 1,451 12
(600 days) 11.520
69,648 1,451 38,400 40% 46,608 971 12
15.360
86.608 1.804 28.800 40% 69.328 1.444 12
11.520
69.328 1.444 38.400 40% 46.288 964 12
15.360
86,288 1,798 28.800 40% 69,008 1,437 12
11,520
4 kg/day/person = 2 5 kg water
07 kg dry food
06 a_r/packagtng/other
B_o-chambercontr,but=ons = 1 6kg/day/person@40%total)
(_1 0 kg water & 0 6 kg food)
Figure 5-2. Mars Evolution Missions Surface Consumables with Bio-Charnber Support
time the permanent oeeupaney and crew exchanges are established, the consumables that
need to be resupplied and the bio-ehamber contributions have almost leveled off. There
is a slight decrease in the amount of consumables on hand as the missions progress, but
not a rapid drop. The resupply requirement becomes almost stable. While an additional
cargo flight may eventually be needed, it is not something that must be done this early in
the program. This ean be seen more clearly in the bar chart of figure 5-3 and the line
chart of figure 5-4.
5.4 MARS RESUPPLY AND EVOLUTION CONSUMABLES WITHOUT BIO-CHAMBER
SUPPORT
Figure 5-5 is the same flight series depicted in figure 5-1, except there is no Bio-
chamber flight. The total mass allotment for each cargo flight now must be dedicated to
resupply consumables for the permanent base. Even this is not enough to maintain both
the permanent base and the safety reserve. Additional supplies must be brought on the
manned mission flights using mass that would normally go to base equipment. The
inventory numbers are shown in figure 5-6. Reviewing these numbers indicates that the
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Figure 5-3. Mars Consumables Resupply with Big-Chamber
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Figure 5-4. Mars Resupply without Big-Chamber
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resupply operation is not stable. Despite the fact that the initial consumable reserves
are greater than with the Big-chamber mission, the they deplete faster with this
scenario. Soon after the missions depicted here an additional consumables resupp[y
mission must be sent to make up the dwindling reserves. This ean be seen in the bar
chart of figure 5-7 and the line chart of figure 5-8.
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Figure 5-6. Mars Evolution Missions Surface Consumables with Bio-Chamber Support
5.5 RESULTS
This initial results indieated that the Bio-ehamber will be important for permanent
Mars oeeupaney. Without it the eonsumables use all the eargo flight eapaeity at one
eargo flight per mission. This was the assigned eargo flight requirement after the initial
base buildup. No additional base buildup equipment, faeilities or spares ean be sent
under these eireumstanees. A true spares assessment was not done for this study and it
is possible that with sueh an assessment that two eargo flights per manned mission may
be required. It is probable that an additional spares/equipment flight will not help the
eonsumables problem and indeed, part of the equipment flight will be devoted to
eonsumables. The impaet of the eonsumables, spares,base buildup equipment and
faeilities must be eonsidered together to get a true pieture of the Mars evolution
program requirements. This includes a review of the risks and abort seenarios that will
be incurred in the program scenario, including the placement of additional landers/
ascent vehicles, repair capability and on-orbit consumable caches.
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6.0 LOW THRUST TRAJECTORY CHARACTERISTICS
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND METHOD
This seetion was adapted from Boeing IR&D work aimed at developing better
methods for mission profile analysis. It illuminates certain characteristics of low-thrust
trajectories that are not generally appreciated. These characteristics lead to a means
of approximate analysis of low-thrust profiles using delta V and trip time, without the
necessity of using a low-thrust path optimizer for every mission profile to be analyzed.
The approximations are about as good as those typically used for high-thrust profile
analysis.
Generally, the heliocentric trajectory that is followed by a transportation vehicle
utilizing low-thrust propulsion is similar to the trajectory of a vehicle which is propelled
with a high-thrust system. A sample of each category of trajectory is shown in
figure 6-1. Wile the low-thrust trajectory is more of a spiral, the actual shape of the
path is determined by the amount of time spent burning and coasting throughout the trip.
Typical optimal low-thrust paths have thrusting periods for planetary departure and
arrival and a coast in between. If the path passes closer to the Sun than either planet, a
third thrusting period during perihelion passage may be optimal. This is analogous to the
use of a "deep-space maneuver" by a high-thrust system. As the percentage of the trip
time spent burning decreases (corresponding to an increase in the percentage of the trip
spent eoasting) the low thrust trajectory begins to approximate a high-thrust path. This
is due to the fact that the burns are becoming more nearly instantaneous, the assumption
made for high-thrust trajectory analysis.
Another property of low-thrust trajectories is called the Tsien Limit. This result
states that for a given opportunity of a low-thrust mission, as the trip time increase the
cost (in terms of delta velocity) of the mission approaches the difference in velocity
between the departing and arrival planets. The Tsien limit is strictly true only for
circular, coplanar planetary paths but is a good approximation to the "very low thrust"
limit for aetual interplanetary trajeetories sinee they are nearly circular and coplanar.
Actual low-thrust paths between Earth and Mars approach the Tsien limit for one-way
heliocentric trip times of about 500 day or more.
For shorter trips, i.e., those in the range of interest, the delta V becomes highly
sensitive to trip time. As trip time is reduced, the delta V increases and the ability of
the low-thrust system to deliver delta V decreases (since it can only deliver a certain
amount of delta V per unit time). At some point the trends cross; the low-thrust system
must thrust constantly st this point and no shorter trip time is possible.
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The approaeh discussed here depends on isolating those characteristics of low-thrust
systems that affect the delta V and ignoring second-order variances. It turns out that
the important characteristics are the positions of the planets ( the boundary eonditions),
the transfer time, and the percentage of time spent delivering thrust.
Low-thrust systems delta V, as for high-thrust systems, is relatively insensitive to
[sp. As usually analyzed, low-thrust systems appear sensitive to lap. This is because as
lsp is increased ( for example), the thrust available at fixed electrical power is decreased
and the percentage of trip time required to deliver the neeessary delta V increases. The
truly important parameter is thrusting tie fraction, not lap. We demonstrated that by
comparing trajeetories where [sp and power per unit mass were both doubled, leading to
essentially eonstant thrusting time. The delta Vs were nearly the same.
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The key to the method is the use of contour plots, a method often used in STCAEM
for high-thrust trajectories. On STCAEM we have strongly advocated the use of contour
plots because they reveal a great many important features of a mission profile "at a
glance" which are not revealed by the usual method of calculating optimal mission
profile dates and paths.
6.2 COMPARISON OF LOW-THRUST AND HIGH-THRUST CONTOUR PIAYI_
While a low-thrust can, at times, approximate a high-thrust trajectory, the contour
plots associated with each trajectory type are very different. A contour plot gives the
launch date and trip time required to reach the destination with a certain delta velocity
for a particular opportunity. A sample low-thrust contour plot is shown in figure 6-2
while figure 6-3 illustrates a typical high-thrust contour plot. Both figures represent
delta velocity data for the same opportunity and represent one-way trajectories from
Earth to Mars. The most notable and significant difference between the two figures is
that the high-thrust contour is closed (has ridges) whereas the low-thrust contour is open
(has elbows). With a high-thrust mission there is a specific window (launch window)
corresponding to a certain delta velocity. In other words, for a given launch date there
is a finite number of arrival dates (or trip times) which will yield a specific delta
velocity.
In contrast to a high-thrust mission, the contour plots associated with low-thrust
trajectories are open. This means that, if the mission trip time is not a concern, any
delta velocity down to the Tsien limit can be achieved with any departure date. For low-
thrust missions there is no real launch window or constraint (which is definitely not true
for high-thrust missions). In general, for a given launch date, as the trip time increases
the delta velocity associated with the trajectory goes down. According to the Tsien
Limit (discussed in the previous section) the minimum delta velocity for a specific
departure date will be the difference in velocity between the launch and arrival planet.
The great difference between low-thrust and high-thrust profiles is immediately
evident from the contour plots, as are such things as the optimum departure and arrival
dates, the dependence of delta V on trip time and deviation from optimal dates, and the
"open" verus "closed" characteristic.
6.3 TRENDING OF DELTA VELOCITY WITH TRIP TIME AND BURN TIME FRACTION
Trends of how the delta velocity changes with trip time and burn time fraction for a
given low-thrust mission opportunity can be determined using the low-thrust contour
plots described in the preceding paragraphs. Information regarding delta velocity, trip
time, and burn time fraction can be taken form the contour plots and erossplotted on a
temporary graph ( an example of this is shown in figure 6-4). A third plot is then created
using the crossplot to show how the delta velocity for a given opportunity is affected by
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ehanging trip times and burn time fraction. A typical sample of this plot is shown in
figure 6-5. The trend that is shown in this figure is the delta velocity increases with
increasing burn time fraction and decreases with increasing trip times. This result
makes sense in that the larger the burn time fraction corresponds to a larger amount of
propellant being used for the entire trip. Additionally, at the trip time decreases the
associated delta veloeity increases due to more propellant being required to make fast
trips. A graph similar to figure 6-5 is show in figure 6-6 for a different low-thrust
mission opportunity. It is apparent that the same trends shown in figure 6-5 can be seen
in figure 6-6. The delta velocity increases with increasing burn time fraction and
decreasing trip time. The sharp valleys present in figure 6-6 are due to inaccuracies in
reading the initial low-thrust contour plot and the subsequent erossplots for which the
data is generated by "eyeballing _' the contour plots. There is every indication that if the
data were more aeeurate, the curves shown in figure 6-6 would look very similar to those
for the different opportunity shown in figure 6-5. Figure 6-7 shows a low-thrust contour
plot for the subsequent Earth-Mars opportunity.
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